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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis tackles the challenges confronting irrigated agricultural practice at the local 
scale in developing country, focusing on water institutional arrangements under water 
scarcity that shapes contestation of day-to-day water use among stakeholders. To 
address this, new approaches must be developed and sensitive to the uncertainty and 
complexity of water resources if they are to meet the needs for sustainable agricultural 
water management. Thus, the thesis’s analytical framework employs particular strands 
of the voluminous literature on governance alongside insights from the literature on 
sociospatial relations as its main explanatory concepts to provide complimentary 
analytical functions, in terms of clarifying local political priorities for water 
(sociospatial relations), and in identifying the decisionmaking and decisiontaking 
activities at other levels and scales that intimately affect these localised politics 
(governance approaches). A case study in north west Thailand was selected to develop 
practical recommendations for achieving more equitable and effective water 
management practice that is sensitive to local socio-economic and environmental 
change, and addresses the needs of multiple stakeholders. Data collection methods 
comprised: (i) 192 face-to-face in-depth semi-structured interviews with key actors; (ii) 
20 questionnaires distributed to actors from Joint Management Committee for Irrigation 
(JMC); (iii) four group discussions with actors from a state-led irrigation project; and 
(iv) 20 remote interviews with four administrator groups. The result reveals that in the 
context of developing country where the continuing hegemony of a command and 
control approach to water policy, such as Thailand, space and scale shapes politics and 
interactions among actors over water use. Therefore, the thesis concludes that ‘middle 
ground’ organization is very much important to facilitate collaboration of actors across 
scales and levels, and also a strategic policy goal to encourage more sustainable 
agricultural water management, set against the pragmatic reality of escalating future 
demand for water from multiple users at different levels and scales.    
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Study context 
Water constitutes a vitally important biological resource and is a critical component of 
any human development strategy. Consequently, sustainable water management is 
increasingly regarded as a necessity (Loucks, 2000; Richter et al., 2003; Mollinga, 
2008; Schelwald-van der Kley and Reijerkerk, 2009; Flint, 2010; Grigg, 2011). 
Although ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable management’ are both vague and often 
politicized terms (Lant, 2004), particularly with regard to water, the basic concept – of 
guaranteeing sufficient water to support socio-economic and cultural activities from 
generation to generation – is undeniably important. Thus, organizations from global 
through national to sub-national scales have adopted the same normative goal of 
managing water resources to achieve sustainability (Koudstaal, et al., 1992; Rahaman 
and Varis, 2005; Molden et al., 2007; Allabadi, 2012). Accordingly, my intention in 
this thesis is to examine the conditions under which a transition to more sustainable 
water management practice can be achieved across multiple scales, focusing on the 
developing country context of Thailand. In this introduction, I begin by considering the 
prevailing models and approaches used to achieve sustainable water management. In 
order to contextualize my case study, particular attention is paid to agricultural water 
management under irrigation systems in the developing world.  
 
This Chapter proceeds as follows. The first section describes the current context of 
global water scarcity and its effects on agriculture. In it, I consider the role of irrigation 
as a management approach that seeks to address the impacts of seasonal and interannual 
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hydrological variability. I then examine one of the principal approaches for encouraging 
more sustainable management of water resources, Integrated Water Resource 
Management (IWRM), its evolution and the recent elaboration of more specific water 
governance concepts which are largely complimentary to IWRM. These governance 
concepts are considered in detail in Chapter 2. The contextual debates on IWRM and 
governance approaches provide the background for establishing the thesis aim and 
objectives, which are discussed in the second section. The thesis structure is then 
outlined, with the chapter-by-chapter elaboration of my argument.     
 
1.2 Water management dilemmas in developing countries 
Water plays a pivotal role in sustainable development, poverty reduction and 
maintaining healthy ecosystems (Flint, 2010; UN-Water, 2010). The use, abuse, and 
competition for increasingly scarce water resources has intensified dramatically over the 
past decade, reaching a point where water shortages are seriously affecting prospects for 
economic and social development, as well as political stability (UNDP, 2008; FAO, 
2012). With water management now playing such an influential role in social 
development, domestic stability and international security, there have been increasing 
demands placed on governments to assume responsibility for, inter alia, determining 
appropriate forms of water management, intervening in water abstraction disputes 
among water users, ensuring year-round access to water reducing conflict over ‘water 
politics’, and preserving ecosystem balance (Johnson and Handmer, 2002; Rogers and 
Hall, 2003; Petersen et al., 2009). Governments’ assumption of these responsibilities is 
arguably most pressing in the developing world, where agriculture has a direct impact 
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on socio-economic growth prospects (The World Bank, 2006; Namara et al., 2010, 
OECD, 2010). 
 
Global water demand has been increasing at more than twice the rate of population 
growth over the last century, and a growing number of regions are now reaching the 
limit at which water services can be sustainably delivered (Rockström et al., 2009; 
UNESCO, 2012; UNEP, 2012). This has led to increasing pressure on water resources 
and greater political tensions and conflicts among users, as well as often excessive 
demands on associated natural resources (Flint, 2010; FAO, 2012). 
1.2.1 Global water scarcity and agriculture 
 
The major driver of these political tensions is water scarcity. Water scarcity has several 
dimensions (Molden et al., 2007; UN-Water, 2006). The first is lack of availability of 
fresh water of acceptable quality with respect to aggregate demand, that is, a simple 
case of physical water shortage (FAO, 2012). It occurs when water availability is less 
than 1,000 cubic metres per capita per year (Rijsberman, 2006; Pereira et al., 2009). 
UN-Water (2006) and FAO (2012) estimates that by 2025, 1.8 billion people are likely 
to be living in countries or regions with ‘absolute’ water scarcity (less than 500 cubic 
metres per capita per year), and two-thirds of the world population could be under 
‘stress’ conditions (between 500 and 1,000 cubic metres per capita per year). The 
second dimension of water scarcity is lack of access to water services as a result of the 
failure of relevant public and private institutions in countries to ensure reliable water 
supplies (FAO, 2007; Namara et al, 2010). Third, water scarcity also arises due to 
inadequate infrastructure, irrespective of the abundance of water resources, because of 
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insufficient investment or other financial constraints (FAO, 2007; Molle and Floch, 
2008; FAO, 2012).  
 
The first instance of water scarcity arises chiefly because of climate change-related 
impacts which are affecting the global hydrological cycle in many ways, including 
change in the volume, intensity, and variability of precipitation (Fischer et al., 2007; 
Arnell et al., 2011; Nan et al., 2011). Change in the frequency and distribution of 
rainfall is associated with more frequent, severe flooding and drought in many regions 
(Zhou et al., 2012; Vrochidou et al., 2013). These adverse climate change-related 
impacts on freshwater systems have already resulted in 2.4 billion people living in 
“highly water–stressed areas” (Oki and Kanae, 2006, p.1069).  In the other two 
instances of water scarcity, countries may have relatively high levels of water resource 
endowment, but are unable to capture and distribute this water because of limited 
financial resources for infrastructure development or lack of institutional capacity to 
maintain or manage them appropriately; a situation confronting many of the world’s 
developing countries (FAO, 2007; Molle and Floch, 2008; FAO, 2012). 
 
In developing countries particularly, water scarcity has serious implications for 
agricultural activities, the main objective of which is to establish domestic food 
security. Globally, agriculture accounts for about 75 percent of the world’s annual 
freshwater consumption (Figure 1.1) or about 3.5 million cubic metres (The World 
Bank, 2004; UNDP 2008; The Water Project, 2011), with this sector’s success crucial in 
achieving global poverty reduction targets (Byerlee et al., 2009; Christiaensen, 2011). 
Hence, water for agriculture is by far the largest category of human use of available 
5 
 
water resources (Harrington, 2009; UNESCO, 2012). Particularly in the developing 
world, withdrawals of locally available fresh water flows for agriculture can reach 90 
percent of total water flow (Postel and Vickers 2004; UNDP 2008; UNEP, 2012). 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Trends in global water use by sector 
Source: Shiklomanov (1999) (Cited in UNEP, 2008) 
 
In the developing world especially, water scarcity has serious implications for national 
economic and social development, as well as for political stability (UNDP, 2008). At 
the local scale in these countries, day-to-day activities are predicated on water scarcity 
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(Rockström et al., 2007).  Small farmers and the rural poor are often significantly 
disadvantaged by lack of access to water for production purposes, entrenching poverty 
and promoting ‘water insecurity’ situations (Qadir et al., 2003; Forouzani and Karami, 
2010). In other words, rural populations frequently do not have access to water to 
satisfy their needs for either food security or sustainable livelihoods, a situation 
exacerbated increasingly by their having to compete for water with urban residents and 
industries (Rosegrant et al., 2002; Molden et al., 2007).  
 
Moreover, rising global population and changing dietary habits among the affluent 
middle classes in the BRICS1
there will be for agricultural water to supply food production needs (de Fraiture et al., 
2007; Harrington, 2009). Agricultural water directly addresses domestic food security 
and also offers quality of life development (Molden et al., 2007).  
 is also affecting water consumption by global agriculture, 
as confirmed in recent reports from international organizations (World Water Council, 
2012). Thus by 2050, the global population is expected to have increased to 8.9 billion, 
86 percent of whom will live in developing countries and 70 percent in rapidly growing 
urban areas (Population Division, 2004; Rosegrant et al., 2009; Bendorf, 2010). Yet 
water demand already exceeds supply in nearly 80 countries around the world, with 
water scarcity affecting more than 40 percent of the world’s population (Qadir et al., 
2003). It is thus inevitable that the more global population increases, the more demand 
 
                                                             
1
 An association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa  
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However, one does not have to look to future demand projections to identify water 
scarcity. Current demand from agriculture is already causing water shortages across the 
developing world, with a variety of studies confirming that this sector typically uses 
more water than that consumed for domestic purposes (around 20 percent) or industrial 
use (around five percent) (see for example Shiklomanov, 1999; The World Bank, 2004; 
UNDP, 2008). There is thus a pressing need for agricultural water use to be much better 
integrated with current and projected future water demand from municipal and 
industrial sectors (UNEP, 2012). Agricultural water scarcity has the potential to become 
a pivotal, indeed the key, limiting factor in food production and livelihood generation 
among the rural poor across Africa, south-east Asia and central and south America, 
where national governments are increasingly confronted with growing and 
unsustainable water demand from users of all kinds (Rijsberman, 2006; FAO, 2012). 
Consequently, agricultural water scarcity is heavily implicated in global poverty 
(Namara et al., 2010).  
 
Inevitably, the tensions and pressures between rural and urban water users and between 
rural stakeholders (agriculture, tourism, industry) promote water conflict (Flint, 2010). 
To address this, new approaches to water allocation and delivery must be developed, 
utilizing natural and technological mechanisms along with social mechanisms in 
decision making for water resource arrangements (Poff et al., 2003; Qadir et al., 2003). 
In turn, these new approaches must be sensitive to the uncertainty and complexity of 
water resources if they are to meet the needs for sustainable agricultural water 
management that is economically viable, ecologically sound and socially responsible 
(Forouzani and Karami, 2011).  
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The following section considers the role of agricultural water management technology, 
focusing on irrigation systems and their limitations. I then focus on social science 
approaches which have been used to conceptualize water resource management issues at 
different geographic scales and levels, since a main cause of water scarcity arises from 
the problem of multiple organizational involvement in the struggle to distribute 
resources equitably (FAO, 2012). The approaches considered here are integrated water 
resources management (IWRM) and water governance, which examines how 
institutional functions and how water allocation and supply decisions affect farmers’ 
livelihoods. It is also relevant to choices on infrastructure development for water and the 
way these structures are managed.  
 
1.3 The role of irrigation systems in agricultural water management 
Although it is certainly possible to enhance rain-fed production in ‘normal’ seasons, if 
there is no rain, then there is no agriculture, bringing us back to the importance of 
irrigation (Turral et al., 2010). Indeed, irrigation continues to be the main water use 
globally (Lopez-Gunn and Llamas, 2008). Irrigation is an adaptation to rainfall 
variability on a seasonal and annual basis as it allows the impacts of seasonal and 
interannual hydrological variability on agriculture to be smoothed out (Turral et al., 
2010; Schneekloth et al., 2009). Typically this is done by making connections between 
sub-systems in agricultural water use, including storage, conveyance, and distribution-
off and on-farm (Pereira et al., 2002).   
 
Apart from the central role played by irrigation in boosting agricultural productivity 
under conditions of climate change, irrigated systems are instrumental in providing food 
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security; approximately 40 percent of the world’s food is derived from less than 20 
percent of its utilized agricultural area (Siebert et al., 2005; Fereres and Soriano, 2007; 
Hanjra and Qureshi, 2010). Moreover, irrigated agriculture benefits farmers and the 
rural poor by improving living standards, particularly in rural areas affected by water 
scarcity (Rijsberman, 2006; Faurès et al., 2007). In effect, irrigation provides the 
backbone of rural economies in the developing world as it is a potent mechanism for 
increasing household income and generating employment (IPTRID, 1999; Smith, 2004; 
Chen and Facon, 2005; Turral et al., 2010). 
 
Consequently investing in irrigation infrastructure and extension activities is 
particularly important in developing countries and in Asia especially, where it accounts 
for over 70 percent of the world’s irrigated area, and is home to some of the oldest and 
largest irrigation schemes (Mukherji et al., 2010). Turral et al. (2010) reveal that Asian 
governments have been the key investors in large-scale irrigation development since the 
late 19th century, including irrigation and drainage development, modernization, 
institutional reform, capacity building, creation of farmer organizations, and regulatory 
oversight. Across south-east Asia, farmers in irrigated areas often play important roles 
in participating in the investment in joint facilities, wells, and on-farm water storage and 
irrigation equipment. In small-scale irrigation, communities throughout Asia have 
collectively invested over many years and traditional management arrangements, 
evolved over centuries, continue in use today (Coward, 1980; Chambers, 1989; Barker 
and Molle, 2004; Mukherji et al., 2009). Equally important, there has been widespread 
emergence of private groundwater exploitation since the early 1980s, which has become 
the dominant form of irrigation in many south-east Asian countries as it is either the 
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sole means of providing year-round water supplies, or provides greater flexibility in 
conjunctive use with use of surface irrigation systems (Barker and Molle, 2002). 
 
The development of irrigation systems in Asia continues to grow. The construction of 
major irrigation infrastructures (Gleick, 2002) demonstrates the importance of physical 
solutions, such as building dams and reservoirs to capture, store, and move ever-larger 
fractions of freshwater run-off (Gleick, 2000). These allow irrigation management to be 
pursued as has been practiced in many regions in the world, though invariably at the 
expense of considering basic principles of resource conservation and sustainability 
(Fereres and Soriano, 2007). This is partly due to the inability of engineers, planners 
and managers to adequately quantify the effects of irrigation and drainage projects on 
water resources, and to use these effects as guidelines for improving technology, design 
and management (Schultz and De Wrachien, 2002). At the same time, increasing levels 
of irrigation increases water costs and, ultimately may exacerbate problems of water 
scarcity in some regions (Sauer et al., 2010). They can be attributed essentially to poor 
planning, design, system management and development.  
 
Wilson (2002) criticizes such physical solutions and demonstrates that they are facing 
increasing opposition, chiefly because of their failure to consider wider environmental, 
economic, and social impacts or to adequately address the uncertainties inherent in 
complex natural systems. Additionally, Smith (2004) comments that there are also 
significant risks that badly designed and managed irrigation can negatively impact on 
poverty. Chambers’s study (2013, p.156) confirms these by pointing out that farmers, 
particularly in South Asia, often suffer from ignorance and blind spots of the main 
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system management of canal irrigation systems (oversupply of water in head reaches 
and little and unreliable supply or none at all in lower reaches). The result is that such 
‘solutions’ often create more difficult water resource problems than were encountered in 
the first place. Furthermore, traditional ‘top-down’ or hierarchical systems of water 
management rely on techno-scientific fields of knowledge that have been ‘hard-wired’  
into governing institutions to have as much control as possible over natural processes, 
with the incentives not aligned with broader goals of sustainability (Smith, 2008; Reed 
and Bruyneel, 2010; Lawhon and Murphy, 2011). Employing ‘technological fixes’ 
might appear very efficient in the short run in solving water management problems, but 
long-term consequences are not taken into consideration (Gleick, 2003).  
 
While examination of formal water management institutions (ie. organizations, legal 
provisions) continues to develop, our understanding of the informal institutions that 
help shape the capacities of individuals and social groups to respond is still lacking, 
because water knowledge has been overwhelmingly dominated by applied and natural 
sciences to control or regulate water regimes for economic development (Molle et al., 
2008; Lankford and Hepworth, 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011). Thus, water norms and 
beliefs crafted to fit one set of socio-cultural conditions can erode as social, economic, 
and technological developments increase the potential for negative human impacts on 
water resources, as well as ways of evading formal rules (Dietz et al., 2003). This can 
cause problems between different stakeholders, particularly farmers and policy makers 
and practitioners, and between farmers and non-agricultural water users (Molle et al., 
2008). As Barker and Molle (2002, p.22) reflect: “The theme of conflict runs through – 
conflict in the goals of equity and productivity, conflict among professionals as to how 
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systems should be designed, and conflict between irrigation bureaucracies and local 
administrations in the management of systems”. Water scarcity is thus a social as much 
as a technological problem and could be viewed as a chronic ‘wicked problem’ that is 
hard to solve (Pereira et al., 2009; Rosegrant et al., 2009; Cominelli and Tonelli, 2010). 
Thus Molle and Floch (2008, p.112) reveal that “water scarcity is constructed and 
reflects the disconnection between politically motivated projects and hydrologic 
reality”. They also state that farmers tend to be those most affected as they reflect, 
“Throughout the entire period…farmers have had very little say in the design and 
management of public irrigation systems”.  
 
Mollinga (2008, p.11-12) considers these problems in his study of social behaviour and 
interaction, which examines how humans have intervened in the water cycle over time 
and/ or spatial characteristics of water availability and/or its quantities. For Mollinga, 
water management is a form of politically contested natural resource management, 
comprising technical/physical controls, organizational/managerial controls and socio-
economic and regulatory controls. Each of these requires careful scrutiny and 
monitoring to ensure effective water management and successful implementation of 
water use regulation. Thus allocation of irrigation water quotas and rights constitutes an 
important part of “the everyday politics of water resource management”, as it shapes 
contestation of day-to-day water use among stakeholders. From Mollinga’s perspective, 
the social relations of power that are part of irrigation need to be explicitly addressed. 
 
Therefore in tackling the challenges now confronting irrigated agricultural practice in 
developing countries, there needs to be much greater emphasis on human needs, 
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conditions and institutional arrangements (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Lopez-Gunn and 
Llamas, 2008; Turral et al., 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2011). One such approach is 
integrated water resources management (IWRM), now widely accepted internationally 
as the way forward for efficient, equitable and sustainable development and 
management of the world’s limited water resources (Rahaman and Varis, 2005; Hooper, 
2006; UN-Water, 2007; Leidel et al., 2012). 
 
1.4 Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) and water governance in 
developing countries 
IWRM is an approach with a long history (according to some, originating in the 
experiences of implementing the US’s Tennessee Valley Authority some eighty years 
ago), but has only come to prominence in the developing country context over the last 
couple of decades. Specifically two conferences held in 1992 on water and 
environmental issues in Dublin and Rio de Janeiro emphasized how ‘water problems’ in 
the developing world were increasing interconnected with other development-related 
issues and also with social, economic, environmental, legal, and political factors at local 
and national levels, and regional and international scales (A1 Radif, 1999; TAC, 2000; 
Biswas, 2004; Engle et al., 2011). Thus IWRM attempts to grapple with multi-sectoral 
and multi-regional interests and multiple causes and variables affecting water quality 
and quantity, which can be resolved only through proper multi-institutional and multi-
stakeholder coordination (Biswas, 2008; Petit and Baron, 2009; Kalbus et al., 2012).  
 
At international scale, since 2000 the Global Water Partnership (GWP) has become 
involved in water policy and has provided its own definition of IWRM as follows: 
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“IWRM is a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and management of 
water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems” (TAC, 2000, p.22). This definition emphasizes the reality of water as an 
integral part of ecosystem viability and integrity, a natural resource and a social and 
economic good, whose quantity and quality determine the nature of its utilization (A1 
Radif, 1999; Bandaradoga, 2006; Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 2012). It also acknowledges the 
importance of policy options that recognize these elements, develop national water 
policies and base the demand for and allocation of water resources on grounds of equity 
and efficient use, as well as to achieve the desired balance between equity, environment 
and economics – in effect,  the ‘three pillars’ of IWRM (Sadoff and Muller, 2009) (see 
Figure 1.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Economic efficiency 
 
Equity 
 
Environmental sustainability 
Management instruments 
- Water resources assessment 
- Plans for IWRM 
- Demand management 
- Social change instruments 
- Conflict resolutions 
- Regulatory instruments 
- Economic instruments 
- Information management and 
exchange 
Enabling Environment 
- Policies 
- Legislative framework 
- Financing and incentive 
structures 
 
 
 
Balance ‘water for livelihood’ and ‘water as a resource’ 
Institutional framework 
- Creating an organizational 
framework 
- Institutional capacity 
building 
Figure 1.2: The ‘three pillars’ of Integrated Water Resources Management 
Source: Adapted from Global Water Partnership (GWP) (2004) and Jønch-
Clausen (2004) 
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According to proponents of this approach, the benefits to policymakers of adopting 
IWRM in planning irrigation water management are fourfold (Savenije and Van der 
Zaag, 2008). First is that IWRM obliges policy makers to take the entire hydrological 
cycle into account, including stock and flows, as well as water quantity and water 
quality; distinguishing, for example, rainfall, soil moisture, water in rivers, lakes, and 
aquifers in wetlands and estuaries, and considering also return flows. Secondly it 
emphasises the diverse needs of all water users, not simply economic interests and 
stakeholders. Third is that this approach recognises the importance of spatial scale, 
including the spatial distribution of water resources and uses (e.g. well-watered 
upstream watersheds and arid plains downstream), and the various geographic scales at 
which water is managed, i.e. individual user, user groups (e.g. user boards), watershed, 
catchment, (international) basin; and the institutional arrangements that exist at these 
various scales. Lastly, IWRM implicitly acknowledges the temporal scale; taking into 
account the temporal variation in availability of and demand for water resources, but 
also the physical structures that have been built to even out fluctuations, and to better 
match water supply with demand. Therefore, the importance of institutional issues and 
governance structures is emphasized (McDonnell, 2008). 
 
The major challenge of IWRM is to set up a structure of cooperative management that 
goes beyond the usual focus of government committees, regulatory agencies and special 
interest groups, to take into account all actors and the potential ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in 
water management (Hering and Ingold, 2012).  IWRM has already proved influential in 
irrigation practice in developing countries (Turral et al., 2010), leading, for example, to 
the development of Participatory Irrigation Management (PIM). This governance 
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approach is now recognized as an important component of reforms in the irrigation 
sector, and has been adopted both in developed and developing countries as it refers to 
the involvement of irrigation users in all aspects of irrigation management, and at all 
levels; from the field channel to the entire system (Peter, 2004; Kono et al., 2012). For 
example, farmers can be involved in various management functions, including planning, 
design, operations, maintenance, rehabilitation, resource mobilization, and conflict 
resolution (Svendsen et al., 1997; Dung and Shivagoti, 2008; Mohan and Reddy, 2012).  
 
Most developing countries, particularly in Asia, have adopted PIM to encourage greater 
involvement of farmers on irrigation, focusing on operation and maintenance (O&M) 
(Ayranci and Temizel, 2011; Kumnerdpet and Sinclair, 2011).  For example, in Pakistan 
Latif and Tariq (2009)’s study reveal that the government in the North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) established an autonomous body, the Frontier Irrigation and Drainage 
Authority (FIDA), in 1997 to effectively cope with the emerging participatory 
challenges in irrigation management. Six water basins were recently transferred to 
farmers’ organizations under the irrigation management transfer (IMT) for their 
operation and management. Newly formed institutions have been organized in three 
tiers, including Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority (PIDA), Area Water Boards 
(AWB), and Farmers’ Organizations (FOs) and Khal Punchyat (KP), to link irrigation 
management at the provincial level with the national canal network and with national 
farmers’ organizations in order to address the requirements of PIM in the country 
(Ayranci and Temizel, 2011).  Latif and Tariq (2009) conclude that after adopting PIM, 
irrigation supplies are now adequate to meet the farmers and crop water requirements.  
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In China, Huang et al. (2009) reveal that almost half of the Water User Associations 
(WUAs) manage irrigation systems in a more transparent way as they encourage board 
members to share management information with water users. This is because China has 
realized fairly quickly the need for institutional reforms towards IWRM (Bandaragoda, 
2006). One of the main reforms is the Self-Financing Irrigation and Drainage Districts 
(SIDD), supporting farmer participation in local irrigation management, focusing on 
creating and maintaining a ‘virtuous circle’ of water delivery in irrigation districts to 
achieve sustainable use of water resources for agricultural development (Ayranci and 
Temizel, 2011).  SIDD is structured mainly in two integrated parts: a water supply 
corporation (WSC) or organization (WSO) serving as water supplier from the main 
headwork, and the water user associations (WUAs) operating as the farmers’ own water 
use organization taking care of the lower distribution network on the ground (Huang et 
al., 2009). Most WUAs have proven to be successful in terms of enhanced efficiency of 
local system operation and maintenance and increased benefits to farmers, and have 
been satisfied with the benefits of applying the Participatory approach (Ayranci and 
Temizel, 2011). 
 
Similarly, most of the major states in India emphasize decentralization of water 
management and empowerment of water users, by encouraging the farmers to form 
WUAs to take over the responsibility of operation and maintenance of downstream 
parts of the irrigation system, distribute water among water users, and collect water 
rates (Swain and Das, 2008). Irrigation management transfer is being practiced under 
the broader framework of participatory irrigation management through the 
implementation of the Water Resources Management and Training Project of the 
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Government of India, supported by the United States Agency for International 
Development, and most of the state governments in India have now made policy 
decisions and enacted exclusive legislation to implement PIM (Ayranci and Temizel, 
2011). Hence, thousands of WUAs were formed and took responsibility for operation 
and maintenance, including the allocation of water among farmers and collection of 
water charges from water users.  
 
PIM in Turkey has sought to promote farmers’ participation in the construction and 
management of the irrigation systems since 1960s. With the management transfer to 
WUA, changes occurred in a positive direction in terms of utility, productivity and 
sustainability criteria (Uysal and Atiş, 2010). The state organization (State Hydraulic 
Works – DSI) has transferred most of the irrigation schemes to different types of 
organizations and also encouraged a participatory approach through establishing 
Irrigation Groups (IGs) or Water User Groups (WUGs) with responsibility for operation 
and maintenance (Kuşçu et al., 2008). 
 
In Sri Lanka, some positive results have been achieved nationally where PIM allows 
secondary or tertiary segments of irrigation schemes to be managed by farmer 
organizations, and small rural water supply schemes to be administered by community 
based organizations (Bandaragoda, 2006). Consequently, farmers’ active involvement in 
irrigation management, especially operation and maintenance decision-making has been 
identified as a key requirement to attain productivity goals and the sustainability of 
irrigation systems. Jinapala et al. (2010)’s study also concluded that participatory 
management in the country has clear benefits and should be continued and supported.  
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These examples demonstrate common characteristics of PIM, namely that hydrological 
management responsibility is shifted from a centralized government irrigation agency to 
a financially autonomous local-level non-profit organization which is either controlled 
by the water users of the irrigation system or in which water users have a substantial 
voice in the control process (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007; Hodgson, 2009). IWRM, 
then, helps balance stakeholder viewpoints (Grigg, 2008) and offers a number of entry 
points for increased adaptability in irrigation management (Herfahrdt-Pähle, 2012).   
 
Nonetheless, a more sceptical stance has been adopted recently to IWRM (Biswas, 
2004; Snellen and Schrevel, 2004; Pahl-Wostl and Sendzimir, 2005; Galaz, 2007; van 
der Keur et al., 2008; Biswas, 2008; Petit and Baron, 2009; Butterworth et al., 2010; 
Hering and Ingold, 2012). These criticisms focus on difficulty of implementation of 
IWRM, with claims that the approach is internally inconsistent, based only on 
neologisms and vague management concepts; that it offers no guidance for practitioners 
using the concept in their planning and decision-making; that it is based on normative 
claims rather than sound science and that there are few, if any, examples of successful 
implementation. In addition in developing countries, implementing PIM is made 
complex by having to integrate often extremely diverse knowledge sets and practices for 
water resource management, and having to grapple with varied institutional and 
organizational arrangements (Jacobs et al., 2010).  Furthermore in these countries there 
is often a strong separation of roles between ‘experts’ and managers with authority, and 
‘the people’, whereas increasingly researchers recognise that all participants are 
stakeholders within a broad arena of shared responsibility (Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Molle et 
al., 2008). Lebel et al. (2011, p.45-48) call this problematic portrayal of water 
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management responsibilities “institutional traps”, which ultimately may compromise 
these countries’ capacities to respond to current and future climate risks. They argue 
that “institutional traps” are the result of (i) bureaucratic fragmentation and competition 
leading to poor coordination, institutionalized incapacities and gaps in service provision 
(c.f. Bandaragoda, 2006; Allabadi, 2012); (ii) overemphasis on control, stability and 
elimination of uncertainties in management functions maintained by, and reinforcing, 
highly inter-connected and inflexible institutions; (iii) overly narrow concentration of 
resource capacities to a single level, ignoring benefits and management challenges of 
cross-scale interactions; (iv) elites deploying experts and technical tools in ways that 
serve their interests, not those of marginalized and vulnerable groups; and (v) a focus on 
reacting to emergencies and crises because of political pressures and opportunities’ 
made possible by absence of effective, strategic, longer-term planning. These could 
seriously compromise the functioning of many large-scale public irrigation schemes and 
weaken their water governance (Fishhendler, 2008). 
 
To be implementable, then, the IWRM approach requires closer attention to be paid to 
existing governance arrangements and how these need to change (Horlemann and 
Dombrosky, 2012; Hering and Inglold, 2012). In effect, IWRM relies upon governance 
as an essential means, a tool, and a goal with which to recast existing institutional 
arrangements for water in such a way as to create the conditions for sustainable 
irrigation management (Castro, 2007; Tropp, 2007; Uhlendahl et al., 2011). Allan and 
Rieu-Clarke (2010) mention that IWRM and ‘good governance’ is connected in three 
ways. Firstly, equity is seen as a uniting factor between IWRM and governance 
(Butterworth et al., 2010). Secondly, effective IWRM requires appropriate policy tools 
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for guaranteeing full participation, transparency and accountability in water 
management. Lastly, governance regimes help promote the core element of IWRM, that 
is for water stakeholders to work more closely with water management authorities. 
Certainly researchers have argued that the multi-dimensional and dynamic concept of 
governance is particularly appropriate for understanding the institutional requirements 
of sustainable forms of water management, as it embraces the relationship between 
societies and their governments (see for example Rogers and Hall, 2003; Kemp and 
Loorbach, 2003; Voß et al., 2006; Rist et al., 2007; Huitema et al., 2009; Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2010; Lebel, 2010). In particular, water governance can be seen as both the structure 
and a set of interrelated processes by which societies share power, balance interests, and 
shape individual and collective actions and practices for water allocation and 
distribution (Lebel et al., 2006; Salanes and Jouravlev, 2006; Franks and Cleaver, 2007; 
Godden et al., 2011). Governance thus comprises formal and informal rules, rule-
making systems and actor networks across all political-administrative levels (from local 
to global) that have the potential to shape decisions taken to mitigate and/or adapt to 
global and local environmental change, within the context of sustainable development 
(UNDP, 1997; Moench et al., 2003; UNDP, 2008; Sehring, 2009; Biermann et al., 
2010; Grigg, 2011).        
 
Even though a number of countries are now engaged in reforming their water 
institutions and policies, progress in nearly all cases has been somewhat slow and 
limited, and often unpredictable (Tortajada, 2010). Particularly in developing countries, 
such as Thailand, greater impetus for the adaptation of water institutions is needed 
(Rogers and Hall, 2003). The rise of water governance has brought examination of 
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politics into the mainstream of water resources management and development 
discourses. As a result, the lack of existing work that applies water governance to 
IWRM as a means of achieving sustainability in water management has been identified 
by many researchers (see for example Lebel et al., 2005; Molle et al., 2008; Ekstrom 
and Young, 2009; Lockwood, 2010; Tortajada, 2010). These researchers have specified 
areas where water governance may be pivotal in explaining the seeming difficulty in 
implementing IWRM. These include, inter alia,  (i) the emergence of polycentric 
governance, which might limit IWRM goals by creating pockets of fragmented, 
unrepresentative and undemocratic institutions and process; (ii) the practice of water 
networks (including co-management, and public-private-partnerships as typical 
examples of so-called ‘hybridized’ forms of governance) could be clarified through 
studies of routine successes and failures, enabling identification of best practice; (iii) 
illustration of contestation among stakeholders over the most appropriate scale of water 
management in study regions; (iv) the politics among stakeholders at different scales, 
positions and places, and its effect on transitioning to IWRM; and (v) identification of 
the role of institutional mechanisms in linking public water use with water uptake and 
circulation in ecosystems (Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 2006; Pahl-Wostl and 
Kranz, 2010).      
 
Further research is undoubtedly needed on all these issues, as current understandings of 
water governance are not by any means strong enough to bring about transitions to more 
sustainable water management (Biermann et al., 2012). In this context, one promising 
approach recently identified is adaptive governance (Folke et al., 2005; UNESCO, 
2006; Gunderson and Light, 2006; Brunner, 2010; Méndez et al., 2012). Adaptive 
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governance priorities collaborative learning and co-management between individuals, 
organizations, and natural and social institutions, as a means of instilling behavioral 
adaptation among them (Young, 2006; Armitage et al., 2007). This approach pays 
particular attention to actors’ involvement in ‘cross-level’ and ‘cross-scale’ interactions, 
which allegedly furnish the managerial and learning frameworks to catalyse sustainable 
development (Folke et al., 2005; Cash et al., 2006; Young, 2006).  
 
My consideration here of the overall research context for water management in 
agriculture in developing countries reveals the paucity of empirical work conducted at 
the local scale, and the importance of the micro-level of water management (c.f. Mol 
and Van Den Burg, 2004). Consequently this thesis focuses on local water institutions 
and practical management arrangements through the lens of governance in order to 
begin to establish how the transition to more sustainable water management might be 
undertaken (Shiroyama et al., 2012). 
 
1.5 Thesis aim and objectives 
This thesis examines how sustainable water management in north west Thailand might 
be achieved by deploying insights from the governance and sociospatial relations 
literatures. The aim is to develop practical recommendations for achieving more 
equitable and effective water management practice that is sensitive to local socio-
economic and environmental change, and addresses the needs of multiple stakeholders. 
This aim is addressed through the following three research objectives: 
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1. To study current interactions in the study area between water user groups and 
communities at the local scale with relevant actors (state and private organizations) at 
other scales. 
2. To identify mechanisms to facilitate collaboration, resolve coordination problems and 
reinforce trust among local actors that are sensitive to their socio-economic needs, and 
responsive to land use projections. 
3. On this basis, to make recommendations that encourage the transition to more 
sustainable water management in the study area. 
 
1.6 Thesis outline 
This chapter has outlined the thesis’s research context, namely how global water 
scarcity and agricultural productivity concerns have triggered increasing emphasis on 
effective irrigation water allocation and delivery in developing countries. The 
theoretical foundation for this research is to explore the potential of governance and 
related sociospatial relations approaches to encourage the transition to more sustainable 
water management at local scale.  
 
The theoretical approach of the study is set out in Chapter 2, which explores in detail 
the literature on governance and sociospatial relations and their applications to water 
resources management. The notion of transitioning to more sustainable water 
management is discussed and, on this basis, research propositions are derived for 
empirical validation on facilitating collaboration, resolving coordination problems and 
reinforcing trust among local actors that are sensitive to their socio-economic needs.  
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In Chapter 3, the methodology is presented and the rationale provided for use of 
qualitative techniques to collect and analyze primary data. In-depth interviews, semi-
structured questionnaires, remote interviews and group discussions with agricultural 
communities and water policy practitioners were undertaken to collect primary data on 
the interaction and relationship among actors, as well as to establish their incipient 
social capacities and willingness to develop a more flexible locally appropriate water 
governance regime in future. 
 
Chapter 4 presents the research context for the empirical work: Nam Bo Luang Sub 
district in Chiang Mai Province, north west Thailand. Contemporary patterns of water 
governance are described in detail, with full consideration given to the historical and the 
current water management nationally and regionally. The chapter dissects the critically 
important influence of the national state apparatus on local water management practices. 
This Chapter provides the context for the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
Chapter 5, entitled ‘Sociospatial relations and water management in Chiang Mai 
province, north west Thailand’, examines the recent development of state-sponsored 
water governance in Chiang Mai and compares this irrigation system with the muang fai 
(traditional irrigation) approach. By selecting as case studies water user groups in Nam 
Bo Luang Sub District, the analysis focuses explicitly on the hydrological politics 
between state-led and traditional irrigation management and the resulting 
decisionmaking challenges faced in transitioning to more sustainable water 
management, as a precursor to identifying water governance mechanisms that might 
encourage more sustainable water management. 
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Recently introduced mechanisms established in the study area to encourage cross-scale 
and cross-level interactions, the Joint Management Committee for Irrigation and the 
Water User Association, are then examined in Chapter 6. The role of these ‘middle 
ground’ organizations is examined in detail with the aim of establishing whether and 
how they facilitate cross-scale and cross-level interactions in water management. Can 
JMC and WUA become new ‘intermediary institutions’ for enhancing cross-scale and 
cross-level interactions that, from an adaptive governance perspective, underpin 
sustainable water practice and management?  
 
Building upon the empirical findings of Chapters 5 and 6, in Chapter 7, I consider the 
conditions under which the transition to more sustainable water management in Chiang 
Mai might be emerged. The Chapter reflects on empirical findings of the study, and its 
contribution to adaptive governance and sociospatial relations theories. The chapter then 
presents a critical evaluation of JMC and WUA as mechanisms of adaptive governance, 
and reflects at length on their strengths and weaknesses as viable ‘middle ground’ 
organizations in water management. An evaluation of the first couple of years’ 
operation of JMC/WUA is concluded at the end of the chapter.   
 
Chapter 8 concludes the thesis. Water governance in north west Thailand has been 
shaped over time according to prevailing paradigms of national water management and 
the determining influence of state policy on local practices. In turn, this has configured 
the identification of water management ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’, and is thus highly 
likely to determine the success of putative adaptive governance approaches to water 
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management in the study area. On this basis, policy recommendations are made to 
encourage the transition to more sustainable water management in north west Thailand. 
 
1.7 Conclusions 
This Chapter has provided the thesis background, focused on the increasing pressure 
upon global water distribution and management and its effects on agriculture, and the 
growing importance of water governance as a process that might address the decision-
making of multiple actors, taking place through institutions ranging from the global to 
the local scale of water management. The Chapter revealed a wide variety of problems 
and difficulties to achieving integrated water resources management in developing 
countries, in particular the transition to more sustainable patterns of water management 
particularly at the local scale. There is, therefore, a need to focus on alternative 
“governance spaces” (Gregory et al., 2011, p.182) for water in order to establish 
appropriate institutions and practical management arrangement in these countries, for 
which the concept of adaptive governance allegedly might act as a promising approach 
to furnish the managerial and learning frameworks to catalyse sustainable water 
management. 
     
The Chapter then set out the thesis aims. On this basis, in Chapter 2 I examine the 
relevant academic literatures on governance (including adaptive governance), 
sociospatial relations, and transition management which form the theoretical basis for 
this study. 
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CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUALISING GOVERNANCE AND 
SOCIOSPATIAL RELATIONS IN WATER MANAGEMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This Chapter sets out the theoretical context of the study, elaborating on the debates and 
concepts introduced earlier. The thesis’s analytical framework employs particular 
strands of the voluminous literature on governance alongside insights from the literature 
on sociospatial relations as its main explanatory concepts, which in turn inform the 
overall research design (see Chapter 3). Governance concepts are used here both as 
foundations to analyze and understand how actors participate in water management at 
different scales (local-regional-national); and to furnish guidance on how water 
governance mechanisms need to change in order to transit to more sustainable water 
management. In particular, I seek to use the governance literature to examine and to 
unlock the social organization of water practice and procedure, focusing on networked 
interactions between actors and the effects of organization culture, including the 
influence of values, beliefs and norms in order to better understand decision-making and 
implementation (Mancini et al., 2005). The second strand of theoretical literature, on 
sociospatial relations, compliments my use of governance concepts by providing insight 
into the territorial organization of water supply and delivery within the study area, 
specifically the all-important role of space and sociospatial relations on day-to-day 
water management. The conclusions at the end of the Chapter summarise my theoretical 
approach.  
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2.2 Governance and water management    
It is now recognized that the governance of water is a pressing policy issue in many 
developing countries, given the growing problem of supply-demand challenges posed 
by population increase, climate change projections, and rapid urbanization (Rogers and 
Halls, 2003; Neef, 2009). Agricultural areas particularly are under increasing pressure to 
raise food production to supply burgeoning urban populations, without recourse to 
greater water supply. Future water governance arrangements thus need to take account 
of competing water use demands and conflicting ideas on water use provision, that is 
water as a consumption good versus notions of it as a common-pool resource (Ostrom 
and Gardner, 1993; Ostrom, 2002; Ostrom, 2008; Delmas and Young, 2009; Dukhovny 
and Ziganshina, 2011). The concept of governance (broadly, the rules, procedures and 
formal and informal relations shaping decisionmaking in particular realms of public 
policy) has been extensively used to examine the challenges and creative opportunities 
available to policymakers charged with overseeing water allocation and supply issues in 
developed and developing country contexts (see, for example, Lautze et al., 2011; 
Evans, 2012). It is the literature on water governance in developing countries that I 
focus upon here. 
 
An array of organizations is now involved in water management in developing 
countries, particularly in the provision, allocation and supply of irrigation water. As 
Wittfogel (1957) famously observed, political practice and power within developing 
country contexts is intimately bound up with the workings of the state and, by inference 
and more contemporaneously, with the evolution of water governance in these 
countries. Thus, organizing effective water governance is inevitably an evolutionary 
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process, based around bringing together different stakeholders in order to orchestrate 
greater equality of water access, more collaborative approaches to water management 
and more effective dispute resolution over time (Royal Irrigation Department, 2001; 
Movik, 2012). According to Coward (1980), there are five main features of ‘good 
governance’ in irrigation systems: (i) water usage should be determined by clear rules 
and the establishment of common water rights; (ii) water allocation requires clear 
priorities and transparent procedures for different users including urban, agricultural and 
industrial stakeholders, to ensure efficient and effective water distribution; (iii) 
irrigation system maintenance requires attention to be paid to both ‘soft’ (collaboration, 
trust, reciprocity) and ‘hard’ dimensions (maintaining and repairing physical structures); 
(iv) labour and resource mobilization requires collaboration across water systems and 
between different stakeholders; and (v) conflict management must focus on effective 
rules for dispute resolution. In effect, ‘good’ water governance in irrigation depends on 
the full spectrum of water users participating actively in the whole range of water 
management activities. Governance provides rules that empower relevant actors to 
participate in this way. 
 
Another consequence, following from Wittfogel (1957), is that current patterns of water 
governance serve to demonstrate deeper relations about how society orders its affairs in 
relation to this key resource, and between its citizens more generally (c.f. Franks and 
Cleaver, 2007; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2010). A governance approach thus obliges us to 
recognise that while state actors remain influential decision-makers, increasingly it is 
non-state actors such as private sectors and civil society that often play pivotal roles in 
decisiontaking on water management (Bulkeley, 2005). Consequently ‘good’ water 
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governance needs durable links to be made between and within organizations and social 
groups involved in decision-making; both ‘horizontally’, that is across sectors and 
between urban and rural areas, and ‘vertically’, that is from local to global scales 
(Tropp, 2007). It is these horizontal and vertical linkages that structure the processes by 
which societies share power, balance interests, and shape individual and collective 
actions on water supply and distribution (Lebel et al., 2006; Toonen, 2011). Thus many 
developing countries now seek to build institutions that bring greater transparency and 
fairness to water management through closer involvement of stakeholders according to 
international principles (UNDP, 1997; UNDP, 2008; UNESCO, 2006) (see Figure 2.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Actors’ co-management at multiple scales and levels  
Source: Adapted from UNDP (1997)  
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To provide a better understanding of how water governance works in practice, Griggs 
(2011) examines generic hydrological management as a chain of institutional 
arrangements, involving formal organizations and legal and public policy procedures 
and processes, as well as societal norms and beliefs (see Figure 2.2). Figure 2.2 
demonstrates essential governance characteristics including (i) the rule of law and 
organized policy procedures are critical for ‘good’ water governance; (ii) basic 
institutional mechanisms to facilitate water governance include government authority, 
contracts and agreements, enabling legislation, and regulatory capacity; (iii) water 
management, regulatory, and empowering organizations are required to implement the 
roles and processes of water management; (iv) water policy and strategy are derived 
from government actions and public participation; and (v) water management is 
influenced by informal networks and patterns of behaviour (Griggs, 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Institutional arrangements for water governance 
Source: Griggs (2011) 
 
Importantly Griggs’s analysis stresses the importance of informal, as well as formal 
institutional attributes to achieving ‘good’ water governance. These informal norms 
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and beliefs play a number of significant roles. In essence, where norms and beliefs are 
shared in common among policy stakeholders, a range of positive collaborative and 
coordinative functions are likely (Lubell, 2004; Valkering et al., 2009; Lebel et al., 
2010). For example, it is probable that there will be greater public confidence in water 
management institutions, and greater perceived transparency in policy decisions so that 
both policy ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ can easily follow policy formulation. Moreover, 
policy decisions are likely to be more inclusive and relevant to stakeholders, while 
levels of communication among actors is facilitated, aiding the development of an 
active civil society. Shared norms and beliefs are alleged also to improve coherence 
between policies and the action required by political leadership, and to enhance 
‘joined-up’ decisionmaking by institutions at different levels within often complex 
public administrative systems. Lastly, equity between and among the various interest 
groups and stakeholders is more easily monitored throughout the process of policy 
development and implementation (Rogers and Hall, 2003). 
 
Contrasting with Griggs’s prescription, however, is the reality in many developing 
countries of deteriorating water allocation, delivery and supply issues (Zimmerman et 
al., 2008; Kuylenstierna, et al., 2008). Often this results in these countries from a legacy 
of ‘top-down’ government control of water resources, and the continued prosecution of 
national water resource regimes (Ratner, 2000; Thomas, 2006). These monolithic 
structures are likely to reduce the adaptability and flexibility of water management 
patterns nationally, while simultaneously escalating vulnerability to various types of 
water stress such as climate change related issues (Young, 2010). Young (2010, p.379) 
notes how the “governance systems we create to steer human-environment relations can 
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be, and often are, just as complex and dynamic as the socio-ecological systems they are 
created to steer”. Where ‘misfit’ arises between political-administrative and 
hydrological systems, the outcome is sometimes characterized as ‘governance failure’, 
increasing the occurrence of water crises (Bakker et al., 2008). Such failures make it far 
less probable that sustainable management of hydrological resources can be achieved, as 
Biermann et al. (2012, p.51) reflect that often “the current institutional framework for 
sustainable development is deeply inadequate to bring about the swift transformatic 
progress that is needed” on water management.  
 
In short, mainstream governance approaches highlight the need for collaboration and 
coordination between the state and diverse stakeholder groups to achieve equitable and 
effective management of water resources. Clearly to fulfil this goal greater stakeholder 
involvement is vitally important, though the governance literature also asserts the 
significance of shared norms, beliefs and other informalities. In developing countries, 
however, governance contexts are still largely state-based and relatively rigid and 
resistant to change. Such institutional failures and rigidity in the capacity to cope with 
water allocation issues can lead to major management difficulties and problems. 
Consideration of how to resolve the resulting difficulties is the province of the relatively 
recent literature on adaptive governance, which I now examine.  
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The emergence of adaptive governance as a separate sub-field of the governance 
literature has come about in response to widespread transformation of ecosystems and 
growing awareness of the very close connection between natural resources and the 
social systems that depend upon them (Folke et al., 2005; Brunner et al., 2005; Olsson 
et al., 2006; Gunderson and Light, 2006; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; Folke, 2007; Huitema 
et al., 2009). Thus ecological crises and change in interrelated social systems, for 
example through political and economic change, need to be considered together rather 
than separately (Huitema et al., 2009). Adaptive governance seeks to address this 
analytical challenge, and in particular has been applied with great success to 
conceptualizing water management as a reform strategy by seeking to understand how 
the resilience of social-hydrological systems might be improved (Brunner, 2010; 
Akamani and Wilson, 2011; Evans, 2012; Bark et al., 2012). In adaptive governance, 
therefore, institutions and political frameworks are designed to adapt to changing 
relationships between society and ecosystems in ways that encourage more sustainable 
patterns of water management (Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005; Carpenter and 
Folke, 2006). As a result, proponents of adaptive governance advocate so-called ‘co-
management’ of diverse sets of stakeholders, operating at different levels and 
cooperating by sharing rights, responsibilities, and power between multiple levels and 
sectors of government and civil society, as essential for effective water management 
(Fabricius et al., 2007; Armitage et al., 2008; Smith, 2008; Berkes, 2009; sometimes 
also referred to as ‘hybrid systems’: see Figure 2.3).  
2.2.1 Adaptive governance 
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In examining water management challenges, governance scholars have employed 
notions of collaborative experimentation and learning, and ‘self-organizing’ systems of 
individuals, organizations, natural and social institutions as a means for instilling 
behavioral adaptation to create the appropriate conditions for greater cooperation and 
collaboration. Thus, for Folke et al. (2005), an adaptive governance approach 
emphasizes three inter-linked elements: (i) knowledge construction and understanding 
the dynamics of resources and ecosystems; (ii) translating ecological knowledge into 
specific management practices; and (iii) support for flexible institutions and cross-level 
and cross-scale interactions, as a means of dealing with external perturbations, 
uncertainty and surprise. An adaptive approach thus has an explicit policy aim of 
meeting the increased demand for governance posed by sustainable management and 
development (Delma and Young, 2009; see figure 2.3). Haufler (2009, p.121) classifies 
this approach an “actor-centered perspective”, as it focuses on the types of actors, their 
character, and their strategies. However, Lemos and Agrawal (2009) note that these 
systems are not a panacea and require considerable effort to forge the necessary 
partnerships under conditions which may not be favourable to the success of such 
endeavours (Delma and Young, 2009).  
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Figure 2.3: Hybrid governance systems 
Source: Adapted from Delma and Young (2009) 
 
As noted by Folke et al. (2005), a critical feature of the adaptive governance perspective 
is the importance attached to effective cross-level (ie. organization-organization) and 
cross-scale (local-regional-national) interactions in delivering successful policy 
outcomes (see also Cash et al., 2006; Young, 2006). In many cases, cross-level 
interactions involve interplay between management systems located at the same scale, 
such as interaction between state-level regimes’ administration, or between traditional 
water management and state water management practices (Cash et al., 2006). By 
contrast, cross-scale interactions refer to transactions between actors, located at 
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different spatial or temporal scales (Berkes, 2002; Cash et al., 2006; Moore, 2008). 
These interactions may also change established pattern-process relationships across 
scales. As such, cross-scale interactions are increasing recognized as having important 
influences on ecosystem processes and posing formidable challenges for understanding 
and forecasting ecosystem dynamics (Peters et al., 2007). 
 
In water management, these cross-scale and cross-level interactions are often a joint 
product of social and hydrological processes. Thus watersheds, drainage basins and 
irrigable areas all have cross-level and often cross-scale components (Cash et al., 2006).  
Inevitably, actors contest these different scales and levels of water use, overtly through 
debate, lobbying and sometimes protest, or more subtly, through use and control of 
technologies, indicators and measurements (Lebel et al., 2005; Lebel and Garden, 
2007). These interventions give actors opportunities to compare the merits of alternative 
governance arrangements and to challenge and/or support other stakeholders’ interests, 
causes, and effects (Young, 2002). For water management institutions dealing across 
levels, timeframes, or scale boundaries, it is vitally important to gain knowledge that is 
prominent, credible and legitimate across these domains (Cash et al., 2006). These 
cross-scale institutions are in a powerful position to provide legitimization for particular 
local-level procedures, to broker cross-scale interactions, and to facilitate state 
legitimization of local practices, thereby enabling cultural and political revitalization, 
capacity building and institutional building. Cross-scale institutions can thus provide a 
forum for exchanging knowledge and technologies applying to water management 
across large areas (see figure 2.4) (Berkes, 2002). 
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Figure 2.4: Roles of cross-scale and cross-level interactions in water management 
Source: Author 
 
It is, thus, important to see cross-scale and cross-level interactions as dynamically 
embedded in the contexts where they take place (Ransome, 2010). In water 
management, understanding the relationship of actors across scale and level can be 
approached in a variety of ways, with Hinde (1981) (cited in Giddens, 1992, p.23-25) 
identifying eight means of assessment. Firstly, the content of interactions is important as 
it reveals relationships derive from what actors do, or do not do, together. The second 
means is the diversity of interactions, which can be used to classify and differentiate 
relationships so that the more diverse the interactions, the deeper the relationship. 
Thirdly is the quality of interaction, which is assessed by examining the intensity and 
style of interaction, the immediacy of the language the actors use, and the non-verbal 
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signals exchanged. A fourth means is to focus on the relative frequency and patterning 
of interactions that could lead to an increasingly deepening voluntary relationship. 
Fifthly reciprocity and complementarity of interaction is important, indicating how far 
actors take into account each other’s needs. The sixth dimension is intimacy, that Hinde 
recognises in two forms: physical and psychological. The seventh dimension is 
interpersonal perception, and lastly the degree of commitment can be used as a 
barometer or measure of the strength of actors’ relations.     
   
Cross-scale and cross-level interactions grant and empower actors opportunities to 
exchange their knowledge for adaptation as well as sometimes providing the fora for 
collective decision-making. By doing so, these interactions can create new social 
learning possibilities, allowing different stakeholders to connect with other networks of 
actors and so build new, or deepen existing formal and informal relationships (ie. from 
formal legal agreements or contracts to informal, voluntary agreements, Pahl-Wostl et 
al., 2007). Certainly, group-centered and multi-level social learning is increasingly seen 
as central to decision-making on water issues in environmental management (Berkes, 
2009). Furthermore, social learning that has been promoted by cross-scale and cross-
level interaction may result in increase effectiveness, sustainability and integration. In 
essence, social learning refers to analyzing and reflecting on existing processes and 
institutions to ensure (representative) stakeholder interaction at multiple levels (Bouwen 
and Taillieu, 2004). 
 
For water practitioners and stakeholders, initiatives of this sort crossing scales and 
levels can also be the prelude to establishing new networks to support formal and 
informal participatory process in water management (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007).  These 
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networked relationships may help articulate a much more profound sense of scaled 
relationships, within which people and places are bound, a sense in which specific 
places are seen as simultaneously global and local without being wholly one or the other 
(Herod and Wright, 2003; Herod, 2011). Networked relations of this sort can foster new 
livelihood opportunities, as well as form the basis for environmental movements that cut 
across different hierarchies (Lebel et al., 2008), permitting multiple voices to be heard 
and different kinds of knowledge to be mobilised. These elements underpin key 
stakeholder activities that can yield new solutions to water management problems and 
dilemmas (Folke et al., 2005; Hahn et al., 2006). Also, it can promote the creation of 
so-called ‘bridging organizations’ that help address cross-level and cross-scale water 
management disputes by building trust, accessing much needed resources for improving 
physical infrastructures such as weirs and dams, and promoting common ‘vision’ and 
shared management goals (Berkes, 2009).  Yet, even though these cross-scale and cross-
level interactions foreseen by adaptive governance may foster new relationships among 
actors involved in water management, as important might be to reinvigorate existing 
negotiating arenas with which individuals and relevant organizations are already 
familiar, thus enabling citizens for example further opportunities to contribute to 
decisions that affecting their everyday water use (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007; Evans, 2012).  
 
Consequently in this thesis I use governance and adaptive governance concepts to 
examine key research questions including: how do individuals and organizations view 
current water governance arrangements; how do they regard and respond to local and 
national styles of water management; and how might new approaches to water 
allocation and delivery be provided through new actor interactions locally and 
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regionally. I also use governance to clarify actor interactions across scales and levels of 
water management, as well as to illuminate how actors combine these to affect 
opportunities and circumstances and choices for collaboration that might realize more 
sustainable water management. This is a key step in establishing whether and how a 
more appropriate water governance regime can be set up. As shown in Chapter 1, to 
date effective water governance has been prevented by over-reliance on ‘top-down’ 
water management or state-led management ‘solutions’ to water scarcity issues. In some 
Thai regions, there has been evidence of gradual improvement from state-controlled 
decision-making to encouraging stakeholders to participate in water management (see 
Chapter 4). As more stakeholders take up this opportunity at different levels of 
administration and different scales, so it is hoped they can facilitate the efficacy of 
cross-scale and cross-level interaction to achieve sustainable water governance. This 
raises the prospect of gradually transitioning to more effective governance 
arrangements over time, a topic to which I now turn.   
 
Transitioning to more adaptive governance arrangements (that is, interlinked at multiple 
levels and scales) has been highlighted as critical to society’s ability to manage water 
use sustainably. These transitions might be triggered by rapid environmental change as 
much as by human design, obliging reorganization and renewal, and thereby offering 
opportunities for building resilience (Folke et al., 2005). Therefore understanding 
processes of transitioning, and factors that may enable transitions in ecosystem 
management, has become an important focus of environmental social science (Folke et 
al., 2005; Biggs et al., 2010).    
2.2.3 Governance and transitions  
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In this context, the literature on transitions stresses a number of key factors in catalysing 
adaptation of governance structures. The nature of formal organizations is the first such 
issue. Organizations are never static, and water management organizations particularly 
are always having to deal with crisis and changing state policies on water management. 
Thus, understanding the impact of structural society transformations on water use is 
critical to predicting transitions. Such transitions emphasise the importance of cross-
scale and cross-level interactions to induce change towards sustainability (van de 
Kerkhof and Wieczorek, 2005), with the interplay between individual actors, 
organizations, and institutions at multiple levels viewed as central in such transitions 
(Olsson et al., 2006). 
 
Crucially, effecting transitions also requires knowledge sharing among and between 
actors at multiple scales and levels, and a social learning process across these levels and 
scales (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007) (Figure 2.5).  From this perspective, therefore, 
transformations at micro-scale through, for example, innovative approaches to water 
delivery or storage developed in a locally ‘protected environment’ (e.g. large-scale 
research projects, subsidized pilot studies at the farm level) and/or in new areas of 
application such as the restoration of riverine landscapes, is not sufficient in itself to 
bring about transitions to more sustainable water use. This requires multiparty 
collaboration involving stakeholder groups at different scales, working in organized 
networks e.g., authorities, associations, agriculture, urban interests, etc. It is only 
through coordinated, multi-level and multi-scalar interactions of this sort that change to 
more sustainable water regimes can be achieved. Hydrological and agricultural 
landscapes encompass environmental variability, legal frameworks, and, very often, 
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deeply-rooted societal norms and cultural values (Pahl-Wostl, 2007). They provide the 
selection environment within which policy options for particular water management 
regimes unfold. The landscape scale is linked with the micro- and meso-scales through 
feedback processes that operate both ‘bottom-up’ (e.g. diffusion of innovation) and 
‘top-down’ (e.g. selection of regime). This distinction between macro-, meso- and 
micro-scales is common for studies of complex adaptive water management systems 
and consequently is adopted here. 
 
A third aspect of transitioning from the current dominance of ‘command and control’ 
mechanisms in water resources management in developing countries  involves bringing 
both economic and non-economic sources of incentives together to promote the 
cooperative behaviour that is critical for ‘self-organization’ to emerge (Dietz et al., 
2003; Akamani and Wilson, 2011).  As Vincent (2007, p.6) points out, “Economic 
incentives are especially important if rapid changes in human behaviour are desired”. 
This is equally important to the mobilization of more extensive networks of actors 
across scales and levels, vital to coordination of collaborative learning and raising 
public awareness – both parts of the transitioning process (Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et 
al., 2006). Moreover, leadership is needed to provide trust-building, vision, and 
meaning among actors across scale and levels of water management, again a key 
requirement for transition to more sustainable patterns of water use (Folke et al., 2005; 
Biggs et al., 2010).  
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Figure 2.5: Multi-level transitions as part of a governance approach  
Source: Adapted from Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007) 
 
Lastly, successful transitioning seems also to depend on mobilizing extant informal 
networks. These provide the necessary continuity and stability in the midst of change 
for actors directly involved in water management, while also facilitating new 
information flows, identifying knowledge gaps, and providing nodes of expertise in 
hydrological and ecosystem management that can be drawn upon at critical times. In a 
sense, such networks offer an anchorage for participants that is ‘out of the fray’ of 
regulation and implementation (Folke et al., 2005). These extant networks therefore 
enable more detailed consideration among participants of sustainability ‘visions’ and 
how to establish and organize the transition arena. Such visions are considered essential 
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to identifying a workable transition agenda, and deriving necessary transition pathways. 
They also can provide the basis for establishing whether transition experiments are 
needed, and for monitoring and evaluating these transition experiments as a basis for 
making adjustments in vision, agenda, and coalitions (Olsson et al., 2006; Loorbach, 
2010; Voß and Bornemann, 2011). The overall aim is to better organize and coordinate 
transition processes at territorial and societal levels, and to attempt to steer water 
management in a sustainable direction. 
 
van de Kerkhof and Wieczorek (2005) propose four aspects to stimulate learning among 
actors with a view to driving forward transitions in governance. These relate to 
commitment, fairness, transparency, and competence. Commitment refers to the 
willingness of stakeholders to invest time and effort in the transition process, to actively 
contribute to collaborative discussion, to be critical but open to new information, and to 
learn from each other. This is to ensure that participants in transitions have sufficient 
opportunities for learning, for example by providing them with relevant information, or 
by giving them sufficient opportunity and freedom to initiate transition experiments. 
They also need to have a certain degree of ownership in the transition process, which 
refers to the responsibility for the choices to be made with regard to the formulation of a 
transition agenda, the development of sustainability visions, and the execution of 
transition experiments.  
 
Fairness is an important condition for learning, as it facilitates an open discussion in 
which minority viewpoints are not a priori excluded; it prevents the process from 
merely being about power and bargaining; and it allows not only learning about new 
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and innovative options and projects to induce the specific transition but also 
deliberating about the different arguments for and against these options and projects. 
Transparency of the transition means that the participants are able to check whether the 
process is sound and whether it gives them sufficient opportunity to achieve their own 
interests. It increases the opportunities for learning as it enables the participants to fully 
concentrate on the contents of the discussion without being occupied with other matters, 
such as planning and procedure. It is also an important condition for commitment, as the 
involved actors need to have insight into the costs and benefits of participation before 
they can commit themselves to the transition management process. Competence, which 
can be understood as the ability of the participants to deliberate about different aspects 
of the transition theme and to make informed choices with regard to both the nature of 
the problem and the possible solutions to this problem, enables participants to prioritise 
the information and knowledge available.  
 
The notion of transitioning to more sustainable forms of water management is used here 
to clarify how stakeholders translate factors and contexts, influenced by cross-scale and 
cross-level interactions of adaptive governance, into active strategies for guiding local 
actors on water management into the future. 
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2.3 Sociospatial relations and water management  
The previous section examined governance, adaptive governance and transition 
concepts, and how they can be put into practice in water management. I have argued 
that these three concepts are particularly useful for understanding social organization 
and ‘out-of-territory’ connections in mediating patterns of water management in 
developing countries. However, as important, is the ‘in-territory’ associations of 
geographical place influencing organization culture, that is the place-specific values, 
beliefs and norms that affect water allocation and delivery priorities, and ultimately the   
transition to more sustainable water management. These sociospatial relations, I 
contend, are equally important as governance relations, exerting a particularly important 
effect on site-specific use of water resources.            
  
Within analyses of water management, concepts of space and scale are usually taken for 
granted as synonymous with the nested territorial ‘containers’ within which social and 
political life take place (Taylor, 1999). However, to put sustainable water management 
into effect, the consideration of how different actors come together across space, levels 
and scales at different times to gain support for their policies, programmes and projects 
must be considered. The concept of politics of space has been advocated as a means of 
gaining more insight on how different actors from different places and levels interact 
(Kirby, 1993; Massey, 1994; Cox, 1998; Lebel et al., 2005). Space is not only a 
backdrop to our activities; it is also a contingent outcome of societal and biophysical 
processes that create places and positions that links us to our environment (Kirby, 1993; 
Sheppard, 2002). Space in modernity has been linked with principles, rules, rationality, 
2.3.1 The importance of politics of space to sustainable water management 
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science, administration, bureaucracy, and institutions to work together (Taylor, 1999; 
Amin, 2002). In politics, however, “it emerges through various actors’ attempts to 
frame reality in different ways that promote their interests and enable them to 
implement policy and mobilize politically” (McCann, 2003, p.160). Both space and 
place are therefore equally important in the search for identifying possible societal-wide 
solutions to local water resource dilemmas.  
 
The field of sociospatial relations encompasses a variety of different political concepts, 
which are particularly important from the point of view of this study (see figure 2.6). 
Politics of scale, for example, concentrates on situations where different actors at the 
local-regional-national-international scales contest the spatial extent and resolution of 
information and decisions (Towers, 2000; Bulkeley, 2005; Lebel et al., 2005). Gupta 
(2011, p.6) states that “the theory of politics of scale argues that social actors have a 
diversity of reasons to scale up or down issues, and it is collective national politics that 
determines what is scaled up and what is not.” Gupta claims that, typically, there are 
four types of argument advanced by actors for ‘scaling up or down’, as follows:  
2.3.2 The interrelation of different foci: politics of scale, position and place 
(i) to enhance understanding of a problem through greater resolution regarding 
critical local and contextual elements;  
(ii) to promote effective governance through using existing institutions and 
mobilizing local people;  
(iii) to promote domestic interests by avoiding liability for externalized effects 
and protecting national interests; and  
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(iv) to promote extraterritorial interests through divide and control, inclusion and 
exclusion strategies, and to bypass specific bodies and procedures at global 
level that are seen as a hindrance to policy-making.   
 
Brenner (2001, p.600) suggested that the “politics of scale” should denote “the 
production, reconfiguration or contestation of particular differentiations, orderings and 
hierarchies among geographical scales-not only local-urban-regional-national and so 
forth, but also, more generally, their embeddedness and positionalities in relation to a 
multitude of smaller or larger spatial units within a multitiered, hierarchically 
configured geographical scaffolding.” Thus to encourage more sustainable water 
management it is important to recognise that not all forms of scale politics are about 
administrative areas, hydrological units or ecological processes; it is also vital to 
consider informal norms, codes, temporal cycles and patterns, and local knowledge 
(Cash et al., 2006). The benefit of using scaled knowledge in water management 
enables particular interventions, patterns of governance, or modes of water allocation to 
be more easily justified or rationalised to local stakeholders, because they will have had 
to participate in decisionmaking for this knowledge to be accessed in the first place 
(Molle et al., 2008; Lebel et al., 2008).   
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Figure 2.6: Sociospatial relations of actors in water management 
Source: Adapted from Lebel et al. (2005) 
 
A sociospatial relations approach also demands examination of the politics of position, 
which refers to societal interaction between locations as a result of their relative 
physical location: for example, between upstream and downstream water users, or those 
on different banks of a river. Position is important because it describes how different 
actors are situated with respect to one another in space. This can have a crucial impact 
upon power relations between actors, both in the sense that some positions tend to be 
more influential than others in determining water access; and in the sense that 
emphasizing the situated nature of all knowledge challenges the power of those who 
claim objectivity (Sheppard, 2002). Politics of position can be a particularly important 
driver of cooperation or collaboration among water users (Lebel et al., 2005).  
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The final consideration is politics of place: that is, the power relations among 
stakeholders that arise because of the special characteristics of the places interacting 
above and beyond those arising from scale or position. For example, one form of 
politics of place is the symbolic use of sites of communal victory, or defeat, to gain 
leverage in discussion or negotiation with other stakeholders (Lebel et al., 2005). Yung 
et al. (2003) concluded that place analysis can lead to the understanding of people’s 
viewpoints and relationships on natural resource use and conservation, and how those 
viewpoints contribute to conflict and conflict resolution at specific sites. Furthermore, it 
can increase the effectiveness of communication because managers, policymakers, and 
stakeholders have a better sense of what other groups mean when they describe their 
interests in relation to a particular place. If people feel that their positions are 
understood and heard, they are more likely to engage in public participation processes.  
 
Building on these themes, Lebel et al. (2005) argue that local level studies of water use 
need to synthesise accounts from actors at different scales, places and in different 
positions in order to identify the advantages and disadvantages resulting from control 
being vested in particular authorities. Typically actors coalesce around stories in 
specific narratives as a basis for building alliances to advance their interests in water 
management.  
 
In my analysis, therefore, I shall be combining insights from this sociospatial relations 
approach alongside the adaptive governance approach already outlined in two distinct 
ways. First is to understand how existing water management patterns and relations 
between scales have emerged. Second is to provide a theoretical lens for understanding 
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the challenges involved in achieving sustainable water management in particular places. 
Thus combining these two theoretical lenses provides me with the necessary in-depth 
analysis needed to scrutinize contemporary and likely future water management 
practices in the study area, and the dilemmas that water resource managers face.  
 
2.4 Conclusions: towards a theoretical approach 
It is important to realise that the theoretical literatures sketched out here provide 
complimentary analytical functions, in terms of clarifying local political priorities for 
water (sociospatial relations), and in identifying the decisionmaking and decisiontaking 
activities at other levels and scales that intimately affect these localised politics 
(governance approaches). As Cash et al. (2006) acknowledge, different actors have 
different aspirations for water management and, on this basis, may seek to strengthen or 
weaken cross-scale linkages, as the range of benefits and risks from such interactions 
are rarely symmetric; in effect, scale and level issues are often strongly linked with local 
territorial politics. Therefore, ignoring cross-scale interactions, or focusing only upon a 
single place or geographic site without examining cross-level interactions is bound to 
lead to partial understanding of water politics and, ultimately, to management problems. 
 
As I show, these two approaches affords valuable new insight into a range of feasible 
policy options around which sustainable water management might emerge (Figure 2.7). 
In particular, sociospatial relations and adaptive governance provide a potent means of 
identifying how water transitions might be encouraged in the study area in future. In the 
next Chapter, I show how these theories have shaped my research design and my 
identification of a series of research propositions for empirical analysis in this thesis.  
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Figure 2.7: Theoretical framework of the thesis 
Source: Author 
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction  
This Chapter sets out the techniques used and the process of research, along with the 
justification of study area selection and rationale for the study’s data collection and 
analysis methods. The Chapter is split into three parts based on the study’s data 
collection periods. The first part discusses the ‘preparatory phase’, which put into effect 
the theoretical approach discussed in Chapter 2 and its relevant notions as a basis for 
shaping the research design. Seven research propositions derived from the governance 
and sociospatial relations literatures are identified for empirical testing in subsequent 
Chapters. I also outline ethical issues and my own positionality as a researcher. The 
next research phase was primary data collection, which consisted of preliminary study 
and fieldwork data. Multiple techniques, including semi-structured face-to-face 
interviews, group discussions, remote interviewing, field observation, and 
administration of questionnaires were used to collect data and record the experiences, 
feelings and opinions of participants. Data management and data analysis associated 
with this second phase of the fieldwork is then described. The final part of the Chapter 
reflects on the successes and limitations of the data collection and analytical techniques 
used.  
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3.2 Preparatory phase – research design  
The main objective of this phase was to establish an appropriate research design, based 
upon the theories and concepts set out in Chapter 2, before undertaking fieldwork data 
collection. Thus in 2010, time was spent on developing a framework for data collection 
and analysis. This comprised: developing my theoretical framework and research 
propositions; identifying study sites within the study area; selecting appropriate research 
techniques, and developing my research ethics strategy. Here I explain these activities 
and the relationship with my research practice. 
 
The study focuses on the challenge posed to existing water management arrangements 
by governance and sociospatial relations and its consequences locally and regionally. 
Typically, water governance comprises interpersonal and interorganizational relations 
that link actors involved in decision-making both ‘horizontally’, that is, across sectors 
and between urban and rural areas; and ‘vertically’, ie. from local to international scales 
(Tropp, 2007). Effective governance needs appropriate formal and informal 
arrangements to enhance ‘joined-up’ decisionmaking by institutions at different levels 
and scales (Grigg, 2011). From a governance perspective, state actors are certainly not 
the only or necessarily the most significant participants: non-state actors, such as private 
sectors and civil society, often play a variety of pivotal roles in water management 
(Bulkeley, 2005). By utilizing the governance literature, therefore, I sought to examine 
the interrelations between all relevant stakeholders in agricultural water management in 
north west Thailand.  
3.2.1 Thesis’s research propositions 
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In particular the notion of adaptive governance has been applied with great success to 
water management. As discussed in the preceding Chapter, this perspective emphasises 
the importance of cross-scale and cross-level interactions and actor participation 
(Berkes, 2009; Huitema et al., 2009; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Clark and Clarke, 2011) in 
helping provide interaction of different kinds of water knowledge, and facilitating 
coordination that enables co-operation over accessing of different resources, so bringing 
together different actors and resolving water conflicts (Berkes, 2009). Folke et al. 
(2005) identify four interacting aspects in achieving adaptive governance of complex 
social-ecological systems: (i) knowledge construction and understanding the dynamics 
of resources and ecosystems; (ii) translating ecological knowledge into adaptive 
management practices; (iii) support for flexible institutions and multilevel governance 
systems, and (iv) dealing with external perturbations, uncertainty and surprise.  
However comparatively few studies have sought to establish the importance of these 
claims empirically. I therefore sought to investigate through the thesis whether and to 
what extent cross-scale and cross-level interactions and ‘bridging organizations’ were 
evident in the study area following recent changes nationally that seek to place water 
allocation and use on a more sustainable footing.  
 
According to adaptive governance studies, effective coordinated action across these 
different scales and levels is needed to effect transitions to more sustainable forms of 
water management (Olsson et al., 2008; Rotmans et al., 2001; Loorbach and Rotmans, 
2006).  These transitions require four suites of change/adaptation in existing forms of 
water governance as follows: (i) structure of the problem in question, to develop a long-
term sustainability vision and establish and organize the transition arena; (ii) develop 
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future water management visions, a transition agenda and derive the necessary transition 
path; (iii) establish and carry out transition experiments and mobilize the resulting 
transition networks; and (iv) monitor, evaluate, and learn lessons from the transition 
experiments and, based on these, make adjustments in visions, agenda, and coalitions 
(Olsson et al., 2006; Loorbach, 2010; Voß and Bornemann, 2011). I considered the 
transitions concept within adaptive governance to be a robust organizing device for 
understanding how change might be steered towards more sustainable water 
management outcomes.  
 
As set out in Chapter 2, alongside governance I also employ the complimentary 
literature on sociospatial relations to give greater depth to my analysis of local territorial 
water practices and traditions, specifically how individuals and communities interact 
with each other over water use in different positions and places. Thus the notion of 
‘politics of scale’ prioritises examination of how actors contest the spatial extent and 
resolution of information and decisions (Towers, 2000; Bulkeley, 2005; Lebel et al., 
2005). In the context of encouraging more sustainable water management, it is 
important to recognise that not all forms of scale politics are about administrative areas, 
hydrological units or ecological processes; it is also vital to consider informal societal 
rules, norms, communal procedures and local knowledge (Bulkeley, 2005; Cash et al., 
2006). Hence Lebel et al. (2008) have noted that reliance upon particular ‘scaled 
knowledges’ can result in groups being included or excluded from water resource 
decisions where participation may be essential to deal with tensions, conflicts, and 
contradictions within and between scalar formations. ‘Politics of position’ is social 
interaction derived from the relative physical location of actors, for example, between 
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upstream and downstream communities, or between groups on different riverbanks. 
Position is important as it can determine how actors at the same scale relate to one 
another with respect to water use. So some positions tend to be more conducive than 
others in determining water access.  
 
More generally, the situated nature of all knowledge challenges the power of those who 
claim objectivity in terms of water allocation (Sheppard, 2002). For ‘politics of place’, 
it is the power relations among stakeholders that arise because of special territorial 
characteristics above and beyond those arising from scale or position. Yung et al. 
(2003) conclude that place analysis can lead to a greater understanding of people’s 
viewpoints on water resource use and conservation, and how those viewpoints 
contribute to conflict and, potentially, to conflict resolution.  
 
In order to make these two literatures tractable to analysis, I devised seven research 
propositions to test key arguments proposed in governance and sociospatial studies 
through my primary empirical research (see Figure 3.1). Three research propositions 
were developed to test sociospatial relations for empirical testing in Chapter 5 to 
complement those informed by governance perspectives. These research propositions 
are as follows: 
Proposition 1: Scale defines actor relationships in terms of actors accepting or 
challenging norms and beliefs pertaining to water management, and participating in new 
water management arrangement.  
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Proposition 2: Differences among actors in water norms and beliefs at local 
scale gives rise to particular water politics that shape ‘solutions’ to local water 
allocation and delivery problems.  
Proposition 3: Local water politics influence the viability of cross-scale 
interactions that seek to specify collaborative water management among state and non-
state actors, and hence the transition to more sustainable water management.  
 
These research propositions derived from the central arguments of the politics of space 
literature, that prioritise the influence of geographical scales, position and place on 
stakeholder relationships (Proposition 1); the significance of embedded beliefs and 
norms in water management (Proposition 2); and their influence upon current patterns 
of water governance locally (Proposition 3). Thus, these propositions enabled me to 
evaluate local water politics in the study area by synthesizing the effect of territorial 
influences on promoting local actors’ water interests across scales and levels. 
 
In order to examine governance relations across scales and levels, and to investigate 
whether cross-scale and cross-level interactions existed in practice in water 
management, a further four research propositions were developed for empirical testing 
(Chapter 6). My aim in drafting these research propositions was to provide me with the 
empirical basis for assessing the local capacity to transition to more sustainable water 
management in the study region. These four research propositions on governance 
relations were as follows:   
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Proposition 4: Recently introduced organizational mechanisms promoted at the 
local scale empower non-state actors to have legitimacy in water management 
comparable with state agencies.  
 Proposition 5: Cross-scale and cross-level interactions encourage local actors to 
engage with actors at other scales and levels, so facilitating collaborative water 
management in the study area.  
Proposition 6: Collaborative water management within the study region offers 
opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage in social learning and networking.  
Proposition 7: Formal and informal institutional mechanisms promoted to actors 
across scales and levels can resolve water allocation problems and encourage the 
transition to more sustainable water management. 
 
I derived these research propositions from the main theses set out in the governance and 
adaptive governance literatures, namely that there should be equal participation of all 
relevant stakeholders in decisionmaking (Proposition 4); secondly, that both formal and 
informal institutions shape effective governance (Proposition 7); and thirdly, that cross-
level and cross-scale interactions need to be examined if a transition to more sustainable 
patterns of water management is to be encouraged (Proposition 5 and Proposition 6). 
The research propositions thus sought to address the main arguments in the theoretical 
literatures on governance by providing a means for their empirical validation. 
 
Dietz et al. (2003) and Newig and Fritsch (2009) both comment that face-to-face 
communication is a basic requirement for water governance and adaptive governance. 
Their argument is in line with Nardi and Wittaker (2002), who also contend that actor 
interaction is crucial for sustaining the social relationships that make distributed work, 
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such as water management, possible. Therefore to utilize adaptive governance in this 
research, I used face-to-face interviewing as one of my principal data collection 
techniques to elicit attitudes and opinions on water governance from interviewees at 
different scales and levels. This technique was very useful as it allowed me to probe for 
in-depth responses, while also giving me the opportunity to study daily water 
management practice at first hand in remote rural communities (Olson and Muise, 
2010).  
    
Using the sociospatial relations approach alongside the governance approach thus 
provided me with a powerful theoretical lens for understanding the challenge involved 
in achieving sustainable water management. At the same time, it allowed me to see the 
extent to which governance approaches (see Figure 2.7) accurately reflected 
contemporary water management practice in the study area, and the dilemmas that water 
resource managers faced, which many of my respondents reflected upon in interview.  
 
From this brief discussion of the data needed for this twofold theoretical approach, 
informants’ interactions, experiences and opinions emerge as indispensible to gathering 
information on contemporary patterns of water management. Observational and 
interview-based techniques were therefore combined with field notes and group 
discussion in order to obtain data from key actors. In particular, semi-structured 
interviews and focussed discussions in groups provided me with a range of rich data to 
understand, explain and interpret the contemporary water management situation in north 
west Thailand. For these reasons the thesis adopted a qualitative approach to uncover 
and understand contemporary water management practices through accessing a wide 
range of personal user and administrative experiences. 
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Figure 3.1: The seven research propositions 
Source: Author 
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As state-led irrigation for agriculture is the empirical focus of the thesis, the first 
criterion for site selection was to identify suitable Thai state-led irrigation projects. The 
main theoretical concept I use, governance, highlights the requirement to focus on 
specific water management decisionmaking arenas that bring relevant actors together. 
The second criterion necessary to ensure my study aim and objectives were 
accomplished was that the study area must have research participants who were willing 
and able to share their experiences to provide primary data, and whom have past and 
present experiences in water management and water governance. Taking these criteria 
into consideration led me to identify a study area in north west Thailand close to the 
area where I had conducted Master’s level research on water management issues. This 
offered me the advantage of being able to build upon and deepen my previous research 
experience. 
3.2.2 Study area selection 
 
Using these criteria, the study site chosen was the Mae Tang Irrigation Project (MTIP), 
focusing on the irrigated area of Integrated Water User Group Zone 10 (IWUG Zone 
10) positioned at the boundary of the MTIP area (see figure 3.2), namely Nam Bo 
Luang. This area is substantially different from that with which I was familiar with my 
Master’s work, and it had a number of features which shaped my research practice. The 
first was that farmers here have to contend with the disadvantage of being situated at the 
end of the main delivery canal. IWUG Zone 10’s location means its water users, 
particularly in the dry season, always have to share ‘their’ water with non-agricultural 
water user groups such as Government agencies, tourism organizations and businesses. 
Secondly the area contained both state-led irrigation management and two local 
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irrigation projects (muang fai), namely Mai Rai Ror Weir (MRRW) and Kor Mai Ton 
Weir (KMTW). These two types of water governance manage water in a relatively self-
contained way: indeed, they had never exchanged ideas on water allocation or delivery, 
or sought to share their water to solve allocative problems, despite the fact that most of 
IWUG Zone 10 members used to be members of muang fai (that is, before MTIP’s 
irrigation canal and ditch system was constructed). Thus, state intervention has 
effectively separated water users, providing me with the challenge of seeking to identify 
appropriate governance mechanisms that might improve cooperation and collaboration 
between the two systems.  
 
The innate characteristics of this study area thus allowed me to examine how the 
theoretical approaches outlined might be used to understand and to reconcile actor 
interactions of both water governance modes, how local sociospatial relations shaped 
water use, and to advise on transitioning to sustainable water management.  
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Figure 3.2: Nam Bo Luang’s two water governance modes, with their irrigated      
areas 
Source: Author 
 
Participant selection drew upon fieldwork experience derived from my preliminary pilot 
study, undertaken in 2010. Crucially, using governance and sociospatial relations as the 
steering concepts of this research stressed collaboration among actors as a basis for 
effective governance in water management. Similarly any transition to more sustainable 
water management in the study area would need greater interplay and interaction among 
actors at multiple scales and levels. Thus, the target sample population for the study 
required participants from state-led irrigation projects, farmers, private agencies, and 
3.2.3 Participant selection 
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participants from the two muang fai systems. Key informant selection in each target 
group or sampling group was very important to gather the most relevant data for the 
study, thereby obtaining a ‘representative characterization’ of the sample population I 
was interested in (Rice, 2010).  
 
Purposive sampling was employed, based upon the theoretical requirements, to select 
informants from Government agencies, private sectors and administrator groups 
(representatives of farmers) in the study area and to ensure balance of group sizes where 
multiple groups were selected (Black, 1999; Kuzel, 1999). For group members or 
farmers, the snowball technique was chosen to expand the sample while retaining a high 
proportion of ‘information-rich’ respondents (Kuzel, 1999). The selected technique was 
applied to interviewees whose farms were situated at the top, the middle and the end of 
the delivery laterals according to geographical location advantages and disadvantages of 
receiving water. This enabled me to identify respondents who could provide detailed 
first-hand knowledge of water allocation and management issues (Taylor and Bogdan, 
1998).  
 Participants from Government agencies with responsibilities for water 
management were approached as they handled the national government policy for 
implementation. Respondents in this group comprised, first, a sample group of Mae 
Tang Irrigation Project (MTIP), including its Chief of Water Distribution and 
Maintenance, Head of Water Distribution and Maintenance Zone 4 (responsible for 
delivering water to IWUG Zone 10) and Zone Assistant of Water Distribution and 
Maintenance Zone 4. This group was selected as they played crucial roles in the study 
area, as well as working with farmers and non-agricultural water users at all levels. 
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Secondly, a sample group of the Joint Management Committee for Irrigation (JMC) was 
created by me including representatives from eight Subdistrict Administrative 
Organizations (SAOs) and two Royal military campuses (both heavily reliant upon 
irrigation water from Mae Tang Irrigation Project). The role of the Joint Management 
Committee for Irrigation is considered in detail in Chapter 6, as it provides a forum for 
bringing together participants in water planning, water management and infrastructure 
maintenance with Mae Tang Irrigation Project officials and other water user groups.  
Participants from private sector organizations were considered especially 
important as they included non-agricultural water users, which are of growing 
importance regionally. Indeed, MTIP is now obliged to provide water to support urban 
economies and tourism according to the national economic development policy (see 
Chapter 4). The sample group included representatives of four organizations: the 
Chiang Mai Provincial Waterworks Authority, the Chiang Mai Night Safari, the Royal 
Flora Ratchapruek Chiang Mai, and His Majesty’s Northern Study Centre of 
Sustainable Economy. In each case, the interviewee selected was the person responsible 
for water delivery planning.  
 The last group in the fieldwork sample comprised participants from Water User 
Groups (WUGs), mainly farmers and members of MTIP and muang fai systems. These 
participants were divided into water management/administration and water 
participation.   
‘Managers and Administrators’ were farmer representatives who took 
responsibility for water allocation on behalf of their members, and who tackled water 
allocation problems as and when they arose. Respondents in this group consisted of one 
sample group of WUA (including the WUA chief, WUA vice chiefs, a WUA Deputy 
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Chief of Water Distribution and Maintenance and a senior farmer), selected as they 
worked with all chiefs of IWUG and controlled group functions through rules and 
regulations, and the roles and responsibilities of members. A second sample group was 
drawn from IWUG Zone 10 (including the IWUG Zone 10 head and his four deputy 
heads), as WUGs offered a focus for farmers in every water management activity by 
obliging members to respect the water management rules, and controlling water delivery 
in sub-canals and ditches for members to ensure that water was fairly shared and 
thoroughly (Water Management Development Group, 2011). Thirdly, sample groups 
were drawn from Mai Ray Row Weir and Kor Mai Tun Weir, comprising weir 
chairmen and their assistants. This group was selected as they are entirely responsible 
for muang fai functions through rules and regulations, roles and responsibility of 
members, and so could provide me with up-to-date and longitudinal data that might 
affect the ability of water management and water governance in muang fai irrigated 
areas.            
 Interviewees thus comprised both rank-and-file farmers from IWUG Zone 10 
and muang fai, establishing data collection on day-to-day water management methods 
for cultivation through the wet and dry seasons. Apart from this, respondents offered 
their opinion on participation, perceptions, attitudes towards prevailing modes of water 
management in the study area. 
 
All in all, the total number of interviewees was 192, with their precise composition set 
out in the five tables below.  
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Table 3.1: Research participants from Government agencies 
 
 
Agency 
 
 
Interviewee’s role 
 
Participant 
number 
 
Total  
participants 
 
Mae Tang Irrigation Project 
Chief of Water 
Distribution and 
Maintenance 
1 
14 
Head of Water 
Distribution and 
Maintenance Zone 4 
1 
Zone 4 assistant 2 
Chiang Mai Municipality Mayor 1 
Rim Nue Subdistrict Municipality Mayor 1 
Hang Dong Subdistrict 
Municipality 
Mayor 1 
Mae Tang Subdistrict 
Administrative Organization 
Chief Executive 1 
Kee Lek Subdistrict 
Administrative Organization  
Chief Executive 1 
Nong Kaew Subdistrict 
Administrative Organization  
Chief Executive 1 
Yoo Wa Subdistrict 
Administrative Organization  
Chief Executive 1 
Ta Wang Praw Subdistrict 
Administrative Organization  
Chief Executive 1 
Royal Animal and Land Farm 
Department 3 Master 1 
Royal Pack Squadron Department Master 1 
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Table 3.2: Research participants from private sector organizations and companies 
 
 
Agency 
 
 
Interviewee’s role 
 
Participant 
number 
 
Total  
participants 
 
Chiang Mai Provincial 
Waterworks Authority Manager 1 
4 
Chiang Mai Night Safari Project Manager 1 
Royal Flora Ratchapruek Chiang 
Mai 
Director 1 
His Majesty’s Northern Study 
Centre of Sustainable Economy Manager 1 
 
 
Table 3.3: Research participants from Water User Association (WUA) and   
Integrated Water User Group Zone 10 (IWUG Zone 10) (MTIP) 
 
 
Agency 
 
 
Interviewee’s role 
 
Participant 
number 
 
Total  
participants 
 
Water User 
Association 
Chief 1 
7 
Vice Chief 4 
 
Deputy Chief of Water Distribution and 
Maintenance 
1 
Senior farmer (Consultant) 1 
Integrated Water 
User Group 
Zone 10 
Head 1 
81 
 Deputy Head  4 
Water user of Rong Wua Village 26 
Water user of Nam Bo Luang Village 28 
Water user of Ton Kaew Village 12 
Water user of Nong Wai Village 10 
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Table 3.4: Research participants from muang fai irrigation systems 
  
 
Agency 
 
 
Interviewee’s role 
 
Participant 
number 
 
Total  
participants 
 
Mai Ray Ror 
Weir 
Chairman 1 
64 
Chief (Chairman assistant)  4 
Water user of Hua Fai Village 12 
Water user of Nong Waii Village 23 
Water user of Nong Ha Village 14 
Water user of Jom Jang Village 10 
Kor Mai Tun  
Weir 
Chairman 1 
22 
Chief (Chairman assistant) 2 
Water user of Ton Kaew Village 9 
Water user of Nong Wai Luang Village 10 
 
 
Table 3.5: Total number of participants in the study 
Agency Participant number 
Government agencies   14 
Private sector organizations and companies     4 
Civil society (farmers) 174 
Total participant number 192 
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Previous sections demonstrate how primary research relied upon contact with 
individuals and communities in the field. Ethical considerations inevitably needed to be 
addressed during primary data collection and post-data collection phases, requiring me 
to protect the rights of participants, communities and environments involved in, or 
affected by, my research.  
3.2.4 Research ethics  
 
The University of Birmingham (UoB) established the ‘Code of Practice for Research’ 
(2011-2012) to ensure research practice meets required ethical standards, and embeds 
good practice in all aspects of the researcher’s work. In essence, the general principles 
of this Code require research activities not to harm participants; to respect respondents’ 
privacy; to respect the rights of all participants; and to ensure informed consent is 
granted (Bryman, 2008; Hay, 2010). My research design was approved by UoB’s 
Humanities and Social Sciences (HASS) Ethical Review Committee.  
 
A participant informant sheet and consent form was created according to the ‘Code’, in 
order to ensure that participants’ rights were respected during the research process. I 
designed the sheet and form to suit participants with any level of educational attainment 
and after that translated it into Thai. For participants with a lower level of literacy than 
others, I explained in person the purpose of the study and the data requirements before 
enrolment into the research. Respondents were free to withdraw from the study at any 
time, for any reason. The sheet and form was provided by me as a researcher before the 
interviews and anonymity guaranteed for all participants. This was to ensure 
confidentiality of the research.   
75 
 
Critical reflection upon the positionality of the researcher is now regarded as a vital 
factor that affects the execution of field research (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998; Miller and 
Crabtree, 1999; Silverman, 2000; Silverman, 2010). As much time is spent in the field 
with participants, my positionality could result in me having biases with some 
participants that might influence the ways in which I conducted research or interpreted 
research results. To avoid these problems, I always referred in the field to my study 
methodology. Moreover to gain data from participants I found it crucial to be open, 
constructive and cooperative with my research participants and organizations during 
fieldwork (c.f. Hopkins, 2007). As Hopkins (2007, p.388) notes, “In doing research, it 
is important that researchers are considerate of both the similarities and differences 
between themselves and research participants”. Positionality also requires similarities to 
be taken into account between informants and researchers – for example, in culture, 
education, social and economic status. As a result, during fieldwork, I tried to use my 
Thai nationality and my local origins to create a close bond with respondents in the 
study area. My idea in doing so was that they would then feel more at ease in giving me 
their honest views and opinions. As Dwyer and Buckle (2009) note, building this 
‘trusted’ status allows researchers more rapid and complete acceptance by their 
participants. Shared nationality automatically provides a level of trust and openness in 
research participants that would likely not have been present otherwise. Certainly in 
practice, participants were typically open with me, permitting rich and insightful 
qualitative data to be gathered.  I followed Hopkins and Dwyer and Buckle’s 
suggestions by conveying to respondents that I was a local, and by speaking the same 
dialect as local people to cement my relationship with them. This allowed me to 
3.2.5 Researcher positionality 
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establish a rapport with my study participants, drawing upon our shared experiences and 
attributes. Our similarities and frequent discussions during field surveys enabled a close 
rapport to build between us. I was also open and deeply interested in the experience of 
my research participants, and committed to accurately representing their experiences.  
 
To sum up, I strived to be aware of my positionality particularly while I was in the field 
but also while undertaking data collation and synthesis, and, crucially, in interpreting 
my research results.  
 
3.3 Implementing empirical data collection and data analysis 
Following completion of the preparatory phase of the project, in phases 2 and 3 my 
research activities moved to data collection and analysis. These phases are considered in 
detail below.  
 
As the study involved different types of water management organizations - state-led 
irrigation project (MTIP) and local muang fai irrigation systems – my research involved 
varied research settings. First was ‘closed’ and ‘private’ settings (Silverman, 2000), 
such as MTIP, local administrative organizations, and private agencies. Here to conduct 
fieldwork I needed to speak with organizational ‘gatekeepers’ and seek their formal 
permission to conduct research. Second was quasi-public settings (Taylor and Bogden, 
1998), such as MRRW and KMTW, where access was freely available as they are 
community-based, but where I needed to obtain permission from community leaders to 
enter and ask for interviews. 
3.3.1 Gaining access 
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Access to both types of irrigation management was through ‘gatekeepers’ who exercise 
great control over research activities, as Glesne (2006, p.44) makes clear: “Gatekeeping 
refers to your acquisition of consent to go where you want, observe what you want, talk 
to whomever you want, obtain and read whatever documents you require, and do all of 
this for whatever period of time you need to satisfy your research purpose”. 
 
Thus the MTIP’s ‘gatekeeper’ was the Director who has responsibility for managing 
officials and all activities in ‘the project’, as well as working with every level of 
stakeholders. ‘Gatekeepers’ could also identify for me respondents whom might provide 
the necessary information for my study. As a result, I drafted an introductory letter in 
Thai that described my research and asked for their participation. The same method was 
used to gain access to the gatekeepers themselves, who were key figures in each 
organization, such as local administrations organizations and private agencies.  
 
Gaining access was vital to developing trust with water stakeholders prior to them 
sharing their experiences and observations. Fortunately, no rejections emerged when 
fieldwork data collection was conducted. Notwithstanding, gaining access through 
‘gatekeepers’ can lead to other participants being marginalized, as gatekeepers try to 
control knowledge availability (Broadhead and Rist, 1976; Silverman, 2010). I avoided 
the ‘gatekeepers’ influence in steering me to particular people by employing the 
snowball technique (mentioned in section 3.2.3) to identify those farms that were 
located at the end of the canals as they always face with disadvantages over accessing 
water (Chambers, 2013). I also managed this issue by actively seeking out ‘typical’ 
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farm businesses and conducting interviews where it was convenient for these 
respondents, for example in village halls, temples or private dwellings.   
 
After securing clearance from ‘gatekeepers’, pilot and primary and secondary data 
collection were undertaken, as described in the following section. 
 
Data collection was divided into two activities; secondary and primary data collection. 
Secondary data was sought to provide background information on the MTIP and its 
water user groups, and muang fai systems. Thereafter, preparing for the first fieldwork 
was initiated. Preliminary data collection or the pilot study was done in August - 
September 2010. The objectives of the pilot were to (i) check the appropriateness of the 
selected study site and sample groups; (ii) identify key informants for later fieldwork; 
(iii) contextualize the study and the primary interactions of each stakeholder; (iv) 
develop preliminary knowledge of water management context and governance style; 
and (v) to collect the data for subsequent analysis.  
3.3.2 Data collection and data analysis 
 
Data collection comprised three elements. The first utilized semi-structured interviews 
based on prepared question themes to ascertain water management challenges and 
difficulties from MTIP officials. These interviews required respondents to reflect on 
their governance style, sectoral integration and scale of analysis and operation. Question 
themes were standardized to ensure comparability of data sets and to assist cross-
checking and accuracy of the collected data.  
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The second and third stages also used semi-structured interviews to understand the 
structure of IWUG Zone 10 and muang fai systems. The participants included the 
leaders, their assistants and members. The same processes, method and question themes 
were used for IWUG Zone 10 and muang fai samples. All participants were interviewed 
separately face-to-face to allow for considered answers that provided depth to the 
analysis undertaken (Longhurst, 2010). Questioning was semi-structured (Longhurst, 
2010). I sought to establish a rapport with my interviewees by asked general questions 
early on, before focusing on more substantive research topics as Taylor and Bogdan 
(1998) suggest. Each interview took about one to one and a half hours, during the 
course of which I would take brief notes including my observations of the respondents’ 
actions and feelings. All interviews were digitally recorded to capture the richness of 
responses from my research subjects.   
 
Once each interview was completed, they were transcribed into Thai and then translated 
into English. Next, a summary report was submitted to my supervisors by email from 
the study area. All data and transcriptions were kept in a file in my computer which 
only I and my supervisors could access to ensure the respondents’ confidentiality. Once 
every transcription was completed, analysis was begun by looking at the responses to 
each individual question and coding up interviewees’ responses, based on foundation 
themes of governance and sociospatial relations. I also tried to reflect on what was not 
in the data by considering what interviewees had omitted in their answers to my 
questions (Ryan and Bernard, 2003, cited in Bryman, 2008, p.555).  
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Once preliminary data collection was completed and analysed, fieldwork data collection 
was begun. This was undertaken between 2011 and 2012. As well as deepening the 
findings obtained from the pilot study, I conducted work on two recently introduced 
organizational structures, the Joint Management Committee for Irrigation (JMC) and the 
Water User Association (WUA).  Interviews within the Joint Management Committee 
for Irrigation were conducted with the heads of ten local administrative organizations, 
four private sector bodies and WUA representatives (see Chapter 6). Interviewees were 
selected based on their administrative role in water allocation planning. As both JMC 
and WUA were ‘private-setting’ organizations, official letters were drafted in order to 
arrange interviews. Each letter contained my details, a brief outline of my research 
project, methods and process of data collection and a self-administered questionnaire 
with clear instructions. In the letter, I offered to conduct a face-to-face interview (based 
on the structured questions in the questionnaire), in case they requested and/or they 
need additional information.  I chased up individuals who did not reply. For the 
administrative group of WUA, which is under the responsibility of MTIP, gaining 
access was less problematic as they knew in advance about the study through the 
MTIP’s Director. 
 
Questions were carefully crafted based on the governance and sociospatial approaches 
outlined in Chapter 2, focused on the seven research propositions. Questionnaires 
consisted of both closed and open questions and were divided into seven sections: 
organization details, water allocation from MTIP, MTIP’s water governance, social 
learning and networking, sociospatial relations, the role in water management as a 
member of JMC, and the respondents’ own comments and suggestions (see Appendix 
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1).  This method was chosen because it was more convenient for respondents working 
in organizations, as they could complete the questionnaire when they wanted (Bryman, 
2008). Completed questionnaires were reviewed by me and in case of non-responses 
were returned for clarification. 
 
Key informants were targeted for in-depth semi-structured interviews in order to 
explore topics in depth, and yielded invaluable insights. In addition, this data had 
greater depth and quality as I was able to follow up on answers and probe for greater 
detail. Questions could be added or altered in real-time if needed. It also allowed me to 
explain or help clarify questions, increasing the likelihood of insightful responses. 
Similarly, face-to-face contact allowed respondents to open up on a one-on-one basis 
and for me to be more flexible in administering interviews to particular individuals. In-
depth semi-structured interviews with all key informants from the pilot study were 
conducted separately and took about one and a half to two hours each on average. 
 
After obtaining data from sample groups of MTIP, private agencies, JMC and both 
muang fai, I focused my attention on group members who were farmers in IWUG Zone 
10, MRRW and KMTW with the objectives of comparing data gathered from the water 
administrator groups, to gain cross-comparative experiences, feelings, opinions and 
attitude in their water use, their leader management, and to gauge the interaction and 
relationship among farmers and their leaders. Group discussions then followed, 
focussing on the administrative groups of IWUG Zone 10, WUA and JMC as well as 
the representatives from MTIP. Each group contained between 3-7 participants based 
upon the number of administrators in each group. I acted as a facilitator and moderator 
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in these discussions. Following Opdenakker (2006)’s recommendation, I ensured that 
one or two people did not dominate these meetings.  
 
Each group discussion lasted approximately one to two hours, with participants asked to 
reflect on how the efficiency and sustainability of water management might be 
improved; how the group maintained and built its networks in water management; and 
what their opinion was of the main difficulties arising from current water allocation 
arrangements. After the group discussions were completed, I summarised the issues 
they raised and requested that they give me any additional information. 
 
The dynamic and fast-moving nature of water policy debates and management change 
in the study area meant that I needed to follow up developments once I had returned 
from fieldwork and prior to the final write-up of the thesis. Logistical considerations 
(chiefly time and finance) prevented me from returning to the field to conduct these 
meetings in person. So, in 2012 I decided to conduct telephone and Skype interviews 
with my key respondents to track any further changes in water management and 
governance. I began each remote interview with the prepared question themes and spent 
roughly half an hour talking with each respondent. Telephone interviews needed to be 
recorded in order to produce transcripts for analysis, so consent form was provided in 
advance already, and I asked again at the start of the telephone call.  
 
Once all transcriptions were completed, data analysis was begun. Miller and Crabtree 
(1999, p.129) suggest that researchers “must keep redescribing and adjusting, gathering 
new information; this is the iteration between data collection and interpretation". I 
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followed these instructions throughout the research process, and this reflected the 
dynamics of my data collection.   
 
The informing theoretical approaches employed in this thesis of governance and 
sociospatial relations provided me with the primary focus for coding and interpreting 
data. Then, I concentrated on four types of themes in the data as Strauss and Corbin 
(1990) suggest; interaction among actors, conditions, strategies and tactics and 
consequences, in each approach. I started with interpreting actor interaction and while I 
was reading each transcription line by line, I used coloured-codes where the informants 
indicated how they engaged with others, what they thought of others, and what others 
did to them with respect to the seven research propositions. After that, I focused on 
whether similar interactions emerged in the data under each approach, underlined the 
‘strategies and tactics’ of what people did in certain situations or how they handled 
particular events, and the ‘consequences’ of these strategies (Cope, 2010). Apart from 
the seven research propositions, repeated phrases or words were also recorded where 
these offered new insights into data interpretation. Thus by using these analytical 
categories to code the data, I was able to connect one code to another code as well as to 
make new connections, so identifying potential new investigative themes.  
 
Where quantitative data arose from the questionnaires, it was interpreted using simple 
arithmetic analysis, for example data expressing percentage of respondents’ answers.  
 
Synthesising these qualitative and quantitative data sets allowed a picture of the current 
actor interactions in water management at each scale and level to emerge, as well as the 
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problems and recommendations which could be used to identify further mechanisms to 
facilitate collaboration and resolve coordination problems. All of these helped me 
understand how key actors engaged with these issues, and how conditions of good water 
governance might be implemented to create more sustainable water management 
arrangements in the study area.  
 
3.4 Conclusions 
This Chapter has set out how governance and sociospatial relations as key theoretical 
concepts informed the methodology of the thesis. I have clarified the data collection and 
analytical approaches used to fulfill my research aim and objectives. In summary, data 
collection methods comprised: (i) 192 face-to-face in-depth semi-structured interviews 
with key actors; (ii) 20 questionnaires distributed to actors on the JMC committee, 
including representatives from WUA, MTIP, local government administrative 
organizations and private agencies; (iii) four group discussions with actors from a state-
led irrigation project; and (iv) 20 remote interviews with four administrator groups. 
 
The interconnected data collection phases proved largely successful, enabling me to 
gain ‘rich information’, first-hand knowledge, facts, feelings, opinions, and 
recommendations, from my respondents. The research techniques I applied in the 
fieldwork were also effective in that they allowed participants to reveal their thoughts 
and opinions frankly and openly. In addition, fieldwork brought different muang fai and 
MTIP groups into contact helping the search for more collaborative water management 
approaches. Presentation of the outputs from data collection is discussed in the 
following Chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONTEMPORARY WATER GOVERNANCE IN 
THAILAND: THE INFLUENCE OF THE NATION STATE ON 
LOCAL WATER MANAGEMENT  
 
This chapter outlines the national context for Thailand’s water management, focusing 
on irrigation and the impact of national legislation and patterns of administration on the 
development of water governance at provincial and local levels, which I then examine 
in detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  Data for this Chapter is derived from Government reports, 
national water policy reviews and other published documentation, in Thai and English.  
 
The Chapter is structured in four interlinked parts which correspond to chronological 
development in Thai national water management and its governance in each period. 
Physical geography, water resources and hydrological characteristics of Thailand are set 
out in the first section in order to provide an overview of how physiographic factors 
have shaped past and present water management arrangements.  I then outline 
traditional water management systems that were dominant before Thailand began to 
implement its National Economic and Social Development Plan in the early 1960s as a 
means of encouraging greater economic development nationally; part of this Plan was to 
adopt a national water management policy. The third section then discusses the 
country’s water management transition to comply with National Development Plans, 
particularly as these apply to agricultural activities. This has resulted in successive Thai 
governments seeking to exert complete legal control over national water management at 
all scales and levels as it has applied to agricultural and rural communities.  However, 
centralized water management has coincided with major water scarcity and supply 
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issues, including those arising from climate change, and greatly increased competition 
to abstract water among industrial, domestic and agricultural sectors. The fourth section 
reflects on these challenges to water supply. I then draw together the main points of the 
Chapter and consider the role they might play in inhibiting or promoting the transition 
to more sustainable water management nationally.  
 
4.1 Thailand: physical geographical and water resource characteristics  
Thailand is located in tropical south-east Asia, and is part of the Indochina peninsula. It 
lies on the geographical coordinates of 15° 0' 0" N, 100° 0' 0" E, covering an area of 
514,000 square kilometres in the centre of the South-East Asian peninsula (Thai 
Meteorological Department, 2012). It is bordered by Myanmar (Burma), the People’s 
Democratic Republic of Laos, Cambodia and Malaysia, and has 2,420 kilometres of 
coast line on the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman sea (Figure 4.1). Thailand stretches 
1,650 kilometres from north to south, and from east to west 780 kilometres at its widest 
point (UN Thailand, 2012).  
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Figure 4.1: Location of Thailand 
Source: World Atlas (2012) 
 
Thailand is usually classified into five geographical regions according to economic, 
social and ecological criteria (UN Thailand, 2012). These are the central, northern, 
north-eastern, south-eastern and southern regions respectively. The central region 
(including Bangkok Metropolitan Region) is dominated by the basin of the Chao Phraya 
River, which runs from north to south and after crossing Bangkok flows to the Gulf of 
Thailand. The northern region is mountainous and remains the most heavily afforested 
area of the country. The main centres of population are in the narrow alluvial valleys 
along the four north-south flowing rivers which unite in the northern central plain to 
form the Chao Phraya. The north-eastern region (Isarn) constitutes approximately one-
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third of the country’s surface area, comprising the Korat Plateau (which is bounded on 
the north and east by the Mekong River) and to the south by the Dongrek escarpment. 
The region is drained by the Mun and Chi rivers, both tributaries of the Mekong. 
Approximately one-third of the national population lives in the north-east. The south-
eastern region is relatively less populated and includes hill country from Bangkok to the 
Cambodian border; it is characterized by higher rainfall and poorer soils than the 
adjoining central region. The southern peninsula has the highest rainfall nationally. It is 
the principal rubber-growing area, and contains extensive alluvial tin deposits (UN 
Thailand, 2012). 
 
Located outside the typhoon belt, Thailand can be divided into two climatic zones (UN 
Thailand, 2012). The north, north-east, south-east and central regions (including 
Bangkok) have a climate with three distinct seasons: rainy, from June to October; cool, 
from November to February; and hot, with the highest temperatures and sunniest 
periods from March to May. Temperatures in Bangkok vary between 20˚C in December 
and 38˚C in April with an average humidity of 82 percent. Winter temperatures in the 
north can fall to 10˚C or lower. The average rainfall in these regions is 1,572.5 
millimetres per year (Thai Meteorological Department, 2012). The southern region has 
a characteristic tropical rainforest climate. Rainfall occurs virtually throughout the year, 
although a number of micro-climates can be found. There is little variation in 
temperature, which is on average 28˚C throughout the year. March and April are 
normally the driest months in the south. The periods of maximum rainfall in these areas 
vary according to climatic sub-regions (UN Thailand, 2012). 
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Thailand’s average annual water volume is estimated at 213,424 million cubic metres 
with 183,001 million cubic metres falling in the rainy season, and 30,423 million cubic 
metres in the dry season (Royal Irrigation Department, 2012). The country is the 
world’s largest rice exporter, and agriculture is a major contributor to the national 
economy, especially in terms of providing employment (Roonapai, 2006; Kisner, 2008). 
As a result, water is in great demand to support the agricultural sector, with 106,169 
million cubic metres or 65 percent of the total water demand accounted for by irrigation 
(Royal Irrigation Department, 2011).   
 
Irrigation development has been an essential component in Thailand’s agricultural and 
overall economic development. I consider this water-agriculture interrelation in detail in 
the following sections.    
 
4.2 North west (NW) Thailand and traditional approaches to water management  
River basins have been a critical physiographic context for agricultural development 
throughout Thailand’s history (Lebel et al., 2009). As a result, ‘know-how’ in water use 
and water management is a key agricultural technology (Vorathepputipong, 1996; 
Surarerks, 2006; Neef et al., 2007; Ounvichit et al., 2008). In this section I describe the 
historical arrangements and traditional water management systems in place nationally 
prior to adopting the First National Economic Plan in 1962.   
 
Human development of water resources in Thailand was pioneered in the country’s 
northern region with the explicit aim of serving the needs of agriculture. Written records 
confirm that the northern Thai (or Lanna Thai) people designed and introduced muang 
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fai irrigation management for agriculture more than 700 years ago (Surarerks, 2006). 
Muang fai thus predates Phya Mangrai’s (king of the Lanna Thai kingdom from 719-
774 AD) founding of the regional capital Chiang Mai, and the proclamation of the first 
recorded irrigation law (Mangrai Sart or Winitchai Mangrai) in 1296 AD. Indeed, some 
documentary sources from the Lanna Thai state that muang fai irrigation was in 
existence 1,300-1,400 years ago (Surarerks, 1968).   
 
Under muang fai, farmers manage water by building a small weir (fai) to raise water 
levels in rivers and divert the overflow water into cultivated (typically rice) fields 
through an earth canal (muang). This kind of traditional irrigation for agriculture is still 
called the “people’s irrigation system” (Vorathepputipong, 1996, p.27). The muang fai  
system was very effective as it represented a highly appropriate technology developed 
to take full advantage of the northern region’s hydrological and physiographic 
characteristics, with its steep slopes and plentiful water (Kao-Sa-Ard et al., 2001). Fai 
helped conserve water, and, by diverting supplies from upstream to downstream 
lowlands with more fertile soils and less water along muang networks, farmers could 
effectively manipulate cropping patterns (Lert-Wicha et al., 2009). Farmers’ local water 
knowledge and ‘folk wisdom’ built up over generations and allowed agricultural 
communities to make the most of locally available waters, and, through muang, control 
water flow as needed to rice fields. Thus muang could be used to slow water delivery 
rates and so manage agricultural lands appropriately.  
 
As a result, muang fai water management determined a small-scale pattern of 
agriculture, first in the north and then increasingly nationally as this irrigation  practice 
91 
 
spread, encouraging a relatively low rural poulation density during Thailand’s early 
modern period. Muang fai is a small-scale hydrological resource management system, 
and is not really viable for farm areas larger than about 1.6 square kilometres (Lert-
Wicha and Wichienkiew, 2003). Its physical structures are built from easily sourced 
locally available materials, chiefly bamboo wood and rock.  Thus, communities could 
easily finance muang fai themselves as the cost of infrastructures was cheap. Moreover, 
farmers are in complete control of water management as the system is based on 
mobilising local knowledge, starting with construction, then water delivery, water 
allocation and finally routine maintenance tasks. Furthermore this knowledge is 
intergenerational, with competence for water management remaining in local hands 
(Tan-Kim-Yong, 1993, cited in Kao-Sa-Ard, 2001, p.258).  
 
Sittilert (2003, p.80) characterises these traditional water management systems as 
follows: “The structure of the weir and the structure of the diversion systems consists of 
the main weir made from wood, which is replaced periodically. The site of the weir 
might be moved upward or downward, but it always needs to be well maintained. Some 
weirs are made from stone, impeding river flow to raise waters to the desired level. 
When water is required, farmers divert water into a main channel which is on a higher 
level than cultivated land, sending water down smaller channels that branch off. When 
the water is diverted into rice fields, ‘Tae’ or small water tubes made from bamboo are 
put into the small channel (lam muang soi) to divert water to ditches (lam muang sai 
kai) leading to the paddies. Excess water flows into a dredging canal (lam muang sia), 
which might act as a main channel of lower – lying areas”.        
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Muang fai administration is accomplished through ‘water user organizations’ (Figure 
4.2). These organize farmers to use water from the same weir at the local scale, making 
water user organizations the basis of a rural community-based natural resource 
management system that addresses the needs of productive agricultural areas (Lert-
Wicha et al., 2009), as each weir irrigates land farmed by many villages.  Water 
management is set out under customary law called ‘Sanya muang fai’, which nowadays 
provide the regulations governing consent and agreement of all members. These 
regulations are administered by a range of locally elected officials including  huana 
muang fai (chair), rong huana muang fai (deputy chair), phuchuai huana muang fai 
(assistant), lam nam (water messenger), and the water users themselves. The Sanya 
muang fai sets the annual work calendar (June to mid- November (only in the rainy 
season)), including dredging and repairing the system, setting exemptions for those who 
are ill or unable to work, establishing the rate of fines for those who do not work as 
scheduled and for those who ‘steal’ water or cause damage to weirs, failure to maintain 
the system such as dredging canals, and setting down penalties for being absent from 
meetings (Surarerks, 2006). 
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Figure 4.2: Muang fai organization 
Source: Author’s interview 
 
Sanya muang fai also codifies water use rights and specifies how to share water among 
members based on water availability, farm size and number of rice paddies, as well as 
the physical characteristics of the irrigated area. Members have to pay kha nam or an 
irrigation fee to fund the administration. The administrators collect the fee from the 
water users on different occasions and in various ways according to the agreement made 
between the administrators and the water user members. Generally, a rate is set for kha 
nam by determining the amount of cultivated land owned by farmers who use the water. 
The rate is always set out in the muang fai agreement (Surarerks, 2006). 
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94 
 
These water management rules and regulations were stipulated in the Muang Fai and 
Phanang Act of 1934, and the Peoples’ Irrigation Act of 1939, enacted by the Thai 
government in order to centralise control of local irrigation systems as well as protect 
and retain people interests. This was because problems emerged with water delivery and 
supply in some regions. As a result, farmers who owned land at the end of canals were 
unable to access sufficient water, resulting in frequent conflicts over water use 
(Palayasoot, 1982). However, after the enactment of the Peoples’ Irrigation Act, Sanya 
muang fai or agreements and regulations made under muang fai were no longer 
effective (Palayasoot, 2005).  
 
Chiang Mai has a long history of muang fai systems, as it is in the central part of Upper 
Ping River Basin, where irrigation practice dates back about 1,500 years (Surererks, 
2006). Cohen and Pearson (1998) reveal that there were three main reasons why Chiang 
Mai Basin was appropriated for muang fai irrigation systems. The first was the area had 
a relatively high catchment-to-ratio area, so water was plentiful in the rainy season. 
Secondly, the basin had sloping terrain, so flooding was not excessive. Lastly, water in 
the main rivers rarely dried up in the dry season, as there were occasional showers over 
in the surrounding mountains, resulting in groundwater being topped up.   
 
Since then, transformation of water and land use in Chiang Mai has been dramatically 
changed by the expansion and intensification of agriculture, urbanization, 
industrialization, and tourism. Hence this area was a selected target for introducing river 
basin organizations to promote integrated water resources management (see Chapter 1). 
These physiographic changes also affected muang fai systems across the region, such as 
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in Nam Bo Luang, San Pa Tong District. Promoting intensive agriculture along with a 
growing number of various types of economic activities led to insufficient water for 
farmers.      
 
This opened up the possibility for state-sponsored irrigation, which began in earnest 
with the diversion and use of unregulated stream flows to address water shortages 
during the dry season. Again, water shortages and storage solutions have a very long 
national history. In the Sukhothai period (c. 13th century AD), for example, the late 
King Ramkhamhaeng the Great had water storage tanks built on the outskirts of the 
former Thai capital to supply the township, which is the earliest recorded instance of 
storage of water resources in the country. Similarly in 1624, in the reign of the late King 
Prasartthong work was begun on a reservoir at Tharuthongdang in Saraburi province to 
supply royal plantations and for domestic use in the Tharu Kasem Royal Villa. 
 
However, the first recorded attempt to provide modern irrigation over large cultivated 
areas occurred just over 100 years ago when the country began to increase rice exports. 
The focus for this new development was a large irrigation system and associated water 
conservation scheme in the lower Chao Phraya basin (1896). By 1915, the first large 
scale gravity irrigation project had been completed, covering an area of 1,088 square 
kilometres on the Pasak river (Palayasoot, 2005). 
 
Subsequently, modern irrigation began in the Northern region in 1930, in the Northeast 
region in 1938, and in the Southern region only in 1948. The Government responsibility 
for irrigation changed organizations as a result of this dramatic expansion in irrigable 
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area. In 1902 the Krom Klong (Canal Department) of the government was established. 
Its original functions were to redredge and dig canals in the lower parts of Thailand’s 
central plain. In 1914 Krom Thodnam (Water Diversion Department) was established to 
replace Krom Klong, which was then renamed by royal decree Krom Jalaprathan 
(Royal Irrigation Department, hereafter RID) in 1927, assuming at this time 
responsibility for all national water resource development projects (Palayasoot, 2005). 
State irrigation development was given legislative basis nationally under the State 
Irrigation Act (1942).  
 
This Act began a process of profound change in the national water management 
paradigm away from muang fai, which was dependent on the availability of water for 
rice planting only in the rainy season. Under muang fai, rice production was used for 
sustenance or trading among village members, rather than for commerce. Under the new 
state management paradigm, these traditional ways of water management came under 
increasing pressure as rice production became the main national export good. Economic 
demand began to dominate the country’s water management, particularly in irrigation, 
with massive consequences for water management nationally. 
 
4.3 National economic growth and development in Thailand: the emergence of 
‘command and control’ water management, 1958-1996  
Once an export market for rice had been established in the early 20th century, successive 
Thai governments began to play important roles in water management and in 
developing irrigation systems with the purpose of facilitating expansion of the paddy 
rice sector. Governments acted in effect as a national supply-side water manager (TDRI, 
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1990), a role promulgated especially through measures introduced under the First 
(1962) through to the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plans 
(1996).  
 
Economic and social development in the 20th century was driven by successive 
governments. From 1958, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
gave advice on investment in irrigation system development to the government in order 
to improve the efficiency of rice production for the export market. Thus rice production 
became integral to national economic growth in Thailand – a plank in the country’s 
economic development strategy (Isawilanon, 2009).   
 
Between the First National Economic Development Plan (1962-1966) and the Fourth 
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1977-1981), national governments 
gave relatively high priority to agricultural development, as approximately 80 percent of 
the total working population was engaged in farming and rice production. Agriculture 
contributed the largest share to the country’s national income, and was the principal 
source of supplies for domestic commerce and industries, and for export (The National 
Economic Development Board, 1967). As a result, expansion of agricultural production 
would increase by no less than four percent per annum following substantial increase in 
government investment in agricultural infrastructures for irrigation and rice storage. 
This also coincided with the beginning of the ‘green revolution’ and the introduction of 
modern plant breeding and harvesting technologies, markedly changing the character of 
muang fai towards an export-oriented agriculture (Yaowalert, 2002; Isawilanon, 2009).    
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Irrigation development was focused on constructing storage tanks and reservoirs with 
canals, ditches and dyke systems to facilitate the rapid increase in water demand in 
agriculture (The National Economic Development Board, 1966). Large and medium-
scale state-led irrigation projects were completed at this time, such as Lam Pao, 
Bhumiphol, Sirinthorn and Huay Luang Dams, with economic support from the World 
Bank (The National Economic Development Board, 1971). This development also 
included the People’s Irrigation projects promotion in the Central plain and the 
Northeastern region.   
 
At the same time, this “era of dam construction” (Yaowalert, 2002, p.2) also had to 
support more electricity generation, an irrigation system and to boost tourism. Thailand 
changed from being primarily agricultural to having an increasing emphasis on 
industrial exports as a newly - industrialized country. This drive to become a leading 
rice exporter, and Thailand’s emergence as one of the newly industrialized countries 
(NICs), the so-called fifth ‘tiger’ economy of Asia, greatly increased national water 
demand.   
 
The Royal Irrigation Development (RID) was charged with the country’s irrigation 
development and management at all scales. RID began to work with other national 
agencies, including the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT), and to 
work over more closely with government agencies with agricultural responsibilities,  
notably the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, and the Ministry of the Interior 
(especially the Land Development and Cooperative Promotion Departments).  Part of 
RID’s response was to introduce Water user organizations (WUO). Although Thailand 
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already had water user organizations under muang fai, the first water user association 
(WUA) was established in 1963 at the Gud Ling Ngor Irrigation Project, Udon Thani 
Province, expressly to take forward state-led irrigation. This association was given legal 
status under the Civil and Commercial Code (1966). After that, water user associations 
were established regionally in order to expand intensive rice production and to 
strengthen farmers associations and cooperatives, and farmers’ education programmes 
in the principles of intensive irrigated farming (The National Economic Development 
Board, 1971).       
 
Water User Associations spread rapidly across Thai regions with the main objectives of 
water delivery and maintenance. However, WUA administrative structures did not 
sufficiently support water allocation and maintenance to members. WUA size did not 
suit increase in farm scale and the increasing number of members, and it was very 
difficult for RID to oversee the activities of water users. As a result, some farmers 
remained outside the WUA system since there was no law to enforce them not to use 
irrigation water. Consequently by the early 1980s, RID slowed the establishment of 
WUAs and commissioned research to improve WUO constitution and management. The 
conclusion of this work was that WUO’s optimum size should be a small number of 
farms to ensure water management was not overly complex, and remained in touch with 
on-farm developments. RID’s emphasis was thus on WUOs with small memberships 
and clear lines of water responsibility, with the aim that farmers would  be able to 
quickly learn new irrigation methods and improve their own water management 
practices and community farming institutions. 
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As part of the Fifth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1982-1986), the 
government remained focused on improvement of irrigated land in order to create a 
national irrigation system and to increase national agricultural productivity. Moreover, 
the irrigation development policy attached importance to expanding the land area under 
irrigation through water pumping projects and small water resources initiatives. This 
was backed up with institutional reform targets that anticipated all farmers’ groupings 
and agricultural cooperatives would be merged into national bodies (National Economic 
and Social Development Board, 1981).    
 
The Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987-1991) recognised the 
increasing water demand for human consumption as well as for agriculture as a result of 
national population growth. Water previously allocated for irrigation was now needed 
for other purposes, including electricity generation, water transport, salinity control, and 
water supply for communities and industries. As a result, water scarcity emerged for the 
first time as a national challenge (National Economic and Social Development Board, 
1986). The direction of national water management policy was concentrated on 
systematic planning of water resource development. Notwithstanding, Sethaputra et al. 
(2001) state that this guidelines were not implemented thoroughly, with most agencies 
still operating independently.    
 
The last national plan relevant to the study is the Seventh National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1992 – 1996), which foresaw increased water demand both 
nationally and at basin level. By the early 1990s, conflicts were already apparent among 
users with different objectives, including water for agriculture, household consumption, 
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and for industrial use resulting from the country’s extremely rapid economic expansion, 
while the administrative efficiency and the water procurement capability had not been 
sufficiently improved (National Economic and Social Development Board, 1991). As a 
result, Thailand was confronted with water resources management problems at two 
scales. Nationally, Thailand had problems with water policy and planning, budgeting 
the overall administrative framework and disseminating information. At basin scale, 
problems were evident with fragmentation of agency responsibilities, lack of proper 
management mechanisms and inadequate participation of stakeholders. Consequently 
the Seventh Plan set targets for upgrading management of all water resources nation-
wide, beginning with the 25 river basins.    
 
These River basin management plans were first initiated in 1994 when the Thai 
government allocated a budget to study and prepare a strategic plan for water 
management on the Chao-Phraya River. This was the initial step that reflected the 
state’s attempt in practicing water management, matching global water management 
priorities through the Integrated Water Resources Management approach (Bhakdikul, 
2005). Thus, after the completion of a preliminary river basin study, a sub-committee 
was established in 1998 to manage water in the Chao-Phraya basin with the task to set 
up a permanent River Basin Committee (RBC) (GWP-Southeast Asia, 2009). These 
RBCs have been rolled out nationally, and typically comprise members from 
government Departments, state enterprises, representatives of local organizations and 
water users’ organizations, and stakeholders who work or live in the focal river basins. 
By 2003, basin organizations had been established in all of the 25 major basins. 
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Kaewkulaya (2004) identifies that because of the lack of coordination among agencies, 
the Thai state decided to establish a central agency in water resources management in 
order to formulate plans, coordinate plan implementation and carry out other works 
concerning management of water resources. This became the National Water Resources 
Committee (NWRC), established in November 1996, and chaired by the Prime Minister 
with membership drawn from civil service permanent secretaries, heads of state 
enterprises, representatives of water user organizations of all sectors, technical experts, 
and representatives of non-government organizations (see Figures 4.3 and 4.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Structure of river basin organization 
Source: Pattanee (2008) 
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Figure 4.4: Structure of national water management 
Source: Pattanee (2008) 
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Under the seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan, the state has 
sought to encourage more efficient use of water and to recognise supply of irrigation 
water is increasingly limited and often falls short of fulfilling demand (Table 4.1). One 
measure considered was the charging of water fees in irrigated agricultural areas, and 
the setting up of a water utilization and delivery system to distribute water from the 
main waterways down to the farm level. Farmers who used this water were encouraged 
to participate in the planning of water distribution and maintenance of the distribution 
system at the farm level (National Economic and Social Development Board, 1991).   
However, Sethaputra et al. (2001) note that by the end of the Seventh Plan, water 
resources management in Thailand had not changed significantly since water supply and 
distribution is operated as an open-access system whereby water can be consumed free 
of charge by all economic sectors, especially agriculture.   
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Table 4.1: Progress and trends in water resource development, 1962 – 1996 
 
National Economic 
and Social 
Development Plan 
 
Irrigation 
area 
(square 
kilometre) 
 
Percentage 
of 
irrigation 
area over 
total area 
Capacity 
(million 
cubic metre) 
 
Percentage of  
increasing in 
capacity over 
previous year 
First Plan 16,000 3.031 14.472 n.a. 
Second Plan 17,600 3.418 15.079 4.19 
Third Plan 24,000 4.484 24.347 61.46 
Fourth Plan 25,600 4.939 25.462 4.58 
Fifth Plan 30,400 5.834 28.669 12.60 
Sixth Plan 33,600 6.458 30.200 5.34 
Seventh Plan 35,200 6.760 31.662 4.84 
 
Source: Budhaka et al. (2002) 
 
In summary, irrigation development for supporting national agriculture can be divided 
into three activities, namely: water management at on-farm level; water management 
through new infrastructure provision; and water management through allocation (ie. at 
river basin scale). Regarding on-farm water management, RID have organized water 
user groups with the intention of bringing greater coordination to agricultural water use 
for the state through registered organizations, i.e. water user’s cooperative or water 
user’s association. At infrastructure level, operation and management staff were 
appointed in RID to take care of the new irrigation facilities financed and constructed by 
the government. A project engineer was made responsible for overall project water 
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management. A continuous flow system in main canals and lateral canals was made 
standard operational practice, important in a country with a tropical climate. In 
principle, water management was based on partnership between RID and water users 
(Palayasoot, 2005). Lastly regarding management of water resources, RID’s Head 
Office and RID’s Regional Offices were responsible for water allocation among the 
irrigation projects through sharing of the common water resource. Allocation of water 
was based on the available amount of in-flow, demand from various water users, and 
other factors including lag time for released water to reach intake facilities, and need for 
discharge to raise water levels. At the national scale, the National Water Resources 
Committee (NWRC) now holds responsibility for water resources development and 
management alongside their counterparts in provincial government. Furthermore, 
Committees for River Basin management have begun to be established in some basins 
(Palayasoot, 2005). 
 
The resulting new paradigm of centralized water management has impacted greatly on 
the traditional muang fai system, particularly in northern Thailand. Cohen and Pearson 
(1998) acknowledge that after the expansion of the state irrigation projects, intensive 
agriculture began to rapidly expand with assistance from government. Farmers grew 
tobacco, soybeans, peanuts, onions, garlic, vegetables, peppers, and rice in the dry 
season and in either double or triple cropping sequences. Some of the most intensive 
cultivation methods (triple cropping) took place in areas irrigated by communal 
systems. These inevitably exacerbated conflict among farmers, given that more and 
more farmers were competing for scarce water resource. Sittilert (2003) reported that 
new large state-funded irrigation projects constructed in many major river basins could 
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provide water for intensive and diverse crop cultivation all year round. Consequently, 
many farmers abandoned their weirs. Cohen and Pearson (1998) point out that muang 
fai became increasingly dependent on the state for technical and financial assistance for 
weir maintenance, due to the mounting difficulties farmers faced in carrying out annual 
weir repairs; the competing labour demands of multiple cropping, and the rapid 
depletion of hardwood and bamboo materials caused by deforestation. Also, there were 
needs for state intervention to resolve irrigation disputes and to build large reservoirs to 
provide supplementary water during the dry season. These changes further increased the 
state’s ‘control and command’ approach to water management. 
 
Indeed ‘command and control’ water management developed substantially in the mid-
late 1980s, with the introduction of several government agencies that figured in national 
and local water management, as follows:   
• Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MONRE), with main 
departments namely Department of Water Resources (DWR) and Department of 
Groundwater (DGR), Pollution Control Department (PCD) including Wastewater 
Management Authority (WMA). 
• Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MOAC), including two main 
departments – Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and Land Development Department 
(LDD). 
• Ministry of Interior (MOI) including Metropolitan Waterworks Authority 
(MWA), Provincial Waterworks Authority (PWA), and a number of local government 
agencies (LGAs) - such as municipalities. 
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• Ministry of Industry (MOInd) including Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand, 
and Department of Industrial Works. 
• Ministry of Energy (MOE) including Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand 
 
As a result, irrigation management in all regions has now been subject to centralization 
processes for more than thirty years with the sole aim of increasing commercial 
production and export opportunities. Muang fai’s persistence in the face of this change 
testifies to the presence of strong local social organization, local development capacity, 
and local social and political force (Tan-Kim-Yong, 2000). Having established recent 
drivers for centralizing water management functions and capacities within Thailand, in 
the following section I consider the need for developing more flexible and adaptable 
water management approaches nationally. 
  
4.4 Water as a source of complexity, uncertainty, unpredictability and conflict: a 
role for adaptive governance? 
Between the Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001) and 
the Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plan (2012-2015), the Thai 
state has adjusted the state’s strategic focus to take account of encouraging greater 
public participation at all levels of state projects under the ‘good governance’ principle, 
with the aim of achieving sustainable development in all sectors, including water 
management (sustainable water management was in fact first raised as a government 
aim in the Eighth Plan). With these National Plans, development decisions, 
implementation and relevant powers are intended to become more decentralized to local 
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scales. In effect, the state is seeking to build a new role for itself not as the central 
decision-maker, but as a facilitator of public policy on water instead. 
 
The Eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan was the first step towards 
adopting this new approach by creating an ‘enabling environment’ for wider societal 
participation. This changed emphasis arose following realization that growth had 
negative impacts on national culture, traditional ways of life, community, family and 
social values (National Economic and Social Development Board, 1996). There was 
little coordination among related agencies, which in a few cases results in overlapping 
project areas (Sethaputra et al., 2001). The involvement of the local population was very 
limited, often causing misunderstandings between line agencies and local groups.  
 
Consequently the rhetoric on irrigation changed, shifting from ‘command and control’ 
to ‘people-centered development’. The planning process was also shifted from a 
compartmentalized to a more holistic approach. To attain these new objectives and 
development targets, the concept of ‘good governance’ was introduced into state 
discourse on water as a basis for strengthening the relationship between government and 
people, through collaborative and participatory efforts (National Economic and Social 
Development Board, 1996). The second strategy was to reform the development process 
regionally, through encouraging greater integration of functions and more participation 
by all stakeholders, improving the efficiency of public government agencies at the 
central level, and introducing a new set of development indicators suitable for the 
monitoring and evaluation of holistic development (National Economic and Social 
Development Board, 1996). 
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These changes sought to encourage greater participation by local people and 
communities in irrigation management. To reach this objective, there was expansion of 
the public sector’s role in promoting participation in irrigation management, 
development of information networks on natural resource and environmental 
conservation, and provision of greater opportunities for local communities and people to 
participate in irrigation. For example, in Part 6 Chapter 3 of the Eighth National 
Economic and Social Development Plan the Government set out strategic objectives to 
expand the public sector’s role in promoting popular participation in natural resource 
and environmental management by changing the attitudes of government officials, and 
by upgrading the capacity of relevant government agencies for effective cooperation 
with and facilitation of local communities in conservation of natural resources and 
environments, in such a way that they will be of real benefit to these communities 
(National Economic and Social Development Board, 1996, p.115).         
 
This new emphasis on public participation also affected national irrigation. The goal of 
irrigation was changed from a quantitative orientation, to a more qualitative approach 
(the so-called “Sustainable Development Approach” – Water Management 
Development Group, 2003, p.19) by encouraging the use of “more appropriate 
technology”. The main supporting legislation was amendment of the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand (1997) concerning community rights and power. 
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National water management strategy is now based around the following guidelines 
(Budhaka et al., 2001):  
1. Organizing supervisory and coordinating mechanisms for the development of 
water resources at both national and river basin levels in order to ensure consistency and 
continuity in the work of all related agencies. 
2. With the participation of all parties concerned, setting up appropriate systems 
at various levels for the allocation of water resources between the various types of water 
consumer, based on the principles of necessity, priority and fairness. 
3. Collecting fees for water from industrial and agricultural producers and from 
domestic consumers. The price structure for domestic consumption and industrial usage 
will be adjusted to properly reflect the real cost of procurement, production, distribution 
and wastewater treatment. 
4. Improving the transmission and allocation systems for both irrigation and 
domestic usage in communities, in order to minimize wastage of clean water through 
leaks. 
5. Conducting public information campaigns to promote thrifty and effective use 
of water, encourage the use of water-saving devices and the re-use of cooling water and 
treated wastewater in some industrial activities. 
 
The Ninth to Eleventh National Economic and Social Development Plans (2002-2012) 
sought to further this shift from the supply-side approach to the demand-side strategy 
for irrigation, concentrating on the organizational and institutional aspects in order to 
reduce costs while promoting sustainability and environmental conservation. A 
comprehensive overall basin water management strategy has now been substituted for a 
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project-by-project approach. This strategy was formulated by integrating institution, 
policy, legal and technical measures, and attempts to provide guidance for the 
systematic development, management and protection of river basin water resources in 
order to meet the increasing demands of socio-economic and population growth in the 
basin area. Incentives, regulations, permit restrictions, and penalties that helped guide 
and convinced the people to use water efficiently and equitably were also established to 
recognize that water was a tradable commodity. The government also tried to create an 
institutional framework of water administration with users’ participation by 
transforming its strategy and operating style in order to give the opportunity to 
stakeholders, especially local people, to participate in water resources management. 
Lastly, the private sector was encouraged to play a more important role in water 
resources management, especially concerning wastewater in urban areas.  
 
These amount to substantive changes in national government policy on water resource 
use, including irrigation, and clearly require a radical reappraisal and reorganization of 
government agencies and national water management priorities. In particular, RID as 
the main government agency responsible for irrigation development and management to 
supply water demand in agriculture activities, industry use and domestic consumption, 
has had to change radically its roles to meet these reformulated national objectives for 
water use and supply. RID’s main response has been to introduce the concept of 
“Participatory Irrigation Management” (PIM) (Figure 4.5). PIM seeks to satisfy the 
irrigation needs not only of farmers (WUO), but also local administrative organizations 
(Provincial Administrative Organization (PAOs) and Tambol (Sub district) 
Administrative Organizations (TAOs). Therefore, PIM seeks to address the new 
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national decentralized water management policy (Water Management Development 
Group, 2003).  Clearly this pattern is very different from the previous driver of national 
policy, where emphasis was placed on engineering aspects for headworks and main 
water distribution systems with little importance attached to on-farm facilities 
development, water management, and water users’ organization and irrigated 
agricultural activities. The country is now committed to taking PIM forward 
(Palayasoot, 2005). 
 
As a result, irrigation operation and maintenance is now focused on the participation of 
water users over the efficient use of irrigation water. There are three types of PIM, 
including participation pre-irrigation construction, during construction, and post 
construction (Water Management Group, 2003). PIM assumes that the success of water 
management in irrigation project depends on the active participation of individual water 
users or members of WUOs. However, Palayasoot (2005) disputes this approach, 
claiming that most WUOs are not strong enough due to lack of active local leadership, 
and weak administration and management. 
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Figure 4.5: Participatory Irrigation Management 
Source: Water Development Management Group (2003) 
 
In conclusion, the Eight and the Eleventh National Plans have concentrated on 
improving the performance of government agencies, including RID, to achieve the 
principle of good water governance; and on encouraging greater stakeholder 
participation in water management.   
 
 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
Fa
rm
er
 
 
Farmer participation 
 Construction 
 Operation & 
Maintenance 
 Construction 
 Operation & 
Maintenance 
 
RID responsibility 
 
Farmer responsibility 
115 
 
It is these recent developments in water management that provide the context for my 
empirical examination of changing patterns of water governance at the provincial scale, 
focused on Chiang Mai province in the north west of the country.  In particular, by 
focusing upon the seven research propositions set out in Chapter 3, I seek to establish 
how far the new top-down objectives for PIM are being realised locally and regionally; 
and how existing local water politics have mediated and moderated this new approach 
to irrigation management. 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
The Thai national water management paradigm has changed significantly from 
‘managing people to suit water conditions’, such as in muang fai, to ‘supply-side 
management’ with water used as the country’s principal driver of national economic 
policy between the First to the Seventh National Development Plan. As a result, water 
and irrigation development and management has come under the ‘command and 
control’ of state agencies, which have invested heavily in irrigation infrastructure. The 
effect on agriculture has been to radically transform traditional farming systems towards 
intensive production practice, causing conflict with other water users, and dependence 
on government assistance. At the same time, due to centralized water management, 
national water policy and legislation has increased dramatically, resulting in 
fragmented, overlapping, and often conflicting agencies and water competencies, as 
well as changed organizational goals and responsibilities. PIM as a form of adaptive 
governance, then, potentially offers a mechanism for returning people to the centre of 
water practice and policy development as they have rights to participate in and monitor 
all management sectors performance, based on good governance principles.  
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The next chapters examine both state-led and traditional forms of water management, 
enabling comparison to be made between stated government policy and the actual 
practices in irrigated agriculture at the provincial and local levels.  
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CHAPTER 5: SOCIOSPATIAL RELATIONS AND WATER 
MANAGEMENT IN CHAING MAI PROVINCE, NORTH WEST 
THAILAND 
 
This Chapter examines the research propositions of Chapter 3 relating to sociospatial 
interactions in water management in north west Thailand (Propositions 1-3 
respectively). The Chapter begins by identifying the day-to-day experience of water 
users in the MTIP and two muang fai (MRRW and KMTW) irrigation systems, as a 
foundation for evaluating the three research propositions.  
 
Primary data for the Chapter was derived from fieldwork, conducted among farming 
communities and policy officials directly involved with both state-led and muang fai 
modes of water governance in Nam Bo Luang, Chiang Mai province. Data collection 
was gained from participant observation, and through conducting semi-structured in-
depth interviews (focused on key themes of sociospatial relations and water 
management at various scales, positions and places) during 2010 and 2012 with 
representatives from WUGs and local irrigation systems, officials from MTIP, as well 
as agricultural communities in eight villages in Nam Bo Luang. 
 
Each proposition is tested through detailed examination of primary data, collected using 
various research methods (see Chapter 3), and is used as a basis for validating 
documentary evidence, presented in Chapter 4, on the influence of the nation state on 
local water management practice. Verbatim responses from interviewees are used to 
evaluate current interactions between water user group and communities at the local 
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scale with state organizations at other scales in the study area. These results are then 
subjected to further validation through interview and group discussion with ‘water 
policy practitioners’, reported in Chapter 6. The critical issue of how space and 
governance furnish particular mechanisms to facilitate transition to more sustainable 
water management in the Thai north west is then considered in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
5.1 Contemporary water governance modes in Chiang Mai province, Thailand 
Currently water management in Chiang Mai has two distinctive governance modes. The 
first is state-sponsored water management, chiefly overseen by government agencies, 
notably Thailand’s Royal Irrigation Department (RID). The second is the muang fai 
system of water management, discussed in detail in Chapter 4, where local communities 
manage water and associated irrigation infrastructure through a diversity of long-
established collective approaches (Cohen and Pearson 1998; Bastakoti and Shivakoti, 
2005). State intervention in irrigation has transformed water infrastructures as well as 
altering (and, in many cases, reducing) the participation of farming communities in 
water management (Budhaka et al., 2002; Palayasoot, 2005; Turral et al., 2010). Thus 
across the province there is an emergent water politics, fuelled by the Thai state’s 
modernisation goal of addressing the water demands of urban areas in preference to 
muang fai’s sole aim of serving local agricultural needs. Resulting conflicts have greatly 
reduced water availability for paddy rice cultivation and exacerbated tensions among 
water users (Walker, 2003). This development context poses substantial challenges to 
provincial water management. The following sections examine these in detail, from the 
perspective of local agricultural communities directly affected by decisionmaking 
through state-led and muang fai irrigation systems. 
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As set out in Chapter 4, over the last decade the Thai state has become increasingly 
involved in modernizing water management practices in response to the declining 
volume of the Mae Taeng River.  This has occurred partly because of the dramatic 
increase in leisure and tourist-related activities abstracting water for their own purposes. 
Ironically, government agencies (many of which are situated along the bank of the main 
irrigation canal) have also engaged in large-scale abstraction, further reducing the 
volume of water allocated to agricultural users.  
5.1.1 State-sponsored water governance: the case of IWUG Zone 10 
 
The Mae Tang Irrigation Project (MTIP) is one of the modern irrigation programmes in 
north west Thailand introduced under the First National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (see Chapter 4). Under its terms, RID replaced three local weirs on 
the Tang River and five weirs on the Ping River, with the goal of supplying irrigation 
water for agriculture in five districts of Mae Tang, Mae Rim, Muang Chiang Mai (City 
Centre), Hang Dong, and San Pa Tong.  
 
One of the country’s larger irrigation projects without reservoirs, the MTIP office and 
its headworks are situated in Mae Tang District, Chiang Mai. ‘The project’, as it is 
known to farmers, abstracts water from the Tang River (a tributary of the Ping), into a 
single irrigation canal that supplies water to a land area of 186.4 square kilometres. The 
Tang River has its maximum water volume estimated at 800 cubic metres per second 
and the minimum volume at two cubic metres per second. Average annual rainfall in the 
province is approximately 1,103 millimetres per year (Mae Tang Irrigation Project, 
2010). 
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The MTIP is a dense irrigation network. The main canal is 74.6 kilometres long, 35.6 
kilometres of which are concrete and 39 kilometres earth. There are 23 laterals and 38 
sub-laterals, with a total length of 239 kilometres (see Figure 5.1). In addition, there are 
910 ditches of 759 kilometres length, and 38 ditches for excess water (119 kilometres). 
In total there are 1,066 weirs, pumping stations and others structures across this 
extensive network.  
   
As befits its original goal, the main aim of the MTIP is to support agricultural activities, 
domestic water consumption and secondly to underwrite tourism activities. Thus as well 
as serving farming needs, water from ‘the project’ is used by Chiang Mai  Provincial 
Waterworks Authority, and government and private agencies, including Chiang Mai and 
Chiang Mai Rajabhat Universities, 41st squadron of The Royal Wing of the Thai Air 
Force, the  Royal Livestock  and  Arable  Farm  Department and Chiang Mai municipal 
authorities.    
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Figure 5.1: Boundary of Mae Tang Irrigation Project  
Source: Adapted from Mae Tang Irrigation Project (2010) 
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Supplying water for the urban and industrial sector was not originally a responsibility of 
‘the project’, but has become so recently as a result of continued rapid economic growth 
of the Chiang Mai metropolitan area. The large scale of water abstraction by non-
agricultural users is exemplified by Chiang Mai Provincial Waterworks Authority, 
which accounts for around 4.32 million cubic metres per annum from MTIP for urban 
consumption, government agencies and academic institutions (Mae Taeng Irrigation 
Project, 2010). Tourism activities and military bases are also big consumers.  
 
A project engineer is responsible for overall management of the MTIP, while the Chief 
of the Water Distribution and Maintenance Division is answerable for management of 
the lateral channels off the main irrigation canal. Until 2010, there were two types of 
organization involved in agricultural water allocation and irrigation management in the 
MTIP. First was the water user group (WUG). Each WUG is tasked with managing a 
defined sub-section of the overall canal network. Farmer membership is not formally 
arranged, but is an essential pre-condition for them to receive water. Once WUGs have 
enough members to manage their own needs, they can link together along the same 
lateral to establish the second type of organization, an integrated water user group 
(IWUG). IWUGs oversee a substantial length of the canal network, or a defined sub-
area of the project network (see Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2: Water Users’ Group and Integrated Water User Group responsibilities 
and organization 
Source: Water Management Development Group (2003) 
 
IWUG Zone 10 – a focus for empirical research in this thesis – is typical of other 
IWUGs across the province. This IWUG oversees water management in two channel 
systems, which deliver water from Lateral 23 of the main canal to rice fields amounting 
to a total irrigable area of about three square kilometres. Its irrigated area covers four 
villages in Nam Bo Luang Sub District, namely Rong Wua, Nam Bo Luang, Ton Kaew, 
and Nong Wai. Each channel system has an irrigation manager and a couple of 
administrators to facilitate water use for members by looking after general paperwork 
and supervising irrigation operations. These managers are in charge of repairing 
irrigation structures, opening and closing canal gates and sluices, maintaining these (see 
Figure 5.3) in proper condition, handling water conflicts and problems among members, 
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and informing the zone assistant of water distribution and maintenance needs. They also 
work alongside the zone assistant in the ‘project’ structure, whom is responsible for 
supervising water distribution to laterals and ditches.  IWUG activities are informed by 
the prevailing water modernization   paradigm   of   RID,   characterized by Lebel et al. 
(2009, p.137) as “a centralized technical bureaucracy diligently pursu[ing] visions in 
which it br[ings] standardization and orderliness to diverse locally managed irrigation 
and rain-fed farming systems”.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Focal irrigation systems in the IWUG Zone 10 area 
Source: Author 
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This has brought about a step-change in agricultural productivity, but increased water 
abstraction by non-agricultural sources means water supply now has to address multiple 
and often conflicting demands.   
 
Increased agricultural intensification has also meant that water allocation now has to be 
regulated throughout the year. Typically, irrigation water is allocated at roughly 24 
cubic millimetres per second in the wet season, falling to around two cubic millimetres 
per second in the dry (author’s interview). Inevitably, this influences farmers’ 
production yields and profitability. Nonetheless in theory all irrigation channels should 
be able to provide water through the year, with IWUG officials disseminating 
information (specific date and time) to farmers on its day-to-day availability. From 
interview testimonies, members abstract water on an hour-by-hour basis when it is 
extremely scarce. 
 
Usually, ‘project’ staff will inform farmers about the water volume they will receive and 
let them know when water will be released. However, even though project 
administrators provide accurate information to farmers on the date and times of opening 
sluices to each lateral, members still compete to use their allocated water. Most 
members are also not content with their daily quota. So to request irrigation, members 
contact their manager who then informs the zone assistant, the head of Water 
Distribution and Maintenance Zone 4, and the chief of the Water Distribution and 
Maintenance Division at the headwork. These officials confer before a decision to open 
sluices is taken. Although ‘the project’ has reasonable allocation capacity, disputes over 
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water from among user groups at different laterals, as well as urban demand and the 
requirement of government agencies, always occur during the dry season2
 
.  
As well as ‘the project’, sub-district administrative organizations also play an important 
role in assisting water allocation in times of shortage and in dredging lateral irrigation 
channels when these become silted up in the rainy season. This role was formalized 
legally in 2010 under the law of transferring irrigation work to local government, 
enacted only after intense public lobbying by WUG members. However, as the Chief of 
Water Distribution and Maintenance Division acknowledged in interview, while the 
sub-districts “assist farmers by providing fuel for water pumping, the main reason 
behind it is to secure their support during provincial and national elections.” 
 
Based on this overview, Figure 5.4 clarifies the complexity of water governance 
arrangements at local scale in northern Thailand. ‘The [Mae Taeng Irrigation] project’ 
emphasises structures, roles, and programmes that are formulated nationally and extend 
downward to the study area. Certainly there are national benefits from this ‘top-down’ 
decision-making in that all local areas are treated identically. But increasingly, the 
different geographic conditions, water demands, and knowledge sets of localities are 
proving to be out of step with these hierarchical arrangements (Thomas, 2006). Thus in 
IWUG Zone 10, when farmers are confronted with water allocation problems, in 
practice they must notify project officers and await solutions. Clearly this lack of 
                                                             
2 In an attempt to resolve these, in 2010 th Chiang Mai Office (in collaboration with RID and project 
officials) set up the Joint Management Committee for Irrigation (JMC) (Figure 6.4 and 6.5), to bring 
together representatives from all provincial water users including the 9th Regional Office of the Provincial 
Waterworks, The Chiang Mai Night Safari, The Royal Flora Ratchapruek Chiang Mai, His Majesty’s 
Northern study Centre of Sustainable Economy. I examine the role of the JMC in Chapter 6. 
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delegated powers is a major obstacle to solving water management problems in a timely 
fashion and in a way that meets local stakeholder needs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Structure of the Mae Tang Irrigation Project 
Source: Author’s interview 
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The traditional form of irrigation in Chiang Mai, muang fai, sees water drawn from the 
Mae Khan river, which flows parallel to the Mae Taeng Irrigation Project’s main canal. 
Two weir systems were the focus of research in this thesis, on account of their specific 
characteristics (see Chapter 3). These weirs are Mai Ray Ror Weir (hereafter MRRW) 
and Kor Mai Tun Weir (KMTW). MRRW and KMTW were built by communal efforts 
over 100 years ago from locally sourced materials (chiefly rocks, boulders and 
bamboo). Subsequently both have been partly rebuilt using concrete (Figures 5.5 and 
5.6). MRRW is 50 metres wide, and the main canal about five kilometres long. The 
headwork is at Hua Fai village, and has an irrigated area of 1.12 square kilometres 
servicing the irrigation needs of around 200 farmers. 
5.1.2 Muang fai irrigation: Mai Ray Ror Weir and Kor Mai Tun Weir 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Mai Rai Ror Weir and its irrigation systems 
Source: Author 
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KMTW’s concrete rebuilding was undertaken for the villages by the Department of 
Agricultural Extension. This weir is 54 metres wide, with a 10 kilometre long main 
canal. Water from this weir supplies 1,000 members over an irrigated area of about 1.6 
square kilometres.   
 
 
Figure 5.6: Kor Mai Tun Weir and its irrigation systems 
Source: Author 
 
Irrigation management for both weirs is conducted entirely independently of ‘the 
project’, via irrigation committees and farmers’ water groups. These irrigation 
committees consist of three-four members: a weir chairman, a weir chief (a village 
representative), and two or three more villagers, acting as weir chief assistants and 
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farmers’ representative (see Figure 4.2). Local committees are responsible for weir 
management and repairs, and for allocating water among members according to need. 
The committee and farmers’ water group draw up regulations for water use, and set out 
conditions for repairing weirs. Each member must agree to abide by the regulations, 
which are numbered and signed off by them in a document called a weir contract. This 
sets out the responsibilities of the committee and the rights, duties and responsibilities 
of members. In turn, these rights and responsibilities are derived from historical 
experience and traditional forms of knowledge acquisition which contrast strongly with 
the modernization paradigm discussed in Chapter 4. From farmer interviews, muang fai 
knowledge sets emphasize decentralization, intuition on the part of farmers, 
responsiveness to natural environmental rhythms and seasonal cycles, and promotion of 
local variety and biodiversity. 
 
The chair and weir chiefs are elected by their members, while the rest of the committee 
is appointed by their respective villages.  With the help of assistants, the weir chairman 
organizes meeting dates, schedules necessary repairs and dredging works, water 
allocation, manages disputes and works in a supervisory capacity. Assistants also help 
manage the irrigation system and disseminate information to the membership. Water 
management at the main weirs is the responsibility of the chair, while at the field level, 
it is the role of respective weir chiefs, their assistants and farmers. Activities here are 
similar to those of the main weirs, consisting of canal work, water allocation and 
agreeing and enforcing regulations. Where laterals branch into minor channels 
delivering water into paddies, farmers are effectively in complete charge, without 
committee involvement.     
131 
 
Generally, the weir chairman can release water to members’ farms without difficulty. 
The committee allocates water according to availability in each season, which is broadly 
similar to the water management of ‘the project’. On the other hand, when water 
volume is scare, water rotation is selected to deliver to the irrigated area. The volume of 
water which each farmer receives depends on the area of land owned. Thus, before each 
member will receive water, a report of farm size owned by each member is sent to the 
weir chief. After that the weir committees will inform each member of the width of the 
sluice (tang nam) they are permitted to use to allow water flow into their rice fields. The 
sluice width also depends on the area of land owned.  
 
Overall, this localized and traditional form of water governance emphasises individual 
participation in water allocation and delivery. The role of communal decision-making is 
also prioritized, in contrast to the WUGs and IWUGs of the MTIP. Yet development 
pressures and growing demand for water in Chiang Mai means state-society relations 
within water management are interlocking and co-produced. Crucially, from this brief 
overview of the two governance modes, both suffer in terms of their reduced capacity 
for learning, lack of knowledge sharing, and the need for coordination between them if 
more sustainable patterns of water management are to be realised.  
 
In order to establish how and in what ways spatial characteristics might be affecting the 
emergence of more sustainable water management, I now examine the three research 
propositions set out in Chapter 3 relating to the role of sociospatial relations in the 
operation of water governance locally. A central focus of the Chapter is then how space 
delimits existing stakeholder positions on water management within and across scales. 
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5.2 Politics of scale, position and place in state-led and traditional water 
management systems 
From the preceding description of the two systems of water governance, it is clear that 
space not only creates material advantages and disadvantages in water allocation. It also 
acts as the arena for contestation between different rules, administration, bureaucracy, 
and institutions that, potentially, could deliver more sustainable water management.  
 
Hence, based on the theoretical work on sociospatial relations set out in Chapters 2 and 
3, I argue that geographical scale and location influence water allocation and delivery, 
and, moreover, that place-specific values, beliefs and norms also affect day-to-day water 
management priorities. Clearly therefore, there is a need to examine how individuals 
and communities interact with each other over water management at different scales, 
positions and places. This is the focus of Propositions 1, 2 and 3, which address directly 
Lebel et al’s (2005) argument that considering these different sociospatial concepts 
together can help the process of devising more sustainable water management strategies. 
 
In order to evaluate how sociospatial relations affect different patterns of water 
management, in this section I examine empirical evidence to support or refute 
Propositions 1-3 of Chapter 3. I begin by testing evidence to confirm or refute 
Proposition 1. 
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Proposition 1 states “Scale defines actor relationships in terms of actors accepting or 
challenging norms and beliefs pertaining to water management, and participating in new 
water management arrangements”. It focuses on whether scale shapes relationships 
between actors over water management, and consequently how scalar relations might 
affect their participation in new governance arrangements. 
5.2.1 Scale and actor relationships (Proposition 1) 
 
From the analysis of national water management evolution and irrigation development 
in Chapter 4, water management policies are clearly formulated by central government, 
with the Thai state acting as ‘supply-side water manager’ (TDRI, 1990). The state’s 
goal has been to expand agricultural production to increase the country’s GDP. To do 
so, the state has created multiple scales and levels of irrigation management, with the 
aim of making irrigation easier to administer and to assess performance of responsible 
agencies in irrigation development from the national to local level. Thus scales and 
levels of water management in the study area were constructed by Thai governments as 
part of successive National Economic and Social Development Plans (see Chapter 4). It 
is interesting to note that before the First Plan (1962), farmers were largely unfamiliar 
with notions of scale, boundary, and level of water management.  On this point, the ex-
MRRW weir chairman commented: 
 
“Our muang fai system developed because farmers situated near Mae Kan river needed 
to use water for their agricultural activities. So, weir groups were established to 
construct irrigation systems, including dykes, canals and ditches to divert, irrigate, and 
slow down and drain water. These included our weir. This is crucial as it helps divert 
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water from the river to supply farmers in many villages in Nam Bo Luang and Ban Mae 
sub-district. Locally, muang fai is the system that spans across the productive areas of 
the village. In fact, muang fai is a type of organization that links various communities 
together. Even though there is labour division through water use regulations to manage 
members, all of us work together on it as a unit. So until recently it could be said that 
there was no ‘scale’ or ‘level’ of water management. Members just focused on the 
whole picture of muang fai, as it was the traditional system. So, there was no ‘zone’ or 
‘scale’ dividing us, as is found in the modern irrigation project” (Author’s interview, 
07/08/2010). 
 
Scale in muang fai systems is thus much less important, as irrigated areas are small, 
compared to the large irrigated expanse of the state-led MTIP (see Chapter 4). 
Moreover, muang fai systems are structured so that local people can afford the time and 
expense to maintain structures relatively easily, as materials are readily available. 
Muang fai also employs local knowledge and simple technology in every part of its 
operation, such as delivery systems, water allocation, and maintenance. As a result, 
farmers can handle their water use demand, as well as relay this knowledge and 
technology from generation to generation (Tan-Kim-Yong, 1993, cited in Kao-Sa-Ard 
et al., 2001, p.258).  
 
While scales of operation in muang fai systems are straightforward, members must 
negotiate a highly structured system of regulation regarding water use as a condition of 
being allocated water for their crops. Thus the chairman of KMTW noted that: 
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“KMTW members have always been treated equally on the basis of water volume 
allocated. Water users pay an annual fee to me and the weir committees, as we dedicate 
ourselves to overseeing water management to members – it costs maybe three pence per 
km2. Members also need to attend the weir meeting twice a year, one held before the 
rainy season rice harvest and the other before the beginning of dry season cropping, 
with the main purpose of informing members of new rules and regulations. After the 
meeting, annual canal dredging will begin and all members have to help out with this 
activity. In cases where members are unable to take part, they have to pay a fine of four 
pounds per day. If there wasn’t a fine, it wouldn’t be fair on the members who do help 
dredge the canal. Rules are rules. You have to respect the principles of water 
management” (Author’s interview, 14/09/2010). 
 
However, for the reasons given already, complex scale politics seldom arise in muang 
fai as farmers and weir chiefs rarely need to refer to other scales of management to 
settle water allocation issues. As the MRRW chairman confirmed: “Water’s used for 
agriculture and consumption only in our irrigated areas. Luckily for us, we don’t need 
to share our water with others”. This makes it easier for muang fai committees to 
conserve water and to quickly solve problems that arise over water allocation. As a 
result, allocative decisions are more straightforward than in ‘the project’. But the 
simplicity of this governance mode and its sole agricultural beneficiary also prevents 
muang fai from offering a template for sustainable water management across the 
province, given growing multiple demands upon water use.   
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In Nam Bo Luang there are now both muang fai and state-led irrigation systems through 
MTIP. Scaled relationships over water use are different under the MTIP compared to 
the muang fai system of irrigation. MTIP’s responsible areas cover four villages in Nam 
Bo Luang, namely Ton Keaw, Rong Wua, Nong Wai and Nam Bo Luang. All members 
supplied water by MTIP are in one of its water user groups, IWUG Zone 10. Within this 
IWUG Zone, four hydrological scales of water management can be discerned (Figure 
5.7). The smallest scale is the irrigation ditch, while the largest is the project’s overall 
operational area. Each scale has its own actors and responsibility. In interview, a zone 
assistant confirmed that: 
 
“As MTIP has only one main canal and has to feed water for five districts in Chiang 
Mai, the easiest way to do so is to divide this responsibility up between four Water 
Distribution and Maintenance subdivisions (Zones). The first zone is located at the 
project headworks, allocating water to Mae Tang and Mae Rim Districts. Water 
delivery for the second zone goes to part of Mae Rim District and city of Chiang Mai. 
The third zone is responsible for the rest of Chiang Mai city and Hang Dong District. 
And the fourth zone delivers water to part of Hang Dong and San Pa Tong District. The 
project and these zones play important roles in water allocation and infrastructure 
maintenance at the project level. In addition, we work with all IWUG heads in opening 
and closing sluices when water delivery rotation is needed in times of drought. 
Agricultural experts also assist decisiontaking in devising water allocation quotas for 
farms. We give some advice on how to establish and develop water user groups as well 
as providing knowledge of how to use water for agriculture efficiently. Apart from this, 
the project provides some funds to improve delivery and drainage systems, but focuses 
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chiefly on the project level or main canal. At the farm level, laterals and ditches, water 
user groups have to devise water allocation with their chiefs and tailor their budget to 
maintain the systems they have. Project officials do not get involved at this level, unless 
there are problems that the groups cannot resolve” (Author’s interview, 02/09/2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Scales and levels of stakeholder involvement in the Mae Tang 
Irrigation Project   
Source: Author’s interview 
 
This response demonstrates how the relationship between officials and farmers has been 
separated by administrative scales. Even though the intention of ‘top-down’ water 
management is to provide equal access to water to all actors, interviewees emphasized 
that their daily experience proved ‘the project’ was complex and lacked the necessary 
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flexibility to facilitate sustainable water use, with allocation and dispute resolution 
involving officials and multiple organizations at different scales and actor levels. Thus 
one farmer commented that: 
 
“To receive water, particularly in the dry season, certain steps must be followed. First 
of all, a report on the crop type and expected harvest area (compiled by the group head) 
is handed to the IWUG Zone head to put together a water delivery plan with MTIP 
officials and JMC. Once the plan’s agreed, ‘the project’ will release the water. The 
chief of Water Distribution and Maintenance Division will confirm with the subdivision 
head by phone, and the zone assistant informs the IWUG Zone head about the number 
of days they can use water. Project responsibility stops at this stage. The rest, on-farm 
level, requires the IWUG head to call the representative of each ditch or basic water 
user group head – again, to put a delivery plan together” (Author’s interview, 
6/09/2010). 
 
Similarly, water users at lateral and ditch scale have to follow strict water use 
regulations as well as their own group rules as a precondition for receiving water. 
IWUG Zone 10’s head commented: 
 
“In our group, to receive water you need to follow the group rules. For instance, when 
the water rotation is selected as the way to allocate water, members must use water 
according to the arranged water volume. In addition, members must obey the group 
agreement and the regulations, such as help preventing irrigation infrastructures, 
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dredging and maintaining ditches before water delivery season, and pay for the water 
fee to the administrator group and WUA” (Author’s interview, 9/09/2010). 
 
Although members’ responsibility is set at the farm level in order to support water 
management of the administrator groups, many respondents whose farms are situated at 
the end of the laterals complained that they were ignored by the IWUG head when 
water becomes scarce. One member told me:   
 
“Personally, I’m not impressed the way the project and IWUG Zone 10 head work, as 
my rice fields are at the end of the lateral. The head rarely takes care of water for me. 
He manages water for only 7-8 ditches and my area is far from the beginning of the 
lateral. I understand that the remuneration is very little, so I guess that it’s doesn’t even 
cover the gasoline cost to drive out to see me” (Author’s interview, 17/09/2010). 
 
In theory, the state-sponsored system can claim to provide a centrally coordinated form 
of governance ensuring a secure water supply and fair allocation. However, disputes 
over water allocation among actors at local scale are endemic, particularly in the dry 
season. One farmer pointed out to me: 
 
“In the dry season, farmers plant soybean and dry season rice. Dry season rice begins 
between November and December or after harvesting wet season rice. Although water 
is plentiful during this period, it begins to get scarce in March and April as the rice 
grains begin to swell. Soybean is planted in January and harvested in May. Water is 
needed in April as soybean growth really takes off then. As a result, the dry season is a 
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season of water crisis - members don’t respect each other and they fight for water. The 
water allocation schedule is not respected anymore because farmers at the canal head 
abstract a large amount of water and leave only a little for the rest” (Author’s 
interview, 2/09/2010). 
 
The Head of IWUG Zone 10 accepted this situation, commenting that: 
 
“Once water’s been available to members in my area for four days or more, I always 
share it with the adjoining IWUG Zone 12, as we share the same lateral canal. Each 
group has two days to use water. Normally, water users at the end of the lateral (IWUG 
Zone 12) are allowed to abstract water before my members at the beginning of the 
lateral. Sometimes they use water more than the days they were allowed, for example on 
the third day. This situation forces my members to use water into the evening or right up 
until midnight of the third day. This always leads to conflicts over the water and 
allegations of water theft” (Author’s interview, 30/09/2010).  
 
As these interviewees’ comments confirm, in effect, irrigation management is controlled 
at a higher organizational scale than WUGs or IWUGs, tending to place ‘remote’, 
overly formalized conditions on daily water management. Hence, participants in IWUG 
Zone 10 are obliged to follow step-by-step procedure and to avoid disagreements with 
officials if they are to ensure long-term continuity of water supply through the growing 
season. Not only does this exclude communities from participatory irrigation 
management: it also greatly complicates the implementation of cross-scale management 
practice.  
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This hierarchical approach also makes it difficult to resolve water disputes transparently 
and accountably. So invariably water users’ groups at the channel level are the last to 
receive water under the irrigation management project. As a result, they are often 
factious, entering into disputes with other groups at different scales whom they believe 
are ‘stealing water’ they feel is theirs by right (c.f. Lebel et al., 2005). One farmer with 
land at the top of a lateral channel stated: “As soon as I know that water is coming, I 
start up my pumps straightaway to channel water into my fields, and I’ll pump as much 
as I need. I have to be quick because project staff and bureaucracy cause problems for 
me.” This comment confirms the problems created by the highly centralized decision-
making of ‘the project’, with the decision to open sluices having to follow a prescribed 
order. 
 
It was also evident that new IWUG members felt disempowered compared to their old 
ways of working, particularly from the participatory forms of water management typical 
of muang fai. A head of water user group stated to me: “Water management and solving 
water use problems largely depend on ‘the project’ determination, although muang fai 
would allow us to have far more say in our water management”.  
 
From the empirical evidence, therefore, geographical scale not only defines 
relationships between the state and water stakeholders, and between water stakeholders 
and other water users; it also defines administrative areas, hydrological units, and 
particular norms and beliefs of water governance, as Cash et al. (2006) identify (see 
Chapter 2). 
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Hence, scale significantly affects the efficiency and effectiveness of water governance 
practice in the study area. Imposing different scales of management means farmers have 
independently managed water in their own ways, based on their beliefs and norms. 
Furthermore, there are complexities in water management and solving water use 
problems, particularly in the state-led irrigation project of the MTIP, where water use 
involvement as well as water regulation has been determined by central government 
without members’ participation. In effect, ‘the project’ has absolute authority to control 
all form of water user organization. Taken together with secondary data presented in 
Chapter 4, indicating the centrality of state to water management development, these 
findings confirm Proposition 1.   
 
The transition to more sustainable water management in the study area is not simply 
dependent on administrative or hydrological scales, however. Differences in beliefs and 
norms also affect water allocation and delivery. The following section tests how this 
influences current patterns of water management and allocation.  
 
Proposition 2 sought to assess the importance of socio-cultural norms and beliefs, 
derived from specific territorial influences, and how these beliefs mediate inclusion or 
exclusion of water users from water resource management decisions. Group norms and 
beliefs seem likely to exercise an impact upon power relations between actors at 
different geographical locations, as Sheppard (2002) states that some beliefs tend to be 
5.2.2  Socio-cultural norms and beliefs in relation to water allocation and delivery 
(Proposition 2) 
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more influential than others in determining water access, so challenging the power of 
those who claim objectivity in water use. Proposition 2 states: 
 
“Differences among actors in water norms and beliefs at local scale gives rise to 
particular water politics that shape ‘solutions’ to local water allocation and delivery 
problems”. 
 
Evidence from WUG meetings in IWUG Zone 10 confirmed that different geographical 
scales and levels of water management have embedded within them specific knowledge 
and rules sets. Thus in case of WUGs and IWUGs, knowledge of water distribution, and 
irrigation infrastructure and maintenance are largely normative science-based, and are 
the responsibility of experienced project staff trained within the state’s water 
modernization paradigm. As one respondent stated, “Project officials manage water 
because they know how water quantity is calculated and allocated and how to manage 
it efficiently.” (Author’s interview, 30/08/2010)  
 
So in IWUG Zone 10, for example, what constitutes water management ‘knowledge’ is 
defined by ‘project’ officials, who are themselves conditioned by their formalized 
training, the legal regulations that establish the remit of the MTIP, and the IWUGs. The 
resulting ‘licit’ forms of water data, and water data collection methods, are often 
complicated (eg. completion of documentation by farmers often requires assistance 
from project officials, and lacks consideration of the real needs of members). These 
distinct forms of knowledge and their mobilization define different types of water users. 
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Moreover, the recently introduced technologies for water modernization are not 
necessarily solving water allocation problems. An IWUG Zone 10 member emphasized 
that: 
 
“I, personally, believe that the concrete-lined canals of MTIP prevent ground water 
from ‘topping up’ water volume in the dry season. And they quickly become clogged up 
[with sediment] in the wet, which stops the water flowing. So in my opinion the concrete 
canals do not perform anything like as well as traditional earth canals.” (Author’s 
interview, 5/08/2010)   
 
By contrast, water management among muang fai groups is derived from a less 
formalized tacit intergenerational knowledge of local physical conditions and the 
drought tolerances of particular crop species, shared among all participants through 
communal management practices. And, although there are many regulations to observe 
in weir contracts, at field or ditch scale members are free to arrange water allocation and 
solve problems over water management without any official oversight.  
 
Furthermore, there is little separation between practical agrarian knowledge and formal 
rules among weir committees and members in muang fai systems. Thus a weir member 
noted:  
 
“We use our own local knowledge, passed from generation to generation, which 
underwrites daily water management, while weir rules also originate from previous 
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practice that’s been handed down, meaning our operational knowledge and day-to-day 
management are very compatible.” (Author’s interview, 14/09/2010) 
 
In addition, muang fai members were also suspicious of the new water management 
technologies introduced by successive governments spending large sums to modify 
muang fai systems in an attempt to raise their efficiency. Members blamed government 
authorities for constructing systems that paid little heed to local requirements and did 
not recognize the maintenance costs involved. On this topic, one farmers’ representative 
commented: 
 
“The government agency commissioned an engineer from the north eastern region -not 
one of our local people – to redesign our irrigation system. He did not once ask us what 
we needed, or how to make the changes fit with our existing system. And, as a result, in 
the dry season water now cannot flow to the end of the lateral and down to our fields. 
We need to show them they are wrong and get them to alter things to the way we want, 
but this is difficult as they are government employees.” (Author’s interview, 
18/09/2010) 
 
These comments confirm the interrelation between water norms and beliefs and 
different knowledge sets, and specifically how traditional water management of muang 
fai is marginalized by the state’s modernization paradigm for water. This explains 
muang fai chiefs’ concern that modernizing their irrigation systems would result in ‘a 
mismatch in the operation of space and demands.’ They asserted instead that ‘local 
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wisdom’ had great potential to inform how irrigation systems might be structured in 
future so that they do not need to rely on technologically advanced techniques. 
 
A clear link thus emerges between beliefs and norms and two different knowledge sets 
for water management: what might be termed science-based knowledge and local 
traditional knowledge. Science-based knowledge projected by MTIP officials provides 
the foundation for ‘modern’ water management practice in the province, and the belief 
that modern irrigation infrastructure are trustworthy and predictable. Moreover, it gives 
credence to the idea that these structures, financed by government, should be handled 
and serviced only by ‘knowledgeable’ people and experts. Thus, norms in water 
allocation start to become based on a model of ‘water expertise’ derived from state-
based decision making. Formal administration is of course appropriate for government 
to assess water governance more transparently. The opposite notion of water 
management is found among farmers, who believe that water is a private, not a public 
good, hence they have unalienable rights to participate in water allocation 
decisionmaking. 
 
These differences in water beliefs and norms clearly impede the development of 
communal projects between muang fai and MTIP irrigation systems, as one WUG 
leader commented: 
 
“MTIP always calls biannual meetings, but these are enough only for ‘project’ officials 
to present to members short reports on current practice and their proposed water 
allocation plans for the forthcoming year. And these meetings are quite formal, too. 
There’s really no other opportunity to deepen our relationships, exchange our 
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knowledge and experiences, and to gain a better understanding of each others’ attitudes 
and approaches. We need to spend a lot of time together for this to happen”. 
(Author’s interview, 25/09/2010). 
 
Because of this lack of connection between farmers and officials, one deputy head notes 
how: “‘the project’ officials have never understood me and my members”, while a Zone 
assistant groused, “Farmers do not understand us - it seems we speak in different 
languages”. Different sets of beliefs and norms thus appear to cause dissatisfaction over 
irrigation management and can provide misunderstandings between different parties that 
are enough to give rise to major disputes between them over the allocation and delivery 
of water, particularly in the dry season.  
 
Clearly therefore, there are different water norms and beliefs at work within Chiang Mai 
and Nam Bo Luang that shape attitudes and approaches to day-to-day water 
management. Equally, these beliefs alter the receptivity of farmers and local policy 
officials to particular policy ‘solutions’ and even to how ‘problems’ of water allocation 
and delivery are perceived, defined and/or framed. In turn, these affect the capacity for 
MTIP and muang fai irrigation systems to work together to address more sustainable 
water management practice. On the basis of the evidence, therefore, Proposition 2 is 
confirmed.  
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Proposition 3 focused on evaluating the occurrence of politics of scale as a supporter or 
inhibitor of transition to more sustainable water management, which Lebel et al. (2008) 
state involves the power relations of water stakeholders. Yung et al. (2003) also 
acknowledge that ‘place analysis’ can provide a greater understanding of peoples’ 
viewpoints and relationship with water use, and how those viewpoints contribute to 
more collaborative governance and water management resolution. Proposition 3 states:   
5.2.3 Influence of local politics of scale in encouraging collaborative governance 
(Proposition 3) 
 
“Local water politics influence the viability of cross-scale interactions that seek to 
specify collaborative water management among state and non-state actors, and hence 
the transition to more sustainable water management”.  
 
One aspect of this politics of scale relates to geographical situation of water use locally 
– that is, the ‘politics of position’ that develop as a result of actors having ‘first use’ of 
water for irrigation purposes because of their being located on the upper or lower 
reaches of the main irrigation canal. ‘First use’ pertains for example to water users 
situated close to the main canal (state agencies benefit in this respect) and at the 
headwaters of lateral channels running off it. I explore this ‘politics of position’ over 
water abstraction here.  
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Figure 5.8: Stakeholders in the Mae Tang Irrigation Project 
Source: Author’s interview 
 
Benefits/disadvantages of ‘politics of position’ over water use do not just relate to 
agriculture. The IWUG Zone 10 chief noted to me that: 
 
“The largest amount of water abstracted by non-agricultural users is Chiang Mai 
Provincial Waterworks Authority, which MTIP delivers around 4.32 million cubic 
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academic institutions. And tourism agencies such as Chiang Mai Night Safari also 
receive approximately 200,000 cubic metres per annum to provide for the needs of 
animals, while His majesty’s Northern Study Centre of Sustainable Economy now needs 
20,000 cubic metres during the growing season for its agricultural demonstration plots. 
Likewise, the military base uses about 1,000 cubic metres per month for their 
agricultural activities within its campus” (Author’s interview, 12/09/2010).  
 
Disagreements over water allocation between these agencies (see Figure 5.8) and 
farmers often occur in the dry season. The Head of IWUG Zone 10 told me that, “I 
always ask them not to abstract a lot of water and they do compensate us for this with 
some money. But my members don’t want money; they need water for their crops. 
Farmers like us have a lot of debts and if we cannot produce crops in sufficient 
quantity, what can we do?” 
 
Contrasting with state agencies, IWUG Zone 10 is in a relatively disadvantageous 
position and receives only irregular supplies of dry-season water as actors ‘higher up’ 
the canal exercise their spatial advantage by abstracting water for their own purposes.  
Water theft through illegal pumping and groundwater abstraction is rife in the face of 
this insecurity of supply (c.f. Lebel et al., 2005), a situation inevitably leading to 
conflict between water users groups and state agencies. A member justified this to me: 
“I have to do this because I need money from my crops. If water cannot flow into my 
farm, my harvest will suffer and I’ll have no money to support my family. And ‘the 
project’ cannot guarantee that it can supply water for all members - I see with my eyes 
the water volume available”.   
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There are clear implications of this ‘politics of position’ for water abstraction. 
Government organizations actively involved in water governance also rely on irrigation 
water for their own needs, for example, so prejudicing allocative decisions. Indeed, it 
was the recent siting of Government offices along both sides of the main canal that 
diverted water away from agricultural users in the first place. This has put ‘the project’ 
in an invidious situation, caught between increased demands for greater supplies in the 
dry season from all stakeholders. Interviewees claimed this new client responsibility has 
also distracted project officials from prosecuting rigorously sustainable water 
management objectives. 
 
Regarding the two muang fai systems, ‘politics of position’ also occurs between 
upstream and downstream weirs (Figure 5.9). So in interview, a weir leader claimed 
“San Poo Lei Weir [the weir located above MRRW and KMTW], diverts water from the 
Mae Khan river to feed their rice fields without thinking of its downstream neighbours”.  
San Poo Lei Weir tends to ‘stretch the rules’ because of its advantageous location, 
which has led to deteriorating relations with downstream weir members, so obstructing 
the prospects for sustainable water management.  
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Figure 5.9: Stakeholders in Mae Kan River 
Source: Author’s interview 
 
By contrast, MTIP seems well attuned to address the politics of scale for irrigation. As 
the deputy head of IWUG Zone 10 pointed out, structurally 
 
“MTIP has everything that’s needed in an irrigation system. They have a substantial 
budget, they have scientific irrigation knowledge, and they have the key experts in 
agriculture and irrigation system engineers trained in the big cities. We have to give 
them credit in managing water, even if it’s in a top-down way”(Author’s interview, 
24/08/2010) 
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But this hierarchical arrangement brings a heavy administrative burden, and makes the 
management of water issues more complicated. For example, the benefits of position 
conferred on government offices and farms at the canal headwaters directly undermine 
the original agricultural goals of ‘the project’. Politics of place, then, confers positional 
advantages upon a minority group of powerful state-based actors, while marginalising a 
far less powerful but much more numerous group locally (farmers). As IWUG Zone 
10’s head described: 
 
“Farmers or members at the end of the main canal or lateral like us are labeled ‘the 
youngest son’. This is because when ‘the project’ delivers water to us, we are the last 
group to receive it. We have to wait until the head canal members, government and 
private agencies finish abstracting. Water rotation delivery just doesn’t work efficiently 
and, yes, conflicts emerge. Sometimes the water quota they allocated us doesn’t come 
through. In fact, most of us did not get enough water this season, but we cannot 
complain because we have to depend on ‘the project’. We have to accept this situation” 
(Author’s interview, 30/09/2010).  
 
The ‘one-sided’ decision-making displayed here clearly causes inequality in water 
allocation. 
 
For muang fai, scales of water management are few and there are much simpler levels 
of administration. There is also no interference from external organizations except 
where water disputes occur between weirs and weir members. Notwithstanding, respect 
for each others’ water rights and the micro-scales and levels of water governance allow 
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weir committees to resolve abstraction disputes relatively easily. In this case, politics of 
place improves opportunities for equitable water use, rather than complicating 
management as in IWUG Zone 10.   
 
More generally, the effect of scaled water politics seems to have led IWUG Zone 10 and 
muang fai members to conceal their concerns over water management from each other, 
preventing the development of mutuality in water management even though both face 
similar – often identical – supply problems. MRRW’s weir chairman told me that: 
 
“Since MTIP was established, as you know some members left this weir and use 
‘project’ water instead. Since then, they have never sent their labor to help us 
maintaining the weir systems. This means the area now has two distinct modes of water 
management – so far, we’ve never been involved with each other. MTIP manage water 
in its responsible area, and its officials have never contacted us” (Author’s interview, 
23/08/2010). 
 
On the basis of the evidence provided, then, the influence of scale politics is very 
apparent, both in terms of administration and knowledge, and in scale separating actors. 
This is a major obstacle to developing cross-scale interactions between water users, 
project officials, and other agencies, as well as between MTIP and muang fai. In short, 
there is clear evidence to support Proposition 3.  
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5.3 The challenges of transitioning to sustainable water management 
From the three propositions examined here, there is substantial evidence to explain why 
transitioning to more sustainable water management has proved so difficult in Nam Bo 
Luang, Chiang Mai. Interview testimonies confirm that the politics of scale, position 
and place influence water management knowledge and water management interactions 
in the study area in terms of actor relationships, differences of norms and beliefs in 
water allocation, and actor capacity to collaborate on water management issues across 
scales.   
 
The Chapter has provided a range of empirical accounts from key representatives of 
farming communities and local water policy officials working within the RID, the MTIP 
and muang fai systems, that demonstrate the relative failure of both modes of water 
governance to deliver sustainable water management. In particular, knowledge sets and 
management objectives that underpin MTIP and muang fai are markedly different. This 
is the consequence of allowing science-based techniques, supported by the national 
modernization policy and economic development, to underpin national water 
management. This situation ignored embedded local water management knowledge and 
led to it being regarded as ‘the second-best’ option. As a result, scale politics have 
emerged, leading to poor actor relationships that challenge greater participation in more 
mutually beneficial forms of water management. This is a considerable obstacle to 
transitioning to more sustainable water management.    
  
Closely related to this, the second difficulty in creating new water management 
arrangements is building relations between stakeholders at different scales and levels. 
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As interviewees claimed, positional politics (Lebel et al., 2005) have emerged over 
water abstraction, with water users close to the main irrigation canal and at the 
headwaters of its lateral channels among the most favourably located actors. In 
particular on account of their position on the upper reaches of the irrigation canal, state 
agencies have benefited greatly. This has put the MTIP as a ‘state-led’ project in an 
invidious situation in its efforts to settle water conflicts among agricultural and non-
agricultural stakeholders. Interviewees alleged that this had also distracted ‘project’ 
officials from prosecuting rigorously sustainable water management objectives. At the 
same time, water management at farm scale face significant problems of ‘water theft’ as 
a result of disadvantageous position, a situation inevitably leading to conflict between 
WUGs, IWUGs and state agencies, particularly in the dry season.  
 
Moreover, even though project administrators provide accurate information to farmers 
on the date and times of opening sluices to each lateral, members compete to use their 
allocated water. These comments refer to the highly centralized decision-making of ‘the 
project’, with the decision to open sluices following a prescribed order. The result is 
that, even though ‘the project’ has reasonable allocation capacity, disputes over water 
from WUGs at different laterals, as well as urban demand and the requirement of 
government agencies, always occur during the dry season.  
 
Muang fai interviewees confirmed similar poorly developed linkages between water 
allocation and water management responsibilities. In muang fai, positional politics also 
play a role, in this case between upstream and downstream weirs. While every weir 
seeks to meet its members’ needs, those upstream tend to ‘stretch the rules’ because of 
157 
 
their advantageous location, leading to deteriorating relations with weir committees 
away from the headwaters. Water management is less problematic than in the MTIP, as 
farmers are not encumbered by the demands of non-agricultural users, so the weir 
committees can focus on the sole purpose of irrigation for their own members. Supply-
side issues are therefore much more straightforward than in the MTIP. However, in the 
dry season water supply is always insufficient, and disputes among weir members and 
between other weirs routinely occur.  
 
Thirdly, as a consequence of knowledge incompatibility and poor actor connections 
across geographical scale and positions, there is a pronounced lack of cooperation 
among stakeholders in the two different modes of water management. Under the state-
sponsored system, centrally coordinated, hierarchical water management and planning 
would appear to ensure a secure supply and fair allocation at each scale. But 
interviewees said their daily experience of ‘the project’ confirmed it was simply too 
complex and inflexible to facilitate sustainable water use, with allocation and dispute 
resolution involving officials and multiple organizations at different scales and actor 
levels. Thus, not only does this exclude communities from participatory water 
management; it also greatly complicates the implementation of cross-scale management 
practices.  
 
In conclusion, sociospatial relations dominate water management and water governance 
in Chiang Mai generally, and specifically in the study area of Nam Bo Luang. Politics 
of scale, position and place over water use tend to separate people, and incompatible 
knowledge sets as well as water beliefs and norms weaken cross-scale and cross-level 
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interactions. This is analogous with the situation Biermann et al. (2012, p.51) describes: 
“the current institutional framework for sustainable development is deeply inadequate to 
bring about the swift transformatic progress that is needed”. Effective water governance 
must now be put in place, and one approach which is under discussion in the theoretical 
literature is that of adaptive governance (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007). This has been the 
focus of recent developments by the Chiang Mai provincial government. Consequently 
in the next chapter I examine two new organizational mechanisms recently introduced 
by the state to advance the goals of PIM in Nam Bo Luang. 
 
 5.4 Conclusions 
In this Chapter, I have analysed empirical evidence on whether geographical scale, 
position and place influence water governance and its implementation in Nam Bo 
Luang. I have done so by testing the research propositions presented in Chapter 3 of the 
thesis under three headings: 
 
1. Scale reflection on actor relationships (examining Proposition 1); 
2. Varying norms and beliefs in relation to water allocation and delivery (examining 
Proposition 2); and 
3. Influence of local politics of scale in encouraging collaborative governance 
(examining Proposition 3). 
 
After empirical examination of each of these propositions in this Chapter, I have 
confirmed their validity as the primary and secondary data demonstrates how space and 
scale shapes politics and interactions among actors over water use. Each proposition 
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also represented the attempts of various actors to promote their interests, enabling them 
to attempt to influence policy, and to mobilize politically (McCann, 2003). On the basis 
of this Chapter’s analysis, I conclude that spatial politics defines actors’ relationships, 
norms and beliefs in water management practice, and shapes decisively the viability of 
cross-scale interactions between actors. 
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CHAPTER 6: THE ROLE OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN 
WATER MANAGEMENT IN CHIANG MAI 
 
In this Chapter, the focus turns to the analysis of the organizational roles and 
effectiveness of the Joint Management Committee for Irrigation (JMC) and Water 
User’s Association (WUA) as ‘middle ground’ mechanisms of adaptive governance; 
that is, organizations capable of restructuring water management among and between 
MTIP, farmers and other stakeholders in Chiang Mai. These two organizations were 
introduced in the study area in 2008-2010 to address some of the difficulties in 
agricultural water supply and distribution identified in Chapter 5. This Chapter presents 
a full description of both organizations, before analyzing their effectiveness and utility 
in resolving these water management challenges.  
 
Primary data for the Chapter was derived from fieldwork conducted among WUA 
administrators, farmers, MTIP officials and JMC representatives directly involved with 
water governance at the local and provincial scales. Data collection was gained from  86 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, 20 questionnaires, four groups discussions and 20 
telephone and Skype interviews (focused on key themes of water governance and 
adaptive governance) undertaken during 2011 and 2012 (see Chapter 3).  
 
The Chapter has four sections. First is a detailed description of the role and function of 
JMC and WUA, and discussion of their organizational structure. This develops the idea 
of their role in water administration as mechanisms of adaptive water management (see 
Chapter 2). The second part then evaluates JMC and WUA’s effectiveness (through 
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testing Propositions 4 and 5 of Chapter 3) in enhancing cross-scale and cross-level 
interactions over water use. Based on this analysis, I then consider Propositions 6 and 7 
to establish whether these recently introduced organizations have assisted in resolving 
water allocation problems in Chiang Mai. The Chapter concludes with an assessment of 
the importance of ‘middle ground’ adaptive governance in promoting sustainable water 
management among the study area’s stakeholders.  
 
6.1 Water management dilemmas at the provincial and local scales: an 
introduction to JMC and WUA 
Chapter 5 identified many water allocation and management problems which advocates 
of adaptive governance contend can be tackled through developing a ‘middle ground’ 
adaptive approach (Gregory et al., 2011). This ‘middle ground’ approach – that is, 
midway between provincial state and grassroots scales of operation, and adopting 
elements of both these scales of intervention – appears to have provided the model for 
the Chiang Mai Governorship’s action in 2008 to address the national goal of 
participatory irrigation management. The new organizational structures were established 
as follows. In 2008, WUA was set up to be a representative forum for farmers to work 
with MTIP and other stakeholders at the provincial and local scales, thus responding 
directly to the national PIM initiative (see Chapter 4). Then, in 2010, the Governorship, 
in collaboration with RID and MTIP, established the Joint Management Committee for 
Irrigation (JMC) to bring together representatives from all other provincial water users. 
WUA and JMC can thus be regarded as a state-led experiment in ‘middle ground’ 
governance, with the aim of attaining more sustainable management of scarce water. 
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JMC/WUA’s establishment is based on the assumption that more collaborative practice 
will develop between agricultural and non-agricultural users through its multi-levelled 
activities, encouraging new behaviours that engender more sustainable water use (c.f. 
Berkes, 2002; Smith and Porter, 2010). This Chapter considers the first couple of years 
(2010-2012) of operation of the JMC/WUA, as a means of evaluating its potential 
contribution to achieving more sustainable water use. 
 
Findings from Chapter 5 confirmed that politics of space influence actor relationships 
(Proposition 1), that there are different, often conflicting norms and beliefs in water 
management (Proposition 2), and that, consequently, there exist obstacles to 
collaborative water management in the study area (Proposition 3). It follows that to 
achieve sustainable water management, novel institutional arrangements for water 
governance are needed in Chiang Mai. WUA and JMC have been introduced in an 
attempt to fulfil that role, by bringing together top-down water management with 
bottom-up water supply and demand issues (see figure 6.1).   
6.1.1 New ‘middle ground’ water management organizations and stakeholder responses 
 
In order to gauge the ability of these newly introduced organizations to change existing 
patterns of water management, I employed the notions of governance and adaptive 
governance to evaluate stakeholder reflections on organizational activities so far. The 
results from this section are used to test Propositions 4-7 (Chapter 3) in the following 
sections and to inform the conclusions chapter.     
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Figure 6.1: WUA and JMC as ‘middle ground’ organizations in water 
management 
Source: Author 
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I. WUA’s introduction and stakeholder evaluation 
The WUA is a logical extension of existing organizational structures within the 
state-led [MTIP] irrigation system (Chapter 4). In effect, WUA has evolved from 
WUGs and IWUGs (see Chapter 4 and Figure 6.2), with its scope covering all farmer-
led irrigation activities, from ditch to lateral to overall MTIP scale. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
   
Figure 6.2: Water User Association evolution 
Source: Adapted from Water Management Development Group (2003)  
 
WUA is legally registered with the Ministry of Interior under the Civil and 
Commercial Code (1992). It has the same structure as IWUGs, and shares IWUG aims 
of instilling collaborative patterns of irrigation. WUA committee office holders are 
elected by its members and are responsible for managing water from main canals to 
particular irrigation zones. There are now 35 WUAs across Thailand, covering the 
country’s entire irrigated area (Kamnerdmanee, 2011, cited in Kumnerdpet, 2011, 
p.176). One of these, the Mae Tang Irrigation WUA, covers five districts of Chiang Mai 
province.       
 
WUG IWUG WUA 
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Mae Tang Irrigation WUA was set up and registered in 2008. The WUA chief 
described to me how the organization was established: 
 
“During 1997-1998, our irrigated areas faced a water supply crisis. Farmers 
competed to abstract water as it was not sufficient to meet their needs. The main reason 
was our irrigation system had only a single dam and no reservoir for water storage. As 
a result, when there was plenty of water in the rainy season at the headwaters in Wiang 
Hang (or Mae Tang) District of MTIP, we couldn’t save it to be used in the dry season. 
What tended to happen was that users across the neighbouring five districts – covering 
about 240 square kilometres – would use water independently of the others. So, to 
overcome these problems – for example, water user groups in San Pa Tong managed 
water only in its area – heads of each water user group met and sought to achieve a 
more collaborative approach. And the result was the Mae Tang Irrigation Water Users 
Network. Then in 1998 the Network appointed me as its chief. We managed both water 
allocation and the organization of water users without regulations and law to support 
us. Later, our administrators had further discussions and agreed to draw up a legal 
basis for our collaborative activities. This took some time to complete, with Mae Tang 
Irrigation WUA finally set up in 2008” (Author’s interview, 18/06/2011). 
 
Mae Tang WUA’s structure is threefold (See Figure 6.3). The first is 
advisory/consultative, with representatives from the Directorate of the MTIP, the 
Director of Water Distribution and Maintenance, and the farming community. The 
second element is WUA committees, with office holders chosen by election; and the 
last is the involvement of farmers or water user members.  
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Figure 6.3: Water User Association (WUA) structure 
Source: Author’s interviews; Water Management Development Group (2003)  
  
WUA’s responsibility is to negotiate water allocation for its stakeholders 
according to farmers’ planting schedules. It does so by bringing water users’ allocation 
problems from the local scale to ‘the project’ and provincial scales of operation. These 
problems often relate to water scarcity in dry season, including failing to supply water 
to farmers at the end of the main canal, enforcing regulations among farming members 
and setting water allocation disputes, and setting and allocating budget for canal 
maintenance and dredging.  
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In order to ensure that farmers receive water equally and transparently, 
according to the agreed rotation plan, and that management problems are resolved 
satisfactorily, the WUA president and vice-presidents work closely with the 15 IWUG 
heads, meeting formally or informally at least once a month, or telephoning in case of 
emergency. This allows WUA to address any management problems and report directly 
to MTIP and JMC.  
Following WUA’s introduction, farming respondents claimed that the 
representation of their allocation needs and problems to MTIP had greatly improved, for 
example enabling successful re-negotiation of water allocation for two IWUGs during a 
drought in 2010. In interview, one farmer observed that: 
 
“As we are situated at the end of a lateral, we have to share water with both 
state and tourism agencies and water use issues often arose. However, these issues were 
largely resolved by our WUA chief. He discussed the problematic issues with these 
organizations directly. For instance, when the office of Chiang Mai Municipality asked 
for water from us to support its tourism activities in the dry season, he could negotiate 
when water should be delivered to the city as he knew the period that farmers needed to 
use water.  We were relieved we had him to take care of our needs” (Author’s 
interview, 09/09/2011). 
 
Another success achieved through WUA negotiation was to increase the 
maintenance budgets allocated by MTIP for repairing dilapidated irrigation systems in 
three contiguous IWUGs. A respondent from IWUG Zone 10 described how: 
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“Being part of WUA means we can control our activities, particularly when we 
need some budget to repair the irrigation systems and for sludge dredging. Last year 
[2010] MTIP were unable to provide us with funds for this. We needed to help 
ourselves. Luckily, the [WUA chief] contacted the Ministry Office and they offered their 
support” (Author’s interview, 10/10/2011).  
 
Among MTIP officials, many were impressed by WUA’s performance in 
reporting water management problems as well as identifying important obstacles to 
collective management across ‘the project’. Importantly, WUA appears to be 
developing a reputation for reconciling differences between farmers and officials. Thus 
a MTIP official remarked to me that: 
 
“The WUA comprises local people with much experience of managing water 
under the previous muang fai system, so farmers trust and respect their decision-
making. We know its strengths, so we employ WUA officials to speak with their 
members in case MTIP needs to negotiate on water allocation with other 
organizations”(Author’s interview, 20/10/2011). 
 
However, among IWUG Zone 10 respondents, some members commented that 
WUA was less successful in getting their members points across, with interviewees 
raising the issue of MTIP having “the final word” in how water was allocated. On this 
point, the WUA chief noted: 
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“Because MTIP is sponsored by government with budgets and irrigation system 
experts, it retains ultimate responsibility for making decisions in water management. 
We don’t have the final say as we have to depend on their support for repairs and 
irrigation technology from the officials” (Author’s interview, 15/09/2011). 
 
From these comments, it appears WUA’s introduction has already established an 
effective role in representing farmers’ opinions and addressing local water management 
problems within MTIP. It could be said that WUA acts as coordinator between diverse 
sets of stakeholders, thereby mitigating problems arising from water politics of scale, 
position and place, particularly through its role as part of the JMC, which I examine in 
the next section.  
 
II. JMC structure and stakeholder evaluation 
The second organizational structure introduced, the JMC, was established by the 
Chiang Mai Governor’s Office in 2010 to improve implementation and planning of 
MTIP and to broker water stakeholder disputes, with powers to restructure WUGs or to 
wind up their operations where necessary. Unlike WUA, JMC’s remit is to address all 
water users – agricultural and non-agricultural – giving it a wider strategic role in the 
development of more sustainable water management in Chiang Mai. Indeed, Chiang 
Mai Office determined that JMC’s first task should be to ensure all WUGs, urban, 
tourism, recreation and amenity interests and government agencies participated in 
decisionmaking on water planning and infrastructure maintenance. Thus this provincial 
level organization potentially has the capacity to improve coordination over irrigation 
management between organizations at regional and local scales, by brokering agreement 
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between farming, amenity and recreation interests. JMC is thus genuinely innovative, as 
it attempts to resolve for the first time water allocation disputes between stakeholders of 
all sorts across local and provincial scales (Figure 6.4). There are now 76 JMCs across 
Thailand, covering the country’s entire irrigated area (Kamnerdmanee, 2011, cited in 
Kumnerdpet, 2011, p.176). 
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Figure 6.4: Joint Management Committee for Irrigation  
Source: Adapted from Water Management Development Group (2003)  
 
JMC’s governance is twofold (see Figure 6.5). The first is advisory/consultative, 
with representatives from the regional (provincial) level including the Chiang Mai 
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Governor’s office, the Chief Executive of the Provincial Administration, the Directorate 
of the Regional Irrigation Office 1, and the Directorate of ‘the project’. The second 
element is participatory – a committee bringing together JMC’s member organizations, 
23 in all, including provincial government, farming groups and private agencies. This 
participatory grouping is charged with advising MTIP on water allocation and 
maintaining provincial irrigation systems. 
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Most water management problems brought to JMC emerge in the dry season, 
because of insufficient water allocation and increased demand, as a result of all 
stakeholders needing to use water in order to supply their various activities at the same 
time. Some 95% of all respondents (19 out of 20 interviewees) stated that the problem 
they had experienced could be described as a water allocation dispute with other JMC 
members, and/or between JMC members and farmers. The other 5% of problems related 
to sediment build-up, and inadequate weir maintenance.     
Representatives from the JMC Committee were interviewed in order to gauge 
their opinion of the Committee’s first full year of operation (representative groups are 
shown in Figure. 6.5). Overall, across all respondents MTIP’s policies on water 
allocation, water planning, problem solving and maintenance of irrigation system 
infrastructure were ranked “moderate to good”, with interviewees commenting that 
JMC’s introduction had improved openness and transparency of decisionmaking, and 
was beginning to have a beneficial effect on decentralizing decisionmaking. For some 
respondents, though, these remarks were tempered by their belief that in JMC meetings 
there was a lack of consideration of alternatives to water modernization; and their strong 
feeling that, as “non-professionals”, they were not qualified to hold opinions on overall 
provincial water strategy. At one level this confirms the entrenched hierarchy within 
Thai society generally. But more specifically I would argue that it demonstrates 
respondents’ engrained sense that the Mae Tang water modernization project cannot be 
challenged. Despite these concerns, 40% of all respondents believed their participation 
in JMC was already contributing to a more integrated approach to irrigation 
management; arguably respectable given this was JMC’s first year of operation. 
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Interviews were then conducted with the president of the JMC committee. This 
respondent commented that the Committee structure afforded opportunities to have 
“meaningful discussions” on provincial water management planning, water 
management problem solving, and information dissemination with other stakeholders. 
He also claimed the JMC committee structure provided a “highly effective” mechanism 
to resolve water allocation and quota issues, as meetings took place at least twice yearly 
(members can also call emergency meetings).  Typically, the first Committee meeting 
takes place before the wet season (rice planting), with the second scheduled 
immediately before the dry season harvest. 
Among Committee members, the main outcome of JMC’s first year of operation 
was reckoned to be a clearer, more transparent water allocation policy for irrigation.  
Farming representatives noted that they now knew and importantly understood how and 
why water volumes were calculated, why water could not be dispensed equally among 
all members, and that negotiation was necessary to share water across multiple uses. 
Moves are now being made to prioritize farm irrigation needs during times of water 
shortage, while releasing water equally to all stakeholders in the wet season.  
Crucially, respondents also commented how the different functional roles of 
JMC governance appeared to be changing their own individual behaviours and 
expectations. Thus, when asked what was expected of them as Committee members, 
72% of respondents (14 out of 20 interviewees) replied their work required them to 
address “at least” three new roles in relation to water management. These were: to 
participate in water allocation planning; to help solve water disputes; and to disseminate 
information related to water management to the client groups they represented. It could 
be argued therefore that institutionalization of roles and social learning among members 
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is beginning to take place. Just over 60% of Committee members (more than 12 
interviewees) claimed they had introduced new channels of communication with their 
client groups to circulate JMC decisions, including: setting up websites; writing 
newsletters; opening telephone help-lines, and running surgeries for face-to-face 
meetings with stakeholders.  
In terms of achieving effective water management, all categories of interviewees 
commented that they were “very satisfied” with the first twelve months’ operation of 
JMC.  JMC committees were helping to make water distribution more equitable and 
transparent at provincial level. Notwithstanding this, respondents acknowledged that 
“other factors” might militate against JMC’s success in future, such as failure to observe 
water use regulations during the dry season. 
 
On this basis, I argue that WUA/JMC’s creation arises directly from state learning over 
stakeholders’ dissatisfaction with, and failure to interact through, the MTIP. JMC/WUA 
have thus been introduced to act as key mediators of a ‘top-down’ system of water 
management trying to respond to changing ‘bottom-up’ water challenges. As such, they 
can be seen plausibly as ‘middle ground’ organizations, responding to the new national 
objectives of PIM (participatory irrigation management) identified by the national 
Government. Hence, in the following section I evaluate JMC and WUA performance in 
terms of their contribution to water management cooperation across different levels and 
scales. 
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6.2 The Joint Management Committee for Irrigation (JMC) and Water User 
Association (WUA): new ‘middle ground’ organizations for enhancing cross-scale 
and cross-level interactions? 
The previous section examined stakeholders’ opinions on water management outcomes 
in Nam Bo Luang, at the beginning of what, hopefully, will be a transition to more 
sustainable water management. Nonetheless, it is possible to make a provisional 
judgment on WUA and JMC’s likelihood of future success by cross-comparison of 
interviewees’ responses with the theoretical work on adaptive governance set out in 
Chapters 2 and 3 as a means of charting possible pathways for future development of 
the WUA and JMC. Specifically in order to evaluate how the governance and 
management of WUA and JMC might proceed in north west Thailand, in this section I 
examine empirical evidence to support or refute Propositions 4 and 5 of Chapter 3. I 
begin by evaluating evidence to confirm or refute Proposition 4. 
 
Proposition 4 focuses on whether JMC/WUA have given non-state actors, such as 
farmers and other water stakeholders, greater legitimacy to intervene in provincial water 
management. Specifically, Proposition 4 states:  
6.2.1 JMC and the WUA as empowering institutional mechanisms (Proposition 4) 
 
 “Recently introduced organizational mechanisms promoted at the local scale empower 
non-state actors to have legitimacy in water management comparable with state 
agencies”.  
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Recent stakeholder experiences of JMC and WUA were obtained through interview. 
‘Non-state actors’ in the WUA structure are farmers, and the key test here is to what 
extent WUA has provided new opportunities for them to participate in irrigation water 
management within ‘the project’ as part of the move towards PIM. Crucially WUA’s 
establishment as a legal organization has the potential to increase the credibility and 
legitimacy of PIM among farmers. When asked in interview what he saw the main 
advantages of WUA were, the WUA chief commented: 
 
“With WUA as an organization with formal legal status, we have more power to 
negotiate many things with MTIP and with other JMC member organizations, including 
budget and water allocation and management. For example, in 2009 – a real drought 
year – we only had enough water left to allocate two cubic metres per person across the 
five districts over the dry season. Water supply was in crisis. But WUA helped us broker 
an agreement for water delivery rotation between stakeholders. MTIP allowed us to 
make a mutually agreed decision. When people knew we had the ability to do this, they 
started coming to us and asked us as their representatives to help them when they had a 
problem with  irrigation water” (Author’s interview, 16/08/2011). 
 
Part of WUA’s legitimacy in water management comes from it bringing together people 
who already know and trust each other from their time in muang fai systems and/or the 
Mae Tang Irrigation Water Management Network. This continuity in values, attitudes, 
norms, knowledge and practical experience seems to have encouraged members to use 
the WUA for collaborative purposes. In addition these informal relationships have 
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helped promote WUA’s image as an organization that can effectively address members’ 
water management concerns, as the vice chief noted in interview: 
 
“We always ask our members to come and see us anytime they need to. In case of water 
shortage or irrigation system problems, they can let us know through their group heads 
or come to see me at home. And, if some of them cannot come to see me, the chief or I 
will go to see them ourselves” (Author’s interview, 25/07/2011).   
 
This was corroborated by the WUA chief as follows: 
 
“When we received some budget from the government, we spent the money to improve 
not only our agricultural activities, but also used it as an incentive for members to help 
dredge irrigation canals and to maintain local water delivery systems. So WUA money 
ends up in farmers’ hands” (Author’s interview, 27/08/2011). 
 
From the perspective of MTIP, ‘project’ officials considered WUA a real asset in 
communicating more effectively with farmers. One official stated: 
 
“WUA is the farmers’ representative   they are local people, they’ve grown up here, 
they know their areas, know their members, know what farmers really need, know which 
period they cannot release water to other agencies. Therefore, if MTIP need farmers to 
reduce their water use so as to manage overall demand, we naturally ask WUA to 
inform their members. We think farmers understand WUA better than us. They’ve 
labeled us as ‘the outsiders’” (Author’s interview, 1/10/2011). 
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It could be said that WUA is a ‘self-organizing’ body for farmers, with the potential to 
change existing patterns of water management through demonstrating new possibilities 
for collaboration and cooperation among its membership. Hence in interview, the vice 
chief reflected: 
 
“As there was evidence showing that farmers as well as other agencies stole water and 
did not respect existing rules, the WUA committee decided to improve the clarity and 
understandability of water use regulations among its members. We also set in place a 
new system of fines in case members abused the regulations – things like not 
maintaining watercourses, or failing to attend group meetings. In addition, we have 
asked members to pay a fee according to their drainage areas especially from 
government and private agencies that use irrigation water from MTIP, including 
Chiang Mai Night Safari, Royal Flora Ratchapruek Chiang Mai and Chiang Mai 
Provincial Waterworks” (Author’s interview, 20/10/2011). 
 
This demonstrates that WUA can empower farmers to participate in water management 
with ‘the project’. However, to communicate farmers’ needs with other stakeholders, 
WUA needs to be part of a wider organizational and institutional context, which JMC 
provides.    
 
In 2010, JMC was established to implement the PIM concept by engaging stakeholders 
in participatory water governance. The WUA chief and vice chiefs act as the JMC 
administrator groups and, according to one respondent, WUA has “a huge opportunity 
to make JMC more relevant and legitimate” to farmers. The interviews I undertook 
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revealed a number of ways in which WUA could do so, ranging from improved 
understanding of farmers’ water needs, through to acting as a ‘clearing house’ for 
grassroots agricultural ideas on how to improve water allocation and delivery. Thus, the 
Association has begun to disseminate knowledge of farmers’ water needs more widely 
to domestic and industrial users through the JMC, enabling other agencies to  recognize 
why water is needed, while permitting farmers greater rights and responsibilities in 
decisionmaking rather than relying on ‘the project’. A representative of IWUG Zone 10 
commented that: 
 
“I think local administrative organizations and private agencies have never understood 
us. Now, while WUA has less power than JMC (it cannot request greater water 
allocation, for example), it can oblige the president of JMC to act. So it has an 
important role to play in counterbalancing the power of the government and tourism 
agencies, and the decision-making they propose”. (Author’s interview, 7/09/2011) 
 
While the WUA chief offered this candid opinion: 
 
“JMC has fewer farmers’ representatives than other stakeholders who have power as a 
result of government back-up and money, including MTIP. In WUA, we do not want to 
make an enemy of JMC, as they could affect the long-term influence we have. But 
farmers do not want money or influence as much as water” (Author’s interview, 
1/06/2011) 
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The Chief also noted a potentially significant organizational weakness in JMC, in that: 
 
 “JMC is not a formal organization in the sense that it has not got any legal powers or 
competencies. Its roles are largely conciliatory and representational, and there’s no 
financial support for its operation. When compared with WUA, JMC only helps make 
water allocation planning more transparent. Particularly among farmers, MTIP and 
local government agencies, I have to say we do not understand each other. We have the 
office heads on JMC committees, but when I invite them to attend a meeting, they rarely 
come; they usually send someone instead. JMC is not strong enough to empower 
farmers to have legitimacy in water management as it is not a legal organization” 
(Author’s interview, 28/08/2011). 
 
This observation was corroborated by a project official: 
 
“JMC is at an early stage. It needs time to develop relationships among its diverse 
membership and to adjust their understanding to each other. Sometimes I think it’s 
difficult to understand what that really requires. And this might obstruct achieving co-
water management”. (Author’s interview, 04/10/2011)         
 
From these interviewees’ comments, therefore, it is apparent that JMC’s status is less 
favourable among farmers than that of WUA, even though both organizations can be 
viewed as demonstrating the provincial government’s intention to directly address the 
problems inherent in the MTIP. Irrespective of this, the overall aim of JMC and WUA 
appears to be to stick with the MTIP model of ‘command and control’ in water 
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governance and management. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence here to support 
Proposition 4, albeit with some reservations regarding JMC’s perception amongst 
farmers. This point is considered further in Chapters 7 and 8. 
 
Folke et al. (2005) note that a critical feature of adaptive governance is the importance 
attached to effective cross-scale and cross-level interactions in delivering successful 
policy outcomes. Hence, Proposition 5 focuses on whether cross-scale and cross-level 
interactions encouraged local actors to engage with actors at other scales and levels, so 
facilitating collaborative water management in the study region. 
6.2.2 Cross-scale and cross-level interactions to facilitate collaborative water 
management (Proposition 5) 
 
A focus group discussion with a sample group of MTIP, JMC, WUA, and IWUG zone 
10 participants enabled me to identify cross-scale and cross-level interactions in practice 
in the study region. From the farmers’ viewpoint, they understood that cross-scale 
interactions offer a potential solution to their informational needs for PIM, by enabling 
them to contact/ask for help/share experiences and knowledge with other actors, located 
across scale boundaries. IWUG Zone 10’s head described his understanding of this to 
me as follows: 
 
“I’d say these ‘cross-scale’ meetings are a chance for us to receive help and knowledge 
from others, such as sharing information on when we’ve plenty of water or when we’re 
short of it with neighbouring muang fai, or when we asked for help from Subdistrict 
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Administrative Organizations (SAOs) for some money to support us with canal 
dredging” (Author’s interview, 17/10/2011) 
 
In interview, the WUA chief offered his understanding of the value of cross-scale and 
cross level interaction in this way: 
 
“It’s of real value to coordinate with others locally or regionally without going through 
MTIP, since ‘the project’ cannot respond to all our requests. For instance, I am going 
to ask the Upper Ping Watershed Committee if we can share its budget to support our 
irrigation activities – though I’ll have to inform MTIP first about this” (Author’s 
interview, 17/10/2011). 
 
While, when asked to clarify their understanding of cross-scale and cross-level 
interactions, many respondents commented along the lines that it was “the ability to 
contact with people at higher level without considering hierarchy”.  
 
Here, ‘cross-scale’ and ‘cross-level interactions’ tend to be defined by interviewees as 
encounters with other water stakeholders that lead to exchange of information on water 
management across multiple scales and levels. Farmers agreed that this multi-scaled and 
leveled governance was a step forward for them, but that it also brought complexity and 
could not be guaranteed to resolve water dilemmas speedily. As Chapter 5 reported, the 
outputs of multi-scale water management often demonstrate gaps between actors in 
levels of knowledge and in administrative competence. This counterbalances assertions 
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made by scholars that cross-scale and cross-level interactions invariably enhance local 
adaptive capacity to deal with disturbance (Folke et al., 2005; Termeer et al., 2010).  
 
A ‘middle ground’ organization thus appears essential to trigger interaction of actors 
across scales and levels to improve prospects for sustainable water management. WUA 
has the potential to encourage farmers to interact with MTIP, local government 
organizations and tourism agencies by using the JMC as a forum. This is because WUA 
is close to farmers, whom trust and respect it as ‘reliable agency’. Likewise, JMC is 
viewed as legitimate and viable by non-agricultural water users. Thus, taken together, 
JMC/WUA represent a credible water management institution, placing this hybrid 
organization in a potentially powerful position to legitimate particular local-level 
procedure, to broker cross-scale interactions, and to facilitate state legitimization of 
local practice, enabling cultural and political revitalization, capacity building and 
institutional building.  Nonetheless these cross-scale and cross-level interactions need to 
grapple with often radically different knowledge sets about water among stakeholders, if 
transitioning to collaborative forms of water management is to come about.  
 
In the study region WUA contains elements both of water modernization and 
intergenerational water knowledge, and its mode of operation lies in between applying 
formal rules and informal procedure (Figure 5.7, Chapter 5). This seems to have 
enhanced the interaction between actors across scales and levels to share their 
knowledge and experience over water allocation disputes.  As the JMC president 
commented: 
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“JMC meetings, which take place at least twice a year, is a forum for me to exchange 
my knowledge and farmers experience from the smallest scale to water management at 
the project level. At the same time, MTIP and the rest of JMC representatives attend 
these meetings to offer guidance and advice on technology and financial issues to help 
us.  And it can provide the forum for collective decision-making. This is because it 
offers a forum where farmers (like me), MTIP, local government organization 
representatives and tourism agents are at the same level and position, there’s no 
hierarchy in meetings” (Author’s interview, 04/04/2012)    
 
However, a representative from IWUG Zone 10 took a more cautionary approach: 
 
“Twice yearly meetings are just not enough to change our understanding, to bring it up 
to the same level as them [the MTIP]. There should be both more formal and informal 
opportunities to sit and talk together. That way, we could reach an agreed programme 
of management of irrigation water much more quickly” (Author’s interview, 
11/09/2011) 
 
From an adaptive governance perspective, together the WUA and JMC have the 
capacity to reduce widespread problems of ‘scale mismatch’ and ‘level misfit’ through 
increasing collaboration among actors in water management (Young, 2002). 
Nonetheless it should be emphasised that introducing JMC and WUA has also 
complicated the already tangled web of provincial water governance, as decisiontaking 
on water policy remains the responsibility of MTIP. Consequently, stakeholder 
engagement in JMC does not necessarily equate with these stakeholders being accorded 
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equal weight in ongoing discussions on future water policy options; nor, crucially, does 
it at this stage include muang fai systems. While muang fai systems are currently not 
within JMC/WUA’s remit, assuming its activities are successful, the intention is to 
bring about new collaborations between these two local systems of water governance. 
As Allen and Gunderson (2011, p.1381) note, “Government agencies often hold sway 
among stakeholders in complex regional scale adaptive management processes. They 
are often the legally empowered, technically astute and the primary funders of much of 
the adaptive management actions”. Clearly this is the case with the MTIP. The key issue 
here, then, will be how WUA/JMC develops as a brokerage/negotiation mechanism 
over MTIP policy, and the scope it has to grant equal importance to all participants in 
the development of new approaches to water allocation and delivery, particularly where 
this goes against MTIP’s current operating procedures. 
 
The analysis set out here thus provides evidence to support Proposition 5. It also 
highlights the need to develop WUA to have the same legitimacy and powers as JMC, 
so that the Association can properly support cross-scale and cross-level interactions to 
ensure successful water management.    
  
6.3 JMC/ WUA as ‘middle ground’ organizations 
The previous section demonstrates that the newly introduced water management 
structures of MTIP (JMC and WUA), acting as farmers’ partnerships and collaborative 
action, have the capacity to overcome the tendency of stakeholders to pursue narrow 
self-interests in water use (Smith and Porter, 2010). Therefore, these organizations 
potentially can be expected to encourage the transition to more adaptive and 
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collaborative water governance arrangements (Loorbach and Rotmans, 2006; Pahl-
Wostl, 2007; Loorbach, 2010). I examine this aspect further here by testing Propositions 
6 and 7 to gauge the ability of JMC/WUA to build social learning and networking 
among stakeholders, resolve water allocation problems, and enhance transition to more 
sustainable water management.  
 
Proposition 6 states: 
6.3.1 Evidence of collaborative water management (Proposition 6) 
 
“Collaborative water management within the study region offers opportunities for state 
and non-state actors to engage in social learning and networking”. 
 
In interviews, ‘collaborative water management’ for all stakeholders was defined as 
active shared responsibility for water allocation and delivery among farmers, MTIP and 
JMC through collective decision-making and decision-taking and the resolution of 
water management problems, with farmers having rights and powers equal to the 
agencies. Of the current situation under the MTIP, one respondent remarked: 
 
“Nowadays, I just want to manage my water needs with the project and with other 
agencies simply. But it seems that farmers like me are expected to accept the decisions 
on water they’re given, more than participate in taking those decisions. As a result, 
water disputes often flare up. And, more importantly, water quantity is unpredictable. 
Only WUA can, I think, relieve our problems” (Author’s interview, 30/08/2011) 
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Thus continued reliance on MTIP governance appears to calls into question the 
emergence of more sustainable patterns of water allocation and delivery. As I have 
shown, MTIP has demonstrated frailties in handling the water management demands of 
multiple users locally and provincially. Importantly, rising water demand and recent 
climate change projections for the river Ping and its catchments suggest that these 
demands will become substantially more difficult to process and handle in future 
(Huitema and Meijerink, 2009). 
 
On this issue, the Head of IWUG Zone 10 commented: 
 
“Collaborative water management in our areas could happen if MTIP acted as 
consultant in terms of informing available water and supporting our water user groups 
with some budget if we really needed it. The rest of irrigation activities, I think farmers 
have the capacity to handle, for example devising water delivery rotation with 
government and private agencies and employing our local knowledge from muang fai 
experience to managing water via WUA” (Author’s interview, 20/06/2012) 
 
As discussed earlier, promoting collaborative water management emerged relatively 
recently nationally with the adoption of PIM. This resulted in WUA and JMC being 
established to promote collaborative water management. The previous section has 
shown how JMC’s non-agricultural stakeholders and WUA’s representation of farming 
interests now appear to enable local level water stakeholder concerns to be fed through 
to MTIP through JMC’s committee structure. For example, there seems to be genuine 
efforts being made to create favourable conditions for collaborative water management, 
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according to WUA and IWUG respondents, and to put stakeholder needs ‘centre stage’ 
in local water allocation and delivery. The intention is that cross-scale and cross-level 
interactions assist farmers and actors at higher scales and levels to collaborative water 
management via WUA. Thus a Zone Assistant said: 
 
“Actually when we started to think through how PIM might work in practice, we asked 
all of our stakeholders to join us in shaping a new approach to irrigation management. 
WUA has helped address farmers’ issues and enabled us to present them more 
effectively at JMC meetings. So, now, farmers’ needs often cross scales and levels. We 
try as much as we can to deliver water for farmers before sharing it with other 
agencies. And we’re still looking for other ways to involve all parties to increase 
effectiveness in irrigation” (Author’s interview, 05/08/2011) 
 
While WUA’s chief stated: 
 
“JMC is a good way of gathering many stakeholders to plan for water allocation when 
water is in crisis. JMC meetings allow us to learn from each other, and to strengthen 
our relationships. It’s got us to work as a team, and to avoid disagreements over water 
allocation wherever we can. And, as to what a good relationship means, it’s about 
being able to ask for help whenever it’s needed” (Author’s interview, 13/09/2011) 
 
These promising developments have recently been further enhanced by policy changes 
in JMC, which were put into effect in March 2012. First, JMC meetings can now be 
convened by a vote among members in order to respond to water circumstances – a 
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useful innovation, particularly in dry season. This allows committee members to have 
more interaction, which, according to Hinde (1981) (cited in Giddens, 1992, p.23-25), 
could lead to deeper relationships among stakeholders. For example, hierarchical 
relationships might be lessened between JMC members and MTIP officials, hence 
offering an opportunity to combine or blend contrasting knowledges on water 
management. Secondly, stakeholders’ increased cross-scale and cross-level interactions 
have resulted in improved water allocation plans, which has greatly assisted water 
delivery to farmers in the dry season. The evidence displayed at JMC meetings is that 
farmers at the end of canal laterals now have water available on at least 57 percent of 
days in the dry season. Moreover, private and government agencies, such as Chiang Mai 
Provincial Waterworks Authority and Military Campuses have to contact JMC and 
MTIP before abstracting water in the dry season. Lastly, JMC and WUA developed a 
relationship as a social network with village chiefs and community leaders to help them 
enforce farmers to respect the water use regulations and use water according to the 
agreed water rotation plans. These local networks are expected to dramatically improve 
communication on water issues with local people. This confirms how collaborative 
water management within the study area has developed since JMC and WUA’s 
introduction, and the range of new opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage 
in social learning and social networking in the study area since 2008. 
 
The findings reported augur well for a collective learning experience, that Bouwen and 
Taillieu (2004) note could underpin collaborative water management, leading to 
sustainability and integration benefits. Specifically, cross-scale and cross-level 
interaction helps deepen networked relationships, permitting ‘multiple voices’ in water 
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allocation to be heard and different kinds of knowledge (local, scientific) to be 
mobilised. As Folke et al. (2005) and Hahn et al. (2006) note, such elements can yield 
new solutions to water management problems and dilemmas among water users.  
 
Taken together, there is circumstantial evidence here for more collaborative practice 
starting to emerge; consequently, Proposition 6 is validated. In the penultimate section 
of this Chapter, I therefore evaluate the prospective capabilities of JMC and WUA to 
instil a transition to more sustainable water management in Chiang Mai.   
 
The last proposition (Proposition 7) to be tested states: ‘Formal and informal 
institutional mechanisms promoted to actors across scales and levels can resolve water 
allocation problems and encourage the transition to more sustainable water 
management’. 
6.3.2 Mechanisms to encourage the transition to more sustainable water management 
(Proposition 7) 
 
The preceding sections identified various mechanisms in water management. The 
obvious instrumentalities include JMC and WUA as new ‘middle ground’ mechanisms 
in the governance of MTIP. JMC and WUA can be categorized as formal institutions, 
since their water policy and strategy are derived from government actions (Grigg, 
2011). On the other hand, my research also identified a plethora of informal institutional 
mechanisms, such as informal relationships, local water norms, the situated knowledge, 
culture and customs of muang fai that, taken as a whole, constitute ‘good water 
governance’. Equally however, respondents commented on the barriers and obstacles to 
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more sustainable water management practice imposed by the MTIP and its legacy of 
top-down water management, which interviewees alleged obstructs effective knowledge 
sharing among and between actors at multiple scales and levels, and hence retards social 
learning (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2007).  So, for example, farmers in Nam Bo Luang 
commented: 
 
“There are many procedures in water management at the project levels. So we have to 
follow these step- by- step if we need help from MTIP or JMC. They cannot quickly 
solve the problems like WUA, so often we rely on our own family and kinship relations 
to deal with the problems instead” (Author’s interview, 20/09/2011) 
 
While a WUA respondent commented that: 
 
“Being WUA, we have formal legal rules and regulations to work with our farmers. But 
more often than not, there is no need to use formal processes to manage our farmers as 
we are the same local people, have the same knowledge level and norms. I work with 
them by using informal relationships, knowing that if we do, we can oblige them to 
respect the rules by using the formal powers at our disposal” (Author’s interview, 
11/10/2011) 
 
Clearly the new procedures do not allow all water allocation problems to be readily 
resolved. However, section 6.3.1 demonstrated that JMC and WUA are at the beginning 
stage of offering opportunities for state and non-state actors to collaborative water 
management. This shows the capacity for combining formal and informal institutional 
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mechanisms to resolve water allocation problems. In particular, both WUA and JMC 
need more time to establish their institutional presence before challenging the national 
and provincial heritage of ‘command and control’ water management. Hence at this 
early stage, it cannot be definitively stated that these organizations have the capability to 
effect a transition to more sustainable water management in Nam Bo Luang or Chiang 
Mai. To do so, according to van de Kerkhof and Wieczorek (2005), WUA and JMC 
must instil four aspects of learning among actors. These are, first, to secure the 
commitment of stakeholders to invest time and effort in the transition process, to 
actively contribute to collaborative discussion, and to be critical but open to new 
information, and to learn from each other. The results reported here demonstrate that 
while WUA and farmers are showing commitment as MTIP and JMC members, MTIP 
still has to show its long-term intentions regarding water use and management. As a 
result, transition has not begun. Second, fairness is needed to facilitate an open 
discussion in which minority (farmers) viewpoints are not a priori excluded from 
discussion. Farmers and WUA revealed that while they often received a fair hearing in 
JMC meetings, the frequency of these meetings was not enough to discuss anything 
more than day-to-day practicalities of water allocation and management, much less to 
establish transition targets or aspiration for more sustainable water use. Thirdly, 
transition needs transparency allowing participants to check whether the process is 
sound, and whether it gives them sufficient opportunity to fulfil their own goals. This 
aspect is certainly supported by the study results, giving credence to the notion of 
“middle ground” as ‘the project’ is now more transparent in its water management 
intentions. Lastly, transition needs competence, which can be understood as the ability 
of the participants to deliberate about different aspects of the transition theme and to 
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make informed choices with regard to both the nature of the water allocation problem 
and the possible solutions to this problem, given the current information and knowledge 
available. Again, this aspect needs much further development across Chiang Mai to 
bring to fruition. On the basis of the many contingencies evident, therefore, Proposition 
7 is rejected. 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
This Chapter has analysed empirical evidence on whether ‘middle ground’ governance 
promoted in the study region is sufficient to solve water allocation problems and to 
encourage sustainable water management. I have done so by evaluating the relevant 
research propositions (Propositions 4, 5, 6 and 7) presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis. 
 
I conclude that WUA and JMC certainly have the capability to encourage cross-scale 
and cross-level interaction to engage actors at multiple scales and levels to facilitate 
collaborative water management (Proposition 5), and hence do offer opportunities for 
state-and non-state actors to engage in social learning and social networking 
(Proposition 6). However, the command and control management of MTIP is the main 
factor obstructing JMC and WUA’s empowerment of farmers to participate in water 
management comparable with state agencies (Proposition 4). Much less certain is 
whether these new intermediary organizations can resolve water allocation problems, 
and so encourage sustainability transitions (Proposition 7). 
 
In Chapter 7, I address these strengths and weaknesses of JMC and WUA’s operation, 
and, reflecting on the results of the empirical research in earlier Chapters, consider how 
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the adaptive governance approach employed in this thesis might enable identification of 
the factors and strategies needed to chart a course towards sustainable water 
management and water governance in Chiang Mai. 
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CHAPTER 7: ENHANCING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ‘MIDDLE 
GROUND’ ORGANIZATIONS IN WATER MANAGEMENT IN 
CHIANG MAI  
 
Building on the preceding research, this Chapter considers the conditions under which 
the transition to more sustainable water management in north west Thailand can be 
promoted. First, I do so by reflecting on the findings of Chapters 5 and 6, focusing in 
particular on the outcome of testing the seven research propositions, and the 
contribution of my empirical findings to adaptive governance and sociospatial theories. 
I then reflect on the strengths and weaknesses of establishing ‘middle ground’ 
organizations in water management demonstrated by my primary research, and how the 
shortcomings of JMC/WUA’s existing approach to implementing more sustainable 
patterns of water management in the study area might be addressed. This discussion is 
structured from the perspective of the informing literatures on adaptive governance and 
sociospatial relations respectively. Finally, drawing on the thesis’s empirical findings, I 
conclude with an evaluation of the first couple of years’ operation of JMC/WUA. 
 
7.1 Empirical findings of the study, and contribution to adaptive governance and 
sociospatial relations theories 
Implementing adaptive governance for water via the introduction of ‘middle ground’ 
organizations in developing countries faces manifest challenges, as water governance 
contexts are still largely state-based, inflexible and often resistant to change (Rogers and 
Hall, 2003; Bressers and Kuks, 2013; Chambers, 2013). Consequently, redesigning 
water management institutions and policy frameworks in order to adapt to changing 
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society-environment relationships in ways that encourage sustainable water 
management is still in its infancy (Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005; Carpenter and 
Folke, 2006). With reference to the case study, JMC/ WUA and the seven research 
propositions, here I consider the thesis findings from the perspective of the two 
informing literatures of Chapter 2, on sociospatial relations and governance. I begin 
with the findings on sociospatial relations and water management.  
 
Chapter 5 critically examined three research propositions to test whether and how 
geographical scale, position and place influence actor interactions over water 
governance and management in the study area. The Chapter’s findings demonstrated 
that politics of space significantly affects water management knowledge and water 
management interactions in Nam Bo Luang, Chiang Mai by structuring actor 
relationships, underwriting and reinforcing differences in norms and beliefs concerning 
water allocation, and determining actor capacity to collaborate on water management, as 
follows.  
7.1.1 Sociospatial relations and water management      
 
I. Scale defines actor relationships in terms of actors accepting or challenging norms 
and beliefs pertaining to water management and participating in new water 
management arrangement. (Proposition 1)  
The empirical findings disclosed the importance of scaled relationships in water use and 
allocation, and the multitude of “smaller”/“larger” spatial units within the study area, 
making up “a multilayered, hierarchically figured geographical scaffolding” (Brenner, 
2001, p.600). Hence, different scales of water management means farmers (local scale) 
198 
 
and MTIP (provincial scale) have managed water in their own ways, based on different 
scaled beliefs and norms. This has tended to prevent collaborations of actors across 
scales and levels, as evidenced in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2.1), leading to complexities in 
water management and solving water use problems across the study area, particularly in 
the state-led MTIP irrigation project. 
 
In line with other studies, therefore, my research demonstrates scale crucially affects the 
efficiency and effectiveness of existing and potential future patterns of water 
governance (Lebel et al., 2005; Cash et al., 2006; Dore and Lebel, 2010). These 
findings foregrounded the potential importance of cross-scale interactions, and 
highlighted for me the potential of JMC/WUA as a ‘middle ground’ organization that 
might enhance a transition to more sustainable water management in the future (see 
Proposition 5). 
 
II. Differences among actors in water norms and beliefs at local scale gives rise to 
particular water politics that shape ‘solutions’ to local water allocation and delivery 
problems (Proposition 2) 
Molle (2007) and Lebel et al. (2008) identify the benefit of applying scaled knowledge 
in water management in terms of easing interventions in water use, and to provide 
justifications or rationalisations to local stakeholders to participate in decisionmaking. 
My analysis in Chapter 5 concurs with this position, by demonstrating how, under the 
state-sponsored system, the centrally coordinated, hierarchical approach is simply too 
complex and inflexible to facilitate local and provincial water management, with 
allocation and dispute resolution routinely involving numerous officials and multiple 
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organizations at different scales and actor levels. Evidence in Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 
confirmed that this arose because different geographical scales and levels of water 
management have embedded within them often radically different knowledge and rules 
sets. These knowledges and rules mean similar – often, the same – water management 
‘problem’ or ‘dilemma’ is viewed very differently by farmers, other water users, and 
MTIP policy practitioners.  
 
Therefore, I conclude that not only does this exclude building communities of actors 
around the concept of “participatory irrigation management”, it also greatly complicates 
developing cross-scale and cross-level water management in practice. In effect, lack of 
cooperation among stakeholders emerges, instead of enhancing collaboration.  
 
III. Local water politics influence the viability of cross-scale interactions that seek to 
specify collaborative water management among state and non-state actors, and hence 
the transition to more sustainable water management (Proposition 3)    
I show in Chapter 5 how one of the most critical consequences of scale shaping actor 
relationships and differentiation of norms and beliefs is that MTIP’ s hierarchical 
[national-local] arrangement brings a heavy administrative burden, exacerbating the 
day-to-day management of water issues by making problem resolution more 
complicated. For example MTIP’s system of water allocation means ‘politics of 
position’ develop where farmers are in a disadvantageous position on canals and 
laterals, and receive only irregular supplies of dry season water as actors ‘higher up’ the 
canal exercise their spatial advantage by abstracting water for their own purposes. This 
can have a crucial impact upon power relations between actors, both in the sense that 
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some positions tend to be more influential than others in determining water access, and 
in the sense that emphasizing the situated nature of water knowledge (water 
stakeholders) challenges that power of those who claim objectivity in water allocation 
and delivery (MTIP) (Sheppard, 2002). 
 
Again, as shown in Chapter 5, these benefits of position also foster a ‘politics of place’ 
where a sense of entitlement to water is bestowed upon a minority group of powerful 
state-based actors, and ‘dispossession’ on a far less powerful but much more numerous 
group locally (farmers). The dangers here are clear; as Yung et al. (2003) note, if actors 
feel that their positions are not understood or heard, they might reject to engage in water 
management participation processes altogether.      
 
In brief, the empirical examination of Propositions 1-3 confirm that scale, position and 
place issues are often mobilised in local territorial politics by actors  to promote their 
often radically different perspectives on interest water use and water management 
across scales. Competition between these different positions often allows the water 
management pattern of the MTIP to dominate other groups. The resulting complexity 
and inflexibility has prevented new forms of collaboration and coordination becoming 
established among stakeholders across scales and levels, reinforcing the Thai state’s 
dominance of water management from local to national scale. Hence, no matter what 
the intentions of ‘scaling up’ or ‘down’ in resolving water management are (c.f. Gupta,  
2011, Chapter 2), the disparity in actors’ beliefs, norms, and relationships arising from 
politics of space has prevented instilling new forms of learning, and the inculcation of 
new water management behaviours favouring sustainability. There is, therefore, a need 
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to create an appropriate governance space where actors across scales and levels can 
work together and define new water management territories and responsibilities, which I 
addressed through critical examination of the other four research propositions.   
 
The empirical findings from the previous section pointed out the difficulty of achieving 
collaborative water management, resulting from the influences of politics of scale, 
position and place. Consequently, in Chapter 6 I examined the introduction of new 
organizational mechanisms that potentially facilitate cross-scale and cross-level 
interactions in water management. There are JMC and WUA. Based on the governance 
and adaptive governance literatures, I distilled four research propositions in Chapter 3 
that I employed in Chapter 6 to evaluate the ‘middle ground’ adaptive governance 
capabilities of these two new organizations. This analysis revealed that JMC and WUA 
have great promise in balancing power between state and non-state actors, and in 
encouraging new cross-scale and cross-level interactions to facilitate collaborative water 
management. There are, however, important provisos in my assessment, which I 
identify and discuss here. 
7.1.2 Governance and water management      
 
I. Recently introduced organizational mechanisms promoted at the local scale can 
empower non-state actors to have legitimacy in water management comparable with 
state agencies (Proposition 4) 
Evidence was found that JMC and WUA can address farmers’ water management 
problems and present them to MTIP more effectively than current arrangements, in 
effect by – passing the hierarchical procedures of decisionmaking and decisiontaking on 
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water management (see Chapter 4). These organizations give actors opportunities to 
compare the merits of alternative governance arrangements and to challenge and/or 
support other stakeholders’ interest, causes, and effects, as Young (2002) noted in other 
situations. 
 
Specifically, WUA’s structure is based on farmers communal water management needs 
and responsibilities, and, by being set within the institutional structure of the RID,  
provides new opportunities for them to participate in irrigation water management and 
to develop this management according to PIM principles. As important, WUA has a 
formal legal organizational basis, so it has the potential to increase the credibility and 
legitimacy of PIM among farmers. Through the status this confers, WUA can empower 
farmers to participate in water management with ‘the project’. JMC, by contrast, is a 
forum that allows WUA to communicate farmers’ needs with other water stakeholders 
since WUA’s constituent groups are represented on the JMC administrative Board. As a 
result, WUA has “a huge opportunity to make JMC more relevant and legitimate” to 
farmers (see Chapter 6, section 6.2.1). 
 
Following adaptive governance literatures, JMC and WUA can be viewed as ‘middle 
ground’ organizations, designed to mediate actor relationships across scales and levels 
over water use (Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005; Carpenter and Folke, 2006) by 
brokering agreement on water rights, responsibilities, and power between multiple 
levels and sectors of government and civil society; a role that, according to governance 
scholars, is regarded as essential for effective water management (Fabricius et al., 2007; 
Armitage et al., 2008; Berkes, 2009). Consequently, through my analysis of the four 
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propositions, I sought to evaluate whether and how JMC and WUA offer opportunities 
to encourage greater participation by water users in decisionmaking arrangements in 
future. 
 
II. Cross-scale and cross-level interactions encourage local actors to engage with 
actors at other scales and levels, so facilitating collaborative water management in the 
study area (Proposition 5) 
Chapter 6’s analysis of Proposition 4 showed the growing reliance by actors on JMC 
and WUA for contact/ask for help/ share experiences and knowledge with actors, 
located across scale boundaries and level management. From this analysis, it appears 
JMC and WUA are consolidating their position to provide legitimization for particular 
local-level water procedure, to broker cross-scale water management interactions, and to 
facilitate state legitimization of local practices, thereby enabling capacity building on 
water governance. Crucially these organizations also provide a forum for exchanging 
knowledge and technologies applying to water management across the study area (c.f. 
Berkes, 2004). Thus, WUA has the potential to encourage farmers to interact with 
MTIP, local government organizations and tourism agencies by using the JMC as a 
forum, because WUA has already earned the trust and respect of agricultural 
community as a ‘reliable agency’. Likewise, JMC is viewed as legitimate and viable by 
non-agricultural water users. In effect, therefore, from the adaptive governance 
perspective, JMC and WUA have the capability to reduce widespread problems of 
‘scale mismatch’ and ‘level misfit’ through increasing collaboration among actors in 
water management (Young, 2002).   
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III. Collaborative water management within the study region offers opportunities for 
state and non-state actors to engage in social learning and social networking 
(Proposition 6) 
As JMC and WUA have empowered non-state actors (especially farmers) to have 
greater legitimacy in water management (Proposition 4), these actors have begun to 
engage with actors at other scales and levels through cross-scale and cross-level 
interactions (Proposition 5). Chapter 6 showed that more collaborative water 
management is beginning to emerge in the study area. Furthermore, this Chapter also 
provides some evidence to suggest JMC and WUA are contributing to social learning 
and networking. Examples demonstrated in Chapter 6 include adjusting water rotation 
plans, providing times for canal dredging and maintenance, and building relationships 
with village heads and community leaders. WUA’s introduction, crucially, enables 
water management problems at the local scale to be ‘scaled up’ to the provincial and 
national scale of resolution through JMC’s fora.  Importantly, these developments may 
represent turning points in beginning to increase effectiveness, sustainability and 
integration and enhancing inclusive governance and self-governing capacities, 
according to Bouwen and Taillieu (2004). By doing so, these two organizations could 
help build trust, access much needed resources for improving physical infrastructures 
such as weirs and dams, and promote common ‘vision’ and shared management goals in 
the longer term (c.f. Berkes, 2009). 
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IV. Formal and informal institutional mechanisms promoted to actors across scales and 
levels can resolve water allocation problems and encourage the transition to more 
sustainable water management (Proposition 7) 
Clearly JMC and WUA are formal institutions since their water policy and strategy are 
derived from government actions (Grigg, 2011). Significantly, though, their success 
depends on integrating informal institutions, such as relationships, local water norms, 
and the situated knowledge, culture and customs of muang fai in order to develop  
‘good water governance’ for Nam Bo Luang. There is evidence in Chapter 6 that JMC 
and WUA have capitalised quite effectively on these informal institutional mechanisms 
in their decisionmaking and decisiontaking, so embedding social learning and social 
networking in the resolution of water allocation problems. Notwithstanding, the 
continued ‘top-down’ water management of MTIP is retarding the transition to more 
sustainable water management. Typically, such transition needs several impetuses, 
including incentives (Vincent, 2007), leadership (Folke et al., 2005; Biggs et al., 2010), 
mobilizing extant informal networks (Folke et al., 2005), and, according to van de 
Kerkhof and Wieczorek (2005), stakeholders’ commitment, fairness, transparency and 
competence. Unquestionably, therefore, JMC and WUA need more time to begin the 
transition to process in Nam Bo Luang.    
 
These empirical findings under lenses of governance and adaptive governance 
approaches thus confirmed the status of JMC and WUA as ‘middle ground’ 
organizations, mediating water uncertainties and the legacy of the top-down approach 
that has dominated water management locally, provincially and nationally. However, 
the operation of both these organization is not by any means perfect. In the following 
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section, therefore, I review the strengths and challenges to this experiment in adaptive 
water governance in terms of its capacity to deliver sustainable water management in 
the medium to long term.  
 
7.2 Strengths and weaknesses of JMC/WUA  
Chapter 2 showed that water governance plays an important role in agricultural water 
management in developing countries, particularly in Thailand, as the normative notion 
of ‘good’ water governance in irrigation foresees the full range of water users 
participating actively in all water management activities. However, Young (2010) and 
Bakker et al. (2008) point out that governance of natural and social systems is complex, 
meaning, for example, ‘misfit’ often arises between political-administrative and 
hydrological systems, the outcome of which can be characterized as ‘governance 
failure’, increasing the occurrence of water crises. Hence, Biermann et al. (2012, p.51) 
reflection that often “the current institutional framework for sustainable development is 
deeply inadequate to bring about the swift transformatic progress that is needed” for 
water management. 
 
I have argued that, when it is appropriately implemented, adaptive governance might 
offer potential solutions to these failures in water management in developing countries, 
where political-administrative contexts are still largely state-based and relatively rigid 
and resistant to changing and/or increasingly unpredictable water management demands 
(see Chapter 6). The research findings on JMC and WUA, discussed above, suggest 
these organizations are playing a broadly positive role in linking stakeholders across 
scales and levels to influence water governance within the MTIP’s organizational 
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setting. Nonetheless, the balance sheet of these organizations presents a mixed picture, 
with much still to do if genuinely sustainable water management is to become a reality. 
I first outline JMC/ WUA strengths in water management. 
 
In Chapter 2, I noted how proponents of adaptive governance advocate so-called ‘co-
management’ of diverse sets of stakeholders, operating at different levels and 
cooperating by sharing rights, responsibilities, and power between multiple levels and 
sectors of government and civil society as essential for effective water management 
(Armitage et al., 2008; Berkes, 2009; Fabricius et al., 2007). JMC and WUA can be 
seen to substantively advance co-management in four ways, as follows. 
7.2.1 Benefits arising from JMC/WUA as ‘middle ground’ organizations 
 
I. Empowering farmers and rural communities to have legitimacy in water management  
Folke et al. (2005, p.460) state an adaptive governance approach emphasizes ‘cross-
scale and cross-level interactions’ as a means of dealing with external perturbations, 
uncertainty, and surprise. The findings in Chapter 6 identify how WUA, with its formal 
legal status, has the power to negotiate on policy issues with MTIP and with JMC 
member organizations, including budget and water allocation and management. This is 
a direct consequence of what I described in Chapter 4 as WUA’s standing as a legal 
organization, set within the institutional structure of the RID, which provides numerous 
opportunities to establish irrigation water management within ‘the project’ along PIM 
principles, as well as increasing the credibility and legitimacy of PIM among farmers.  
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Additionally, part of WUA’s legitimacy in water management comes from it bringing 
together people who already know and trust each other from their time in muang fai 
systems and/or the Mae Tang Irrigation Water Management Network. Thus in Chapter 
6, the evidence pointed to WUA helping farmers improve their water allocation and 
raising the maintenance budgets available for repairing dilapidated irrigation systems. 
These informal relationships have also helped promote WUA’s image as an 
organization that can effectively address members’ water management concerns, as one 
respondent commented that “WUA helps poor farmers to have rights to speak at the 
higher level, to let the project know that they are here” (Chapter 6, Section 6.3.1). This 
statement demonstrates the role WUA is beginning to play in articulating farmers’ 
views and opinions.   
 
For JMC, the results in Chapter 6 show how it has improved implementation and 
planning of MTIP and brokered water stakeholder disputes, through its restructuring 
powers. JMC’s holistic focus (addressing all water users – agricultural and non-
agricultural) also gives it a wider strategic role in developing more sustainable water 
management in Chiang Mai. Respondents also commented, variously, that JMC 
afforded opportunities to have “meaningful discussions” on provincial water 
management planning, water management problem solving, and information 
dissemination with other stakeholders. These aspects show how water management is 
now more transparent and accountable, and is beginning to have beneficial effects on 
decentralizing decisionmaking away from the legacy of top-down government control 
of water management.  
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II. Encouraging stakeholder interaction across scales and levels  
Gregory et al. (2011) believe that societal engagement and stakeholders participation 
are pillars of sustainable water management. Therefore, they argue that ‘middle ground’ 
approaches are needed to reconcile differences of value and norms in water 
management between top-down and bottom-up approaches. The findings from Chapter 
6 prove that WUA has the potential to encourage farmers to interact with MTIP, local 
government organizations and tourism agencies by using the JMC as a forum. From the 
evidence, I would argue this is because WUA contains elements both of water 
modernization and intergenerational water knowledge, and its mode of operation lies in 
between applying formal rules and informal procedure. As a result, it seems to have 
enhanced the interaction between actors across scales and levels to share their 
knowledge and experience over water allocation disputes. Likewise, JMC is viewed as 
legitimate and viable by non-agricultural water users. 
 
In interview, the JMC president also pointed out that JMC meetings acted as a forum to 
exchange farmers knowledge and experience from smallest scale to water management 
at the project level. At the same time, MTIP and the rest of JMC representatives attend 
these meetings to offer guidance and advice on technology and financial issues to help 
farmers as well as the forum for collective decision-making. This is because JMC is 
viewed as ‘neutral ground’, where farmers, MTIP, local government organization 
representatives and tourism agents are at the same ‘level’ and ‘position’, so helping to 
broker agreement on water politics. 
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Thus JMC/WUA represent a credible water management institution, placing it in a 
powerful position to legitimate particular local-level procedure, to broker cross-scale 
interactions, and to facilitate state legitimization of local practice, enabling cultural and 
political revitalization, capacity building and institutional building. In this way, the 
committee could act as a multi-levelled mechanism (WUA at farm level, JMC at 
provincial level) for translating sustainable water policy into management practice, 
bringing new configurations of actors into engagement, and creating new ‘opportunity 
structures’ for social learning. From an adaptive governance perspective, therefore, 
certainly together the WUA and JMC have capacity to act as ‘middle ground’ 
governance structures. 
 
III. Creating opportunities for social learning and networking about collaborative 
water management among stakeholders  
Chapter 5’s findings confirmed that different geographical scales and levels of water 
management have embedded specific knowledge and rule sets on water (Proposition 2). 
Local government and private agencies claimed little knowledge of irrigation water 
management, or, as Chapter 6 respondents commented, that they believed as “non-
professionals” they were not qualified to hold opinions on overall provincial water 
strategy (section 6.1.2).  
 
Farmers also had this impression, as among rural communities understandings of water 
are derived from less formalized tacit intergenerational knowledges, shared among all 
participants through communal management practices. This “local wisdom” isn’t in line 
with science-based knowledge which MTIP engineers have. It is exactly this dissonance 
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between different sets of water beliefs and norms that JMC will need to overcome to 
place irrigation management on a more sustainable footing, and to overcome 
misunderstandings between parties over the allocation and delivery of water, 
particularly in the dry season. 
 
Nonetheless, evidence in Chapter 6, section 6.3.1 proved that there is already some 
progress in developing social learning and networking to address problems of water 
scarcity and water allocation among JMC’s stakeholders at different scales and 
geographical positions. It could be said that this is the beginning of a process to develop 
JMC as a ‘self-organizing’ and adaptable organization, creating the appropriate 
conditions for greater cooperation and collaboration among water stakeholders.  
 
IV. Counterbalancing farming’s role in water governance relative to the state and state 
agencies 
Chapter 5 confirms that irrigation management is controlled at a higher organizational 
scale than WUG or IWUG, tending to place ‘remote’, overly formalized conditions on 
daily water management. This situation is often found in developing countries, as 
Wittfogel (1957) famously observed. Political practice and power within developing 
country contexts is intimately bound up with the workings of the state and, by inference 
and more contemporaneously, with the evolution of water governance in these 
countries.   
 
State-led water management obliges farmer groups to act in a sense as ‘rule followers’, 
rather than participants, by requiring them to follow step-by-step procedure and to try to 
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avoid disagreements with officials if they are to ensure long-term continuity of water 
supply through the growing season. Not only does this exclude farmers from 
participatory water management: it also greatly complicates the implementation of 
cross-scale management practice. Typically, IWUG respondents felt disempowered 
compared to their old ways of working, particularly from the participatory forms of 
water management typical of muang fai.  
 
Chapter 6 noted that WUA could balance water management power between MTIP, 
local and tourism agencies, and farmers by employing JMC as a forum for negotiation. 
Results in section 6.2.2 further reported that JMC meetings can provide valuable 
opportunities for collective decision-making as it is the place where farmers, MTIP and 
other JMC representatives are at the ‘same level’, lessening hierarchical relations 
between individuals and different organizational groupings. Accordingly, JMC offers 
WUA opportunities to communicate with actors at different scales which may serve to 
strengthen collaborative working relationships (Adger et al., 2003). 
 
Taken together, this suggests that JMC, with the assistance of WUA, is vital to the 
promulgation of adaptive water governance, linking both horizontally and vertically to 
structure the processes by which Chiang Mai stakeholders share power, balance 
interests, and shape individual and collective actions on water supply and distribution 
(c.f. Lebel et al., 2006; Toonen, 2011). 
 
Nonetheless, despite these four steps towards delivering more equitable and effective 
water management and water governance in the study area, JMC/WUA’s status as a 
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‘middle ground’ organization has not run completely smoothly, with obstacles found in 
Chapters 5 and 6. It is to these limitations that I now turn.           
 
In synthesizing the results from Chapters 4, 5 and 6 it is possible to identify obstacles 
blocking the development of ‘middle ground’ approaches to water governance. This is 
also in line with the analysis of the specific claims made by water stakeholders, and 
comparison of the attributes of the JMC against recent accounts of pathologies of 
difficulty and failure of adaptive water management (for example Allen and Gunderson, 
2011).  
7.2.2 Obstacles to applying ‘middle ground’ organization in water management 
 
I. Adherence to the ‘command and control’ model of water governance  
It is important to recall that JMC and WUA are part of MTIP’s policy architecture, and 
so are reliant upon its centralization of provincial decisionmaking and decisiontaking, 
and the pervasive effect of the ideology of water modernization. It could therefore be 
argued that JMC/WUA’s establishment exacerbates water management difficulties by 
introducing another administrative level into the province’s already complex system of 
water policy and administration (Chapter 4). 
 
Chapter 4 revealed the national aim of water management policies: to expand 
agricultural production with the aim of boosting national income. As a result, Thai 
agricultural water management has created multiple scales and levels of political 
activity to make irrigation activities easier to administer and to assess performance of 
responsible agencies in irrigation development from the national to local level. Indeed, 
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explicit elaboration of these distinct scales and levels of water management were an aim 
of Thai governments as part of successive National Economic and Social Development 
Plans. 
 
This is supported in Chapter 5, where data confirmed multiple scales and levels of 
administration and responsibility separating policy officials from farmer respondents. 
Thus interviewees emphasized their daily experience of ‘the project’ being too complex 
and inflexible to address their production needs. Similarly in Chapter 6, responses from 
IWUG Zone 10 and WUA members emphasised their lack of success in getting their 
members points across, with some interviewees noting that MTIP invariably had the 
final word in how water was allocated (Section 6.1.1). This hierarchical approach makes 
it difficult to resolve water disputes transparency and accountably.  
 
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that water use as well as water regulation continues 
to be largely determined by central government without popular participation. ‘The 
project’ has, in effect, absolute authority to control all form of water user organization. 
This reinforces the argument made earlier that JMC and WUA’s introduction has 
simply complicated the already tangled web of provincial water governance, as 
decisiontaking on water policy remains the responsibility of MTIP. Stakeholder 
engagement in JMC does not necessarily equate with these stakeholders being accorded 
equal weight in ongoing discussions on future water policy options, or at this stage 
include muang fai systems. From the empirical evidence, therefore, the central 
importance of the state in water management significantly affects the efficiency and 
effectiveness of water governance practice in Chiang Mai (Proposition 1). 
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II. Lack of clear direction and incentives for transitioning 
Transitioning processes to more sustainable water management require appropriate 
governance structures to deal with crisis and changing state policies on water 
management. However, there exists no template for determining how transitions should 
unfold (Herrfahrdt-Pähle, 2012) or what incentives (Dietz et al., 2003; Akamani and 
Wilson, 2011) are needed for more sustainable water management to emerge.   
 
In Chapter 6, some evidence was adduced to show that the introduction of JMC and 
WUA had enabled farmers to participate more fully in water management. However, 
there was insufficient evidence to validate Proposition 7 on these organizations’ ability 
to encourage the transition to more sustainable water management. This lack of 
evidence reflects uncertainty over the precise activities JMC and WUA need to 
undertake in order to establish new forms of collaboration and coordination, as Pahl-
Wostl et al. (2011) note that effecting transitions requires knowledge sharing and 
collective learning of actors at all scales and levels.  
 
Moreover, JMC lacks a repertoire of incentives which as Folke et al. (2005) and Olsson 
et al. (2006) comment is vital to instilling collaboration learning and raising public 
awareness. Most importantly, leadership is one of the non-economic incentives that can 
provide trust-building, vision, and meaning among actors at different geographical 
scales of water management (Bouwen and Taillieu, 2004; Folke et al., 2005; Biggs et 
al., 2010). Vincent (2007) also notes that economic incentives are necessary when rapid 
changes in human behaviour are desired. For JMC, it is still too early to judge whether 
leadership of the change processes needed to create sustainable patterns of irrigation 
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will emerge. So the decision to create JMC and WUA may be seen either as potentially 
innovative and an instance of bold leadership, or as a pragmatic act to raise farmer 
participation in a water modernization project that looks set to face increasing problems 
as water demands escalate over forthcoming years (Clark and Semmahasak, 2013).  
 
The weaknesses in JMC and WUA I have identified could be seen as impeding 
transitioning to more sustainable water management. Consequently, in the final Chapter, 
I consider how JMC/WUA’s activities might be enhanced in practical terms to facilitate 
behavioural adaptation favouring greater cooperation and collaboration.   
 
7.3 Conclusions 
Based on the informing literatures reviewed in Chapter 2, and the empirical findings of 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I conclude that in developing country contexts, such as Thailand, 
politics of scale, position and place significantly affect water management, knowledge 
and actor interactions in terms of differences of norms and beliefs in water allocation, 
and the capacity of actors to collaborate on water management. In order to mitigate 
influences of the politics of space, the study examined the need for ‘middle ground’ 
organizations (JMC and WUA) to furnish formal and informal institutional mechanisms 
for achieving good water governance, so facilitating transition to more sustainable water 
management.  
 
This Chapter has argued that, potentially, WUA and JMC have a substantial role to play 
as mechanisms of adaptive governance. First, they have the ability to confer upon non-
state actors, especially farmers, greater legitimacy in water management policymaking 
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and day to day activities. Secondly, these new organizations can encourage stakeholders 
across scales and levels to interact in order to facilitate collaborative water management. 
Thirdly, WUA/JMC offer new opportunities to encourage social learning and 
networking to disseminate innovative norms and beliefs about water management 
among stakeholders. Lastly, they can help counterbalance the ‘top-down’ legacy of state 
involvement in water policy and irrigation management. Nonetheless, undoubtedly there 
remain manifest shortcomings in JMC’s organizational structure, arising from continued 
reliance on a model of ‘command and control’ in water governance and management, 
some disunity among its constituent membership, and its lack of overall strategic 
direction.  
 
In the final Chapter, policy specific recommendations are set out for provincial and 
local authorities to improve JMC/WUA’s operation; and to make the organizational 
context of their operation more favourable. 
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CHAPTER 8: TRANSITIONING TO MORE SUSTAINABLE 
WATER MANAGEMENT IN NORTH WEST THAILAND: 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has demonstrated that implementing adaptive governance for water 
management in NW Thailand via the introduction of ‘middle ground’ organizations still 
faces major challenges, chiefly because water governance remains largely state-based 
and relatively rigid and resistant to change. As such, it confirms recent research findings 
that re-designing institutions and political frameworks to encourage more sustainable 
patterns of water management is still in its infancy (see for example Dietz et al., 2003; 
Folke et al., 2005; Carpenter and Folke, 2006). Nevertheless, empirical findings in 
Chapter 7 confirmed that JMC and WUA have begun to reshape water governance 
arrangements in the study area. With reference to the case study context, JMC/WUA, 
and the study’s two informing literatures, this Chapter sets out policy recommendations 
that might not only help this reorganization and recalibration of stakeholder 
relationships, but also balance the right to water access for actors at different scales and 
levels.  
 
In the first section of the Chapter, I propose strategies for the provincial authorities to 
enhance JMC’s capability as the pre-eminent ‘middle ground’ organization in water 
management and governance in Chiang Mai. Then policy recommendations are set out 
to support WUA’s role as a representative organization for farmers at the local scale. In 
the third section I present final reflections on the study, and its principal findings. 
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8.1 Policy recommendations at the provincial scale (Chiang Mai Province and Mae 
Tang Irrigation Project)   
My study of irrigated farming in Nam Bo Luang, Chiang Mai province demonstrates 
that water is under ever-increasing demand from a variety of users. Thus, future water 
governance arrangements need to take account of competing water demands and 
conflicting visions for water use, that is water as a consumption good and a “common-
pool resource” (Ostrom and Gardner, 1993; Ostrom, 2002; Ostrom, 2008; Delmas and 
Young, 2009; Dukhovny and Ziganshina, 2011). 
   
Building upon this, the empirical findings in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 revealed that the major 
barrier in developing an effective ‘middle ground’ approach to more sustainable water 
use is political practice and power within Thailand; as I demonstrated in Chapter 4, 
water management is intimately bound up with the workings of the state (Wittfogel, 
1957). Latterly (since 1997), the state has applied the principles of ‘good governance’ 
and PIM (Participatory Irrigation Management) to encourage more public participation 
at all levels, with the aim of achieving sustainable water management. Even though 
JMC and WUA now have officially sanctioned national backup to develop as ‘powerful 
governance spaces’ for water stakeholders, the legacy of ‘command and control’ in 
water governance and management (Chapter 7) is a major obstacle to these newly 
introduced ‘middle ground’ organizations. Consequently, I have three policy 
recommendations to assist JMC to implement good water governance at the provincial 
scale.  
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The aim here would be to delegate to JMC full authority over all water management 
activities in the way advocated by Coward (1980) (see Chapter 2) that is over water 
usage, water allocation, irrigation system maintenance, labour and resource mobilization 
and conflict management. In effect, JMC could adapt to create or change the appropriate 
conditions for greater cooperation and collaboration over water use (Imada, 2008), 
without needing to defer in decisionmaking and decisiontaking to MTIP.  
8.1.1 Develop JMC as a focus for ‘self-organization’ in provincial water management 
 
This policy change would oblige JMC to broker traditional-scientific knowledge 
conflict to facilitate change in water governance (Folke et al., 2005; Olsson et al., 
2006). As  Meijerink and Huitema (2010, p.35) comment: “A combination of bottom-up 
and top-down strategies makes most transitions happen, and their relative importance 
depends largely on the particular institutional context or opportunity structure”. This 
recommendation is based on the “actor-centered perspective”, as it focuses on the types 
of actors, their character, and their water management strategies (Haufler, 2009). In 
particular, it seeks to develop the capacity for ‘self-organization’ in water management 
provincially. 
 
For ‘self-organization’ in water management to materialise, it is crucial to apply 
monitoring and evaluation to existing water management and governance in practice. As 
Swanson et al. (2010, p.936) mention: “If there is no monitoring of policy 
implementation in comparison to intended objectives, adaptive policy mechanisms 
cannot function”. So evaluation and monitoring water management of JMC/WUA must 
be done by all stakeholders giving their feedback about the successes and problems 
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found by implementing adaptive management solutions, providing a valid empirical 
basis on which to assess whether there is a need to adapt JMC/WUA operation. Oakley 
and Clayton (2000, p.14) caution that monitoring must be an in-built project activity, 
constantly assessing whether water management activities are “going to plan”; thus 
JMC members, including president and vice-presidents, MTIP representatives, 
representatives from local government and private agencies should be encouraged to 
critically reflect upon their water allocation and management activities, as they are an 
integral part of day-to- day management (Casley and Kumar, 1987, cited in Oakley and 
Clayton, 2000, p.14). For JMC’s water management evaluation, bringing monitoring 
and evaluation together would support sound governance as critical reflection can 
provide valuable input for refining existing decisionmaking and prioritization, so 
contributing to accountability mechanisms (Schacter, 2009). Smith and Porter (2010) 
also note that these should be integrated in an adaptive water management cycle to 
improve management by learning from the outcomes of policies and practices that have 
already been implemented (Figure 8.1).      
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Figure 8.1: The adaptive water management cycle of JMC 
Source: Adapted from Murray and Marmorek (2004) 
 
Moreover, under the adaptive governance approach, promoting JMC’s capacity for 
‘self-organization’ can, according to Folke et al. (2005), help identify common water 
beliefs and norms and the dynamics of water resources and ecosystems, translate water 
knowledge into specific management practices, and support the emergence of cross-
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level and cross-scale interactions to deal with external perturbations and uncertainty 
over water management.  
 
Lastly, promoting JMC as a form of ‘self-organization’ could drive forward transitions 
in water governance as it could bring together water users  from the local to provincial 
scales to actively participate in the whole range of water management activities. So, 
stakeholders at all levels develop their competency by learning from open discussion (as 
evidenced in Chapter 6, JMC respondents commented that, currently, meetings lack 
consideration of alternatives to water modernization; and that their strong feeling was, 
as “non-professionals”, they were not qualified to hold opinions on overall provincial 
water strategy). This could also provide opportunities for actors to make concrete 
commitments to invest time and effort in the transition process, with the JMC providing 
transparency and accountability in these discussions.  
 
This recommendation, then, seeks to make water management policy decisions more 
inclusive and relevant to stakeholders, while facilitating the level of communication 
among actors. To make this possible, there is a need from MTIP to improve its 
organizational roles as a water information provider and to enhance JMC’s existing role. 
Other changes to MTIP are, I think, also needed, which I identify next.  
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This recommendation is I think not only vital for supporting JMC as a focus for self-
organization in provincial water policy among stakeholders, but also in developing 
competency of participants to deliberate about different aspects of the transition process, 
and to make informed choices with regard to both the nature of the water management 
problems, and the possible solutions to these problems. Evidence in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 
shows some benefits arising from the existing hierarchical pattern in irrigation 
management in the study area. Significantly, stakeholders, especially farmers, still need 
MTIP’s resources to support their water usage and solve water management problems.   
8.1.2 Recast MTIP’s role to facilitate JMC’s activities  
 
To increase JMC’s capacity as a focus for ‘self-organization’ in water management and 
governance, as set out above, MTIP must position itself as an effective supporter of this 
organization. This includes consolidating its role as ‘water expert’ in providing data on 
water availability, appropriate technology that support irrigation systems maintenance 
with its abilities of having knowledgeable officials, and providing an operational 
budget. MTIP’s advice in facilitating JMC’s decisionmaking in water delivery planning 
would be equally important. Fitzpatrick (2011, p.162) calls this important role 
“information disclosure”, noting that it improves the flow and transparency of 
communication between state and non-state actors. Indeed, it should be a new 
organizational requirement for MTIP officials to promote the necessary cooperative 
behaviour that is critical for ‘self-organization’ of JMC to emerge (Dietz et al., 2003; 
Akamani and Wilson, 2011). This new mandate for MTIP will need to be assessed and 
verified by JMC members. At the same time, information on water availability should 
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be delivered on a daily basis to stakeholders through telephoning, websites, or face-to-
face meetings.    
 
Given implementation of this recommendation, there should be a corresponding new 
responsibility for JMC and its committees to identify ‘good governance’ of irrigation 
systems provincially and locally, and, crucially, to set up a clear direction for transition 
to more sustainable water management in Chiang Mai.  
 
Although Chapter 6 offered evidence of JMC offering some opportunities for state and 
non-state actors to engage in social learning and networking, this is still in its infancy 
and it is not enough to effect more sustainable water management in Chiang Mai. It is 
therefore important to see cross-scale and cross-level interactions as dynamically 
embedded in the contexts where they take place (Ransom, 2010) and to seek to instill 
more collective learning and social networking within the study area. 
8.1.3 Develop a civil society forum to enhance participatory learning and tighten social 
networking on water management 
 
Hence, the aim of this recommendation is to set up for JMC members a dedicated public 
space to enhance the quality of actor interactions across scales and levels, as it is an 
essential ingredient of social learning. Establishing a bespoke public meeting place 
would create conditions where stakeholders can become better informed about the 
possible beneficial effects of more sustainable water management, and how 
sustainability can benefit to their own interests (Mostert et al., 2007; Pahl-Wostl et al., 
2007). Public meeting would bring together science and local knowledge, offering an 
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opportunity for stakeholders across-scales and levels to discuss, recognise and 
understand water management issues and make suggestions to adjust water allocation 
plans. Results of these meetings would be compiled and synthesized as a basis for being 
put into a more formal regulatory form by MTIP. Local knowledge could then be 
validated through formal water management and governance. Then, the formal water 
management regulations could be further adjusted and developed according to the result 
of day-to-day practice.   
 
Actor interactions in the forum would also help strengthen and deepen network 
relationships between JMC members and farmers. Such interactions would support the 
group to review its addressed problems, and hence the aims of its water management 
practices as well as the methods (Bodin et al., 2011).  
 
Improving the quality of actor interactions in this way via public support is considered 
central to enable transitions toward sustainable water management (Gunderson and 
Light, 2006). This is because all significant perceptions of the problem would be heard 
and acknowledged to ensure the problem is fully understood and shared, so public 
debate would progress from current problems to scenarios that meet the collective 
values of rural communities (Smith and Porter, 2010). Moreover, by enhancing actor 
interactions through public participation, it becomes more likely that members with 
leadership potential emerge who can recognise or create ‘windows of opportunity’ to 
shape existing patterns of water use, encourage novelty, and make sense of emerging 
events for others (Olsson et al., 2006; Rijke et al., 2012).  
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These three provincial-scale policy recommendations would, I think, improve JMC’s 
operation, and instill the conditions for a decisive shift away from the ‘command and 
control’ mode of water management associated with MTIP, by embedding local needs 
within its water management frameworks and allowing devolution of water allocation 
and delivery to lower levels of organization (Gregory et al., 2011).  However, there is a 
need to improve the condition locally, too, so they connect more effectively with 
provincial. The following section tackles this issue.   
 
8.2 Policy recommendations at the local scale (Nam Bo Luang, San Pa Tong 
District)  
Local water management is critically important, particularly for farmers. Evidence from 
Chapters 6 and 7 reveals that WUA has become the “farmers’ representative” and, with 
its legal status, it has a formal mandate to negotiate on policy issues with MTIP and 
JMC’s member organizations.  
 
Policy recommendations at the local scale I would like to propose, then, focus on 
improving WUA’s capacity to enhance transition to more sustainable water 
management. The results of policy implementation are also expected to assist JMC’s 
operation at the provincial level to achieve effective governance in water management.  
 
As discussed above, promoting adaptive management of water in Chiang Mai needs 
more knowledge integration and actor interactions in future. As most actors are reliant 
8.2.1 Strengthen cooperation between farmers, local government agencies and 
community leaders in order to enhance social learning and networking  
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on their informal relationships and networks, these provide a potent means for 
improving unity among water users if they can be tapped.  
 
Therefore, I suggest building cooperation between farmers and other local actors by 
promoting regular informal meetings, such as setting a local public space or a public 
forum, which focuses on irrigation water use issues with WUA and relevant local 
governmental organizations acting as facilitators for these meetings. Such meetings 
would enhance interactions among local stakeholders, so increasing their commitment 
to invest time and effort in the transition process, to actively contribute to collaborative 
discussion, and to learn from each other. van de Kerkhof and Wieczorek (2005) note 
that participants in transitions must have sufficient opportunities for learning, or by 
giving them sufficient opportunity and freedom to initiate transition experiments.  
 
In this way, social networks can be used as a basis for discussion, enabling detailed 
consideration among participants of sustainability ‘visions’ for water use, and how to 
establish and organize local transitions. Such visions are considered essential to 
identifying a workable transition agenda, and deriving necessary transition pathways 
(van de Kerkhof and Wieczorek, 2005). Shared norms and beliefs would facilitate 
information flows, and help identify knowledge gaps. So, it offers an anchorage for 
participants that is ‘out of the fray’ of regulation and implementation, where formal 
networks and many planning processes often fail (Folke et al., 2005).    
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This new public forum might offer an opportunity to reconnect muang fai water users in 
the development of mutuality in water management after it was separated by MTIP’s 
introduction of the water modernization paradigm. 
  
Strengthening deliberation between local water users, local government organizations 
and community leaders could lead to better organized and more coordinated transition 
processes at the territorial and societal levels, so helping to steer water management in a 
sustainable direction.  
 
Once social learning and networking among actors is embedded locally, water 
management data (including water usage, water allocation, irrigation system 
maintenance, labour and resource mobilization, and conflict management) of JMC 
should be reviewed. I recommend local actors should take part in this evaluation of 
JMC’s activities.  
8.2.2 Empower water user groups to participate in evaluating JMC’s actions 
 
Any adaptive management process requires evaluation (Douverse and Ehler, 2011). In 
particular, evaluation is needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of adaptive 
management through evidence of results. Such evaluation should be a periodic 
assessment and, importantly, requires information from outside the evaluated project 
(Oakely and Clayton, 2000). The results of evaluation would serve several purposes, 
including enabling more transparent linkages between management objectives and 
management actions, identifying gaps that may be consequently rectified, providing for 
more informed decisionmaking and improvements in water allocation planning and 
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field management for decision makes, and promoting openness and accountability (Day, 
2008). 
 
Key indicators with which to evaluate formal water management regulations include 
water usage, water allocation, level of irrigation systems maintenance, labour and 
resource mobility, and the degree of water conflict management. Within farmer groups, 
respondents could report through their heads of WUGs and IWUGs after each water 
allocation plans are announced, as well as to the WUA president. WUA could then 
submit feedback to be discussed in a JMC meeting.  
 
For the evaluation, I would suggest dividing into three periods according to water 
availability and cropping seasons. The evaluation results could help adapt current water 
governance arrangements to resolve water disputes.   
 
The results of evaluation should systematically recorded and collected in order to assist 
managers at the provincial scale. Hence, developing a local water management database 
is critically important and this, then, is my final policy recommendation at the local 
scale.         
 
The water management database I recommend developing would be a simple process, 
but very helpful in assisting farmers to have empirical evidence to inform WUA and 
JMC’s solutions to water management problems and dilemmas. To create the data, 
leaders of the water user groups would take responsibility to acts as data recorders, 
8.2.3 Establish local water management database   
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collating information from local meetings (daily, weekly, monthly, and annually). The 
minutes of these meetings would be retained in an easy-to-use form so that they can be 
immediately retrieved and used.  
 
As such when JMC needs any supporting evidence from farmers to monitor its 
organizational operations, the up-to-date information can be applied to improve 
coherence between policies. Such information would enhance ‘joined-up’ 
decisionmaking by institutions at different scales within Thailand’s complex public 
administrative system.  Thus, the information can help the provincial water management 
policy be more inclusive and relevant to stakeholders. At the same time, equity between 
and among the various interest groups and stakeholders is more easily monitored 
throughout the process of policy development and implementation (Rogers and Hall, 
2003) by applying these supporting database.   
 
My intention with the provincial and local policy recommendations I have outlined here 
is to improve the overall organizational context within which JMC and WUA operate, 
with the aim of achieving a more rapid transition to more sustainable water management 
in Nam Bo Luang, Chiang Mai. Improving JMC/WUA’s operation is, I believe, the only 
substantive means to facilitate cross-scale and cross-level interactions water 
management, to offset the traditional state focus upon command and control. 
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8.3 Final reflections on the study and its principal findings  
This final section reflects on the overall aims and objectives of the thesis, in light of the 
empirical findings from the preceding seven Chapters. I begin answering the first 
research objective below. 
 
8.3.1 Current interactions in the study area between water user groups and communities  
I demonstrated in Chapter 4 how the Thai state developed an effective national and 
provincial form of management and governance for the water sector, but that this had 
been very much at the expense of popular participation. Results in Chapter 5 
substantiated that actor interactions in the study area were shaped by a resulting politics 
of scale. 
at the local scale with relevant actors (state and private organizations) at other scales 
 
The multiple scales and levels of irrigation management introduced by the Thai state 
have sought to make irrigation easier to administer nationally and to assess performance 
of responsible agencies in irrigation development from the national to local scale. This 
has been predicated on the state-sponsored system claim that centrally coordinated 
water policy can ensure a secure water supply and fair allocation.  
 
Consequently, the Thai state’s construction of scale has tended to delimit actors to 
specific territories, with ‘water management’ defined in terms of actors’ roles in water 
management tied to particular scales. Therefore there are significant opportunities for 
actors to cooperate or collaborate through new cross-level and cross-scale interactions. 
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Such interactions can significantly affect the efficiency and effectiveness of water 
policy nationally.   
 
Furthermore, geographical scale not only defines relationships between the state and 
water stakeholders, and between water stakeholders and other water users; it also 
defines administrative areas, hydrological units, and particular norms and beliefs of 
water governance, as Cash et al. (2006) identify. I concluded that, under the existing 
arrangements, local water politics largely prevent solutions emerging to water allocation 
and delivery issues and influence in collaborative governance, became of their 
conflicting nature.     
 
Building on the preceding analysis, in Chapters 6 and 7 my empirical findings 
demonstrated the potential role of the ‘middle ground’ organizations in restructuring 
water management among and between actors, such as between MTIP, farmers and 
other stakeholders in Chiang Mai, based on adaptive governance approach analysis. 
8.3.2 Mechanisms to facilitate collaboration, resolve coordination problems and 
reinforce trust among local actors that are sensitive to their socio-economic needs 
 
The crucial ‘middle ground’ organizations I identified through my fieldwork was the 
Joint Management Committee for irrigation (JMC), and its supporting structure, the 
Water User Association (WUA). Both have been established by central government 
according to the National Policy of ‘good governance’ and Participatory Irrigation 
Management (PIM) in irrigation water management. Findings in Chapters 6 and 7 
confirmed that JMC (the provincial organization) and WUA (the local organization) can 
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facilitate collaboration, resolve coordination problems and reinforce trust among local 
actors. They have done so, first, by empowering local and provincial stakeholders in 
water management decisionmaking. In particular, WUA offers a new representative 
structure for farmers, set within the institutional structure of the Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID), thus providing new opportunities for local agricultural communities 
to participate in irrigation water management within the MTIP according to the newly 
ratified PIM principles. Thus WUA approximates to a self-organizing body for farmers, 
with the potential to change existing patterns of water management through 
demonstrating new possibilities for collaboration and cooperation among stakeholders.  
 
Secondly, a “middle ground organization” is very much essential to trigger interaction 
of actors across scales and levels to improve prospects for sustainable water 
management. JMC is a forum that allows agricultural interests to interact with MTIP, 
local government organizations and other water stakeholders. Thus, taken together, 
JMC/WUA represents a credible hybrid water management institution, placing it in a 
powerful position to legitimate particular local-level procedure, to broker cross-scale 
interactions, and to facilitate state legitimization of local practice, potentially enabling 
cultural and political revitalization, capacity-building and institutional building. 
 
Lastly, WUA and JMC can promote collaborative water management within the study 
area by offering opportunities for state and non-state actors to engage in social learning 
and social networking. Results from testing Proposition 6 confirmed that JMC’ s non-
agricultural stakeholders and WUA’s representation of farming interests do now appear 
to enable grassroots concerns to be fed through to MTIP through JMC’s committee 
235 
 
structure. The evidence demonstrated that water rotation plans are now being changed 
to address the supply and allocation problems faced by farmers at the end of canal 
laterals, with increased funds being allocated for canal maintenance and dredging. 
Increasingly, JMC meetings are bringing together representatives from local 
governmental organizations, local authorities and tourism interests, and community 
leaders with farmers to settle agreed water use regulations and use water according to 
the agreed water rotation plans. 
 
Chapters 4 and 5 identified the importance of politics of space in water management and 
governance in practice in the study area, and the continuing hegemony of a command 
and control approach to water policy. This results not only in constraining actor 
interactions across scales and levels, but also obstructs the emergence of more 
collaborative water management in the study area. 
8.3.3 Recommendations to encourage the transition to more sustainable water 
management in the study area 
 
Consequently I advocated enhancing the putative ‘middle ground’ governance approach 
of JMC and WUA, as this hybrid organization has, as I demonstrated in Chapter 7, 
several benefits when applied at the provincial and local scales. Specifically, it offers 
the opportunity to bring state and non-state actors to work together without hierarchical 
considerations in order to mitigate the manifest complexity and inflexibility of existing 
water management and governance practices.  
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To do so, I proceeded to identify two obstructions limiting JMC/WUA’s capacity to 
encourage transitioning to more sustainable water management: (1) sticking with the 
model of command and control, and (2) the transitioning process lacks clear direction 
and incentives. I therefore devised policy specific recommendations for provincial and 
local authorities to improve JMC/WUA’s operation, with the aim of developing their 
organizational functions and powers at local and provincial scales to counterbalance 
MTIP’s hierarchical approach to water management. I also noted that there is a need to 
develop a civil society forum to enhance participatory learning and to provide a focus 
for network activities, as it is important to involve local communities directly in policy 
and to ensure policy makers keep informed about local water management problems. In 
this way, water management resolutions can be matched with the needs of stakeholders.      
 
At local scale, first, I suggest strengthening cooperation between farmers, local 
government agencies and community leaders in order to enhance social learning and 
networking between these actors. Once this process has gained momentum, actors at 
local scales could begin to act as evaluators, assessing JMC/WUA’s water management 
and governance operations. Secondly, the information received from the group 
discussions foreseen here should be recorded and collated as a local water management 
database by local governmental organizations, enabling the establishment of a 
systematic database on water management issues in Chiang Mai.    
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 1: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR JMC  
 
Part 1: Organization details 
[1] Name of organization __________________________________________________ 
[2] Address_____________________________________________________________ 
[3] What is your organization role in general? _________________________________ 
 
Part 2: Water allocation from the Mae Tang Irrigation Project 
[4] Do you know how the project is managed including its rules and regulation for water 
use?   (  ) 1. Yes  (  ) 2. No (please give reasons)______________________ 
[5] Please indicate what are your purposes of using water from the project?__________ 
[6] Please clarify how you receive water from the project_________________________ 
[7] How often do you receive water from the Mae Taeng Irrigation Project? 
 (  ) 1. Daily   (  ) 2. Weekly        (  ) 3. Monthly (  ) 4. Other (please specify) 
[8] Have project managers asked you how much water you need? (  ) 1. Yes     (  ) 2. No  
[9] Did you receive enough water from the Mae Taeng Irrigation Project to use? 
  (  ) 1. Yes   (  ) 2. No 
[10] If you answer “YES” in [9], how much water do you often receive from the 
project?_________________m3/ day/ week/ month/ season/year. 
[11] If you answer “NO” in [9], please explain_________________________________ 
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Part 3: Water governance of the Mae Tang Irrigation Project 
[12] How often do project managers contact you about water management and/or the 
state of repair of irrigation structures? 
Section 1 Governance Style 
(  ) 1. Every day  (  ) 2. Once a week    (  ) 3. Once a month
 (  ) 4. Once a year  (  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________ 
[13] In your opinion, are project managers clear in explaining water allocation 
decisions? If not, why not? ________________________________________________ 
[14] Has the project’s system of water management helped you? If so how/ in what 
ways __________________________________________________________________ 
 
Please answer the following questions about water management problems  
Questions 
(1) 
Wet 
Season 
(2) 
Dry 
Season 
[15] Which season for you is the most problematic for 
obtaining water? 
  
What kind of problems do you regularly encounter? 
[16] Water shortage  
  
[17] Flood    
[18] Sedimentation    
[19] Inadequate weir maintenance     
[20] Theft of water   
[21] Water pollution   
[22] Water allocation disputes with other members   
[23] Water allocation disputes between members and other 
organizations in the same irrigated area  
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Questions 
(1) 
Wet 
Season 
(2) 
Dry 
Season 
[24] Water allocation disputes between members and other 
organizations in different areas 
  
[25] Water disputes with project management    
[26] Delays in resolving water management disputes   
[27] Other (please specify)___________________________   
 
[28] On average, how often do these problems occur in the wet season?  
(  ) 1. Every day  (  ) 2. Every week    (  ) 3. Every month 
(  ) 4. Every year  (  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________ 
[29] On average, how often do these problems occur in the dry season?  
(  ) 1. Every day  (  ) 2. Every week    (  ) 3. Every month 
(  ) 4. Every year  (  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________ 
 
Please rate the degree of decentralization in decision-making on the themes 
indicated in the table. 
List of activities 
Degree of decentralize in decision-making 
(1) 
NONE 
(2) 
LITTLE 
(3) 
MODERATE 
(4) 
SIGNIFICANT 
(5) 
ALL 
[30] Water allocation      
[31] Water management 
planning 
     
[32] Water dispute 
resolution 
     
[33]Maintaining water 
infrastructure 
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[34] In which of these activities does the project encourage your active participation? 
Section 2 Membership participation 
 (   ) 1. Ditch maintenance            (   ) 2. Water management planning 
 (   ) 3. Decision-taking on water allocation  (   ) 4. Information dissemination 
 (   ) 5. Water management problem solving (   ) 6. Other (please specify)______ 
[35] How often do you participate in these management activities? 
 (  ) 1. Every day  (  ) 2. Once a week    (  ) 3. Once a month 
(  ) 4. Once a year  (  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________ 
 
[36] How do you access information on water management from the project? 
Section 3 Information dissemination 
 (  ) 1. By speaking directly   
(  ) 2. By uploading from the project website 
 (  ) 3. Through an official letter or other publication   
(  ) 4. Other (please specify) _____________________ 
[37] How do project managers let you know about your water quota/ available water 
volume? 
(   ) 1. By telephoning  (   ) 2. By speaking directly 
 (   ) 3. Other (please specify)_________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
241 
 
Please answer questions about the project’s information management as follows 
Questions (1) 
Yes 
(2) 
No 
[38] Has the project facilitated your access to information on water 
management? 
  
[39] Has the project promoted the sharing of water information 
among members?  
  
[40] Has the project helped you to develop new sources of 
information on water availability?  
  
 
Part 4: Social learning and networking 
[41] If you have experienced water shortages, please describe how the project sought to 
solve it? 
 (  ) 1. Managing available water more efficiently 
 (  ) 2. Asking for more water from the project 
 (  ) 3. Negotiated more water from other agencies 
 (  ) 4. Negotiation for water from water user groups 
 (  ) 5. Use pumped water from the canal     
    (  ) 6. Others (please specify)_________________________________________ 
[42] Apart from the JMC members, do you have experience of managing water 
problems with any of the following groups? 
 (  ) 1. None    (  ) 2. Farmers 
(  ) 3. Water user groups  (  ) 4. NGOs  
(  ) 5. Scholars               (  ) 6. Other agencies (please specify)____ 
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[43] How did you resolve your differences? 
(  ) 1. Group discussion  (  ) 2. Group meeting 
 (  ) 3. Learning-by-doing  (  ) 4. Other (please specify)____________ 
[44] How often did you meet together? 
  (  ) 1. One a week   (  ) 2. Once a month  
(  ) 3. Once a year   (  ) 4. Once a cropping season 
(  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________________________________ 
[45] Please indicate the relative importance of the following stakeholders to your own 
water management needs.  
_____(  ) 1. The water user groups in the project  
_____(  ) 2. WUA  
_____(  ) 3. The project 
_____(  ) 4. SAOs 
_____(  ) 5. NGOs 
_____(  ) 6. Scholars 
_____(  ) 7. Other agencies (please specify)_____________________________ 
 
Part 5: Sociospatial relations 
[46] Are you aware of the water allocation needs of other agencies?  
(  ) 1. Yes   (  ) 2. No 
[47] If you answered “YES” in [46], please specify name of the agencies and their 
location 
 1_______________________________________________________________
 2_______________________________________________________________ 
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[48] Have you ever been in conflict with these agencies for water? 
 (  ) 1. Yes   (  ) 2. No 
[49] If you answered “YES” in [48], please explain when this dispute arose? ________ 
[50] How were the problems resolved? _______________________________________ 
[51] Were these resolved satisfactory from your point of view? 
 (  ) 1. Yes   (  ) 2. No 
[52] What are your preferred solutions for water management? ____________________ 
 
Part 6: The role in water management as a member of JMC 
[53] What are your roles as a member of JMC (can be more than one answer, and 
please priorities)  
____(   ) 1. Ditch maintenance 
 ____(   ) 2. Water management planning 
 ____(   ) 3. Decision-making on water allocation 
 ____(   ) 4. Information dissemination/awareness-raising 
 ____(   ) 5. Water management dispute resolution 
 ____(   ) 6. Other (please specify)_____________________________________ 
[54] How often do the JMC meetings occur? 
 (  ) 1. Once a week   (  ) 2. Once a month  
(  ) 3. Once a year   (  ) 4. Once a cropping season 
(  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________________________________ 
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[55] How often do you attend JMC meetings? 
 (  ) 1. One a week   (  ) 2. Once a month  
(  ) 3. Once a year   (  ) 4. Once a cropping season 
(  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________________________________ 
[56] What are the aims of JMC meeting? (Can be more than one answer, and please 
prioritise)  
____(   ) 1. Ditch maintenance 
 ____(   ) 2. Water management planning 
 ____(   ) 3. Decision-making on water allocation 
 ____(   ) 4. Water management dispute resolution (please specify) 
   (  ) 1. Water shortage     
(  ) 2. Flood  
   (  ) 3. Sedimentation  
   (  ) 4. Theft of water  
   (  ) 5. Water pollution    
(  ) 6. Conflicts in water use among members 
(  ) 7. Other (please specify)______________________________ 
[57] In allocating water and managing water allocation, please indicate the most 
important of the following  
  (  ) 1. Water quantity     
(  ) 2. Water needs farmers or for agriculture  
(  ) 3. Water needs of other agencies 
(  ) 4. Other (please specify)____________________________________ 
245 
 
[58] How do you communicate your decision-making to other water user groups? (can 
be more than one answer) 
(  ) 1. Telephoning 
 (  ) 2. Speaking directly 
 (  ) 3. Uploading on to the project website  
(  ) 4. Posting on the project’s discussion forum  
(  ) 5. Other (please specify)__________________________________________ 
[59] In your opinion, do you think JMC has an important role in water management or 
not?  (  ) 1. Yes  (  ) 2. No (please specify why)______________________ 
[60] In your opinion, do you think JMC has succeeded in providing effective water 
management or not? 
 (  ) 1. Yes  (  ) 2. No (please specify why)______________________ 
[61] What are the major factors that might obstruct the success of JMC?_____________ 
 
Part 7: Suggestions 
[62] Suggestions for improving MTIP’s governance of water management___________ 
[63] Suggestions for improving the JMC’s governance of water management_________ 
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APPENDIX 2: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MTIP OFFICIALS 
 
[1] Please clarify how you deliver water to farmers in wet season and dry season. 
[2] In your opinion, is the project transparent regarding water allocation decision? If 
not, why not? 
[3]. What are the water management problems? 
[4] Has water management of the project helped farmers? If so how/ in what ways. 
[5] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the farmers. 
[6] Please rate the degree of decentralization in decision-making on water allocation, 
water allocation planning, water problems solving, and maintaining water structure. 
[7]. What are your responsibilities as a project official? 
[8] Which activities does the project encourage farmers participation? 
[9] Has the project allowed farmers to access its water information? 
[10] Has the project clearly shared water information? 
[11] How frequently do water management disputes arise? What kind of disputes have 
you experienced? 
[12] Do you know WUA, JMC, SAOs and their role in water management? Please 
clarify. 
[13] Are there any other organizations outside the group, help the project solve water 
disputes? 
[14] Which organizations help you most in solving water disputes? 
[15] Suggestions for improving water governance 
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APPENDIX 3: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR FARMERS FROM 
IWUG ZONE 10, MRRW AND KMTW 
 
[1] Type of crops grown.  
[2] How many km2 is it possible to irrigate? 
[3] Please clarify how you receive water from the project in wet season and dry season. 
[4] In your opinion, is the project transparent regarding water allocation decision? If 
not, why not? 
[5] What are the water management problems? 
[6] Has water management of the project helped you? If so how/ in what ways. 
[7] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the project. 
[8] Please rate the degree of decentralization in decision-making on water allocation, 
water allocation planning, water problems solving, and maintaining water structure. 
[9] What are your responsibilities as a water user member of the project? 
[10] Which activities does the project encourage you participation? 
[11] Has the project allowed you to access its water information? 
[12] Has the project clearly shared water information?  
[13] Please specify how your leader and committee allocate water to you. 
[14] In your opinion, are your leader and committee transparent in the ways in which 
they have allocated water to you? 
[15] How frequently do water management disputes arise? What kind of disputes have 
you experienced? 
[16] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the group.  
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[17] Do you know WUA, JMC, SAOs and their role in water management? Please 
clarify. 
[18] Are there any other organizations outside the group, help you solve water disputes? 
[19] Which organizations help you most in solving water disputes? 
[20] Suggestions for improving water governance.  
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APPENDIX 4: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR IWUG ZONE 10 
AND WUA ADMINISTRATORS 
 
[1] How long have you been the administrator of the group?  
[2] Please let me know the organization history. 
[3] Please clarify how you receive water from the project in wet season and dry season. 
[4] Has water management of the project helped you? If so how/ in what ways. 
[5] In your opinion, is the project transparent regarding water allocation decision? If 
not, why not? 
[6] How you allocate the water to your members? 
[7] What are the water management problems? 
[8] How frequently do water management disputes arise? What kind of disputes have 
you experienced? 
[9] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the group.  
[10] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the project. 
[11] Please rate the degree of decentralization in decision-making on water allocation, 
water allocation planning, water problems solving, and maintaining water structure. 
[12] What are your responsibilities as an administrator group? 
[13] Which activities does the project encourage you participation? 
[14] Has the project allowed you to access its water information? 
[15] Has the project clearly shared water information? 
[16] Do you know JMC and SAOs and their role in water management? Please clarify. 
[17] Are there any other organizations outside the group, help you solve water disputes? 
[18] Which organizations help you most in solving water disputes? 
[19] Suggestions for improving water governance.  
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APPENDIX 5: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR MUANG FAI 
ADMINISTRATORS  
 
[1] How long have you been the administrator of the group?  
[2] Please let me know the organization history. 
[3] Please clarify how you receive water from Mae Khan River in wet season and dry 
season. 
[4] In your opinion, has you receive enough from this water source.  
[5] How you allocate the water to your members? 
[6] What are the water management problems? 
[7] How frequently do water management disputes arise? What kind of disputes have 
you experienced? 
[8] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the group.  
[9] What are your responsibilities as an administrator group? 
[10] Which activities do you encourage your members participation? 
[11] Have you allowed your members to access your water information? 
[12] Have you ever received any contact from Mae Tang Irrigation Project and its water 
user groups?  
[13] Are there any other organizations outside the group, help you solve water disputes? 
[14] Suggestions for improving water governance. 
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APPENDIX 6: IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS FOR JMC 
ADMINISTRATORS 
 
[1] How long have you been the administrator of the group?  
[2] Please let me know the organization history. 
[3] Please clarify how you receive water from the project in wet season and dry season. 
[4] Has water management of the project helped you? If so how/ in what ways. 
[5] In your opinion, is the project transparent regarding water allocation decision? If 
not, why not? 
[6] How you allocate the water to your members? 
[7] What are the water management problems? 
[8] How frequently do water management disputes arise? What kind of disputes have 
you experienced? 
[9] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the group.  
[10] Please clarify the water dispute resolution process of the project. 
[11] Please rate the degree of decentralization in decision-making on water allocation, 
water allocation planning, water problems solving, and maintaining water structure. 
[12] What are your responsibilities as an administrator group? 
[13] Which activities do you encourage your member to participate? 
[14] Has the project allowed you to access its water information? 
[15] Has the project clearly shared water information? 
[16] Are there any other organizations outside the group, help you solve water disputes? 
[17] Which organizations help you most in solving water disputes? 
[18] Suggestions for improving water governance.  
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APPENDIX 7: GROUP DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR ADMINISTRATORS 
FROM IWUG ZONE 10, WUA, JMC AND MTIP 
        
Themes for discussion 
 [1] How might the efficiency and sustainability of water governance be improved 
through group activities? 
[2] How can the group maintain and build its networks in water management? 
[3] In the group’s opinion what are the main difficulties arising from the Mae Tang 
Irrigation Project? 
[4] What factors might promote a flexible and suitable water governance regime locally 
scale, i.e. in ways sensitive to local socio-economic and environmental characteristics, 
based on principles of multiple- stakeholder involvement? 
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